16.6 Discussion
357
water availability per capita resulted in a lower reform percentage of total administrative regions (including prefectural and county levels) which implemented
integrated urban and rural water affairs management in total provincial administrative regions. At the same time, regions with lower runoff depths had a higher
reform ratio. This may be because the availability of water resources is a factor
impacting reform. Then, considering the geography and climate, it could be investigated that more reforms were conducted in northern China than in the south; and
in western China than in the east. An interesting fact is that the 400-mm runoff
depth contour line is a rational boundary reflecting the reform. In China, the 400mm runoff depth line is almost the boundary between the Yangtze River and the
Huai River, Yellow River, and the boundary between the humid and semi-humid
zones.
• The institutional evolution could be correlated to the occurrences of natural
phenomena, such as drought. When selected water resource circumstances in
2002 are compared to reform in 2004, it is seen that water crisis promotes reform.
The reduction in water resources could worsen water resource problems and attract
more concern over water issues, and it might facilitate reform related to water.
The identical case is Beijing, as discussed, suffering from continuous droughts.
• Although reform is thought to be triggered by the urbanization process, urban
water use did not support reform. A higher ratio of urban water usage (the sum of
industrial and urban domestic water usage) to rural water usage (the sum of agricultural and rural domestic water usage) was linked to a lower reform percentage.
It is the same with wastewater discharge: a higher ratio of wastewater discharge to
total water usage is associated with a lower reform percentage. To link these findings to management institutions, a higher urbanization rate and higher wastewater
discharge ratio could have a more powerful urban management sector and agency
which resist the water sector and department.
• In terms of socio-economic factors, reform could be driven by interests, such as
investments in the water sector and from the central government. Analyzing 2002
investment against 2004 reform reveals that water investment as a percentage
of regional total fixed investment, representing the influence of the local water
resources department in the government, is not a factor impacting reform; and it
is interesting that the negative relationship between water investment and reform
was investigated. The willingness to reform is not stronger in regions with high
water investment than in regions with less investment. Regions with more water
investment have a lower percentage of central water investment and are generally
located in developed regions. But central government investment is a driving
factor: regions with a high percentage of central water investment had higher
reform percentages. This is consistent with the reform facilitator: the MWR.
By contrast, more urban water investment results in a lower reform possibility;
a higher urbanization rate was also associated with a lower reform ratio. This
indicates reform is hindered by the urban sector indirectly.
357
water availability per capita resulted in a lower reform percentage of total administrative regions (including prefectural and county levels) which implemented
integrated urban and rural water affairs management in total provincial administrative regions. At the same time, regions with lower runoff depths had a higher
reform ratio. This may be because the availability of water resources is a factor
impacting reform. Then, considering the geography and climate, it could be investigated that more reforms were conducted in northern China than in the south; and
in western China than in the east. An interesting fact is that the 400-mm runoff
depth contour line is a rational boundary reflecting the reform. In China, the 400mm runoff depth line is almost the boundary between the Yangtze River and the
Huai River, Yellow River, and the boundary between the humid and semi-humid
zones.
• The institutional evolution could be correlated to the occurrences of natural
phenomena, such as drought. When selected water resource circumstances in
2002 are compared to reform in 2004, it is seen that water crisis promotes reform.
The reduction in water resources could worsen water resource problems and attract
more concern over water issues, and it might facilitate reform related to water.
The identical case is Beijing, as discussed, suffering from continuous droughts.
• Although reform is thought to be triggered by the urbanization process, urban
water use did not support reform. A higher ratio of urban water usage (the sum of
industrial and urban domestic water usage) to rural water usage (the sum of agricultural and rural domestic water usage) was linked to a lower reform percentage.
It is the same with wastewater discharge: a higher ratio of wastewater discharge to
total water usage is associated with a lower reform percentage. To link these findings to management institutions, a higher urbanization rate and higher wastewater
discharge ratio could have a more powerful urban management sector and agency
which resist the water sector and department.
• In terms of socio-economic factors, reform could be driven by interests, such as
investments in the water sector and from the central government. Analyzing 2002
investment against 2004 reform reveals that water investment as a percentage
of regional total fixed investment, representing the influence of the local water
resources department in the government, is not a factor impacting reform; and it
is interesting that the negative relationship between water investment and reform
was investigated. The willingness to reform is not stronger in regions with high
water investment than in regions with less investment. Regions with more water
investment have a lower percentage of central water investment and are generally
located in developed regions. But central government investment is a driving
factor: regions with a high percentage of central water investment had higher
reform percentages. This is consistent with the reform facilitator: the MWR.
By contrast, more urban water investment results in a lower reform possibility;
a higher urbanization rate was also associated with a lower reform ratio. This
indicates reform is hindered by the urban sector indirectly.