27. See Regional Overview for the Middle East and North Africa and the Regional Overview for the Commonwealth of
Independent States.
28. Goldsmith and Wu, supra note 5.
29. Except for the root page at http://www.erols.com itself, potentially indicating a desire to manage perceptions as to
the extent of the blocking.
30. ‘‘Filtering by Domestic Blog Providers in China,’’ OpenNet Initiative, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/008/
(last accessed January 15, 2007).
31. The mechanism for so doing turned out to be extremely rudimentary, as outlined in a previous ONI bulletin. See
‘‘Google Search & Cache Filtering Behind China’s Great Firewall,’’ http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/
(last accessed January 15, 2007).
32. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—and How to Stop It (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
33. William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
34. RSS also allows the user to access a blog via an application other than a Web browser such as a desktop aggregator. While we have not yet performed any testing in this area, it seems that a request issued directly to a blocked
blog for an RSS feed would also be blocked, as it would be subject to the same filtering mechanisms despite the
use of a different application. The RSS feed may be accessed at a different URL, but it stands to reason that, even
if this were the case, the process of blocking a blog would simply be expanded to include this URL.
35. VOA has taken an interesting approach to a similar problem in its creation of a general anonymizer that fully circumvents government filtering. The site has a new address every day, which is broadcast via radio (and other means).
ONI has not tested how quickly the Iranian filters are able to update and block these changing sites (see http://
opennetinitiative.net/advisories/001/).
56
Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey
Independent States.
28. Goldsmith and Wu, supra note 5.
29. Except for the root page at http://www.erols.com itself, potentially indicating a desire to manage perceptions as to
the extent of the blocking.
30. ‘‘Filtering by Domestic Blog Providers in China,’’ OpenNet Initiative, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/008/
(last accessed January 15, 2007).
31. The mechanism for so doing turned out to be extremely rudimentary, as outlined in a previous ONI bulletin. See
‘‘Google Search & Cache Filtering Behind China’s Great Firewall,’’ http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/
(last accessed January 15, 2007).
32. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—and How to Stop It (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
33. William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
34. RSS also allows the user to access a blog via an application other than a Web browser such as a desktop aggregator. While we have not yet performed any testing in this area, it seems that a request issued directly to a blocked
blog for an RSS feed would also be blocked, as it would be subject to the same filtering mechanisms despite the
use of a different application. The RSS feed may be accessed at a different URL, but it stands to reason that, even
if this were the case, the process of blocking a blog would simply be expanded to include this URL.
35. VOA has taken an interesting approach to a similar problem in its creation of a general anonymizer that fully circumvents government filtering. The site has a new address every day, which is broadcast via radio (and other means).
ONI has not tested how quickly the Iranian filters are able to update and block these changing sites (see http://
opennetinitiative.net/advisories/001/).
56
Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey