11. See ‘‘Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia in 2004,’’ OpenNet Initiative, http://opennet.net/studies/saudi at n23 (stating
the director of Saudi Arabia’s Internet Services Unit director ‘‘knows that anyone with much knowledge of the Internet and computers can blow right by the Saudi content filters’’ and ‘‘sees the filtering as a way to protect children
and other innocents from Internet evils, and not much more than that’’).
12. ‘‘Appeal Court Confirms Prison for Cyber-Dissident While Blogger is Re-imprisoned,’’ Iran: Reporters sans Frontie `res, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12564 (accessed February 15, 2005) (‘‘Javad Tavaf, a student
leader and the editor of the popular news website Rangin Kaman, which for a year had been criticising the Guide
of the Islamic Revolution, was arrested at his home on 16 January 2003 by people who said they were from the
military judiciary, which later denied it had arrested him.’’). Internet—China, China: Reporters Sans Frontie `res,
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10749. Internet—Vietnam, Vietnam: Reporters Sans Frontie `res, http://
www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10778.
13. See ‘‘Blocking Web Sites,’’ Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/4.htm#_Toc119125716
(last accessed February 15, 2007).
14. See Elijah Zarwan, ‘‘False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa,’’ Human Rights Watch,
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/ (last accessed January 15, 2007). In addition to his work for HRW, Zarwan
contributed research to the ONI work in 2006.
15. See Amnesty International, ‘‘Egypt: New Concerns about Freedom of Expression,’’ http://www.amnestyusa.org/
news/document.do?id=ENGMDE120182006 (last accessed January 15, 2007).
16. Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N. M. Watson, ‘‘Ignoring the Great Firewall of China,’’ http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~ rnc1/ignoring.pdf (last accessed January 15, 2007).
17. See, for instance, ‘‘Syria,’’ Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/6.htm#_Toc119125750
(last accessed February 15, 2007), a report on Syrian blocking for which ONI provided technical testing support.
18. The effectiveness of such a maneuver will be limited by the need to publicize to users that the content can be found
at the alternate site without bringing it to the attention of those managing the filtering.
19. This appears to have been the choice facing Saudi Arabia, where our research indicates that the category was generally allowed but the URLs for anonymizers were added to its local block list. Subsequent versions of SmartFilter
have instituted separate categories for these two types of sites.
20. UAE has elected to block sites falling within the ‘‘dating’’ category, resulting in very high levels of blocking for
English-language dating sites, but we found no blocking of Arabic-language dating sites.
21. The same default structure will also be applied to the ‘‘2006_swimsuit’’ directory: SmartFilter assigns the category
of ‘‘provocative attire/mature’’ to a request for sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/2006_swimsuit/does_not_exist.
Again, the assignment of a default is always subject to a more granular categorization. We checked URL categorizations via the SmartFilterWhere tool at http://www.securecomputing.com/sfwhere (last accessed December 29,
2006).
22. See ‘‘Internet Filtering in Pakistan,’’ Internet Censorship Explorer, http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=204 (last accessed
February 15, 2007).
23. Chinese official Yang Xiaokun stated at the 2006 Internet Governance Forum (IGF): ‘‘In China, we don’t have software blocking Internet sites. Sometimes we have trouble accessing them. But that’s a different problem. . . . We do
not have restrictions at all.’’ See transcript for October 31, 2006 ‘‘Openness’’ session, at http://www.intgovforum
.org/IGF-Panel2-311006am.txt. The Uzbek government has also denied filtering, calling it ‘‘impossible.’’ See
Ferghana.Ru news agency, ‘‘Foreign Minister Eljer Ganiyev: We lack the capacities to restrict access to Internet,’’
June 3, 2005, at http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=969; RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, ‘‘Rights Group Lists
‘Enemies of Internet’ at UN Summit,’’ November 15, 2005, at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/2fdba63a153a-4268-af4b-e6ebcf54e9ef.html (last accessed September January 3, 2007).
24. ‘‘The Old User Survey Results,’’ Internet Services Unit, http://www.isu.net.sa/surveys-&-statistics/user-survey.htm
(last accessed September 7, 2004), reporting an online survey of 260 users from July through September 1999.
25. Rafal Rohozinski and Deirdre Collings, ‘‘The Internet and Elections: The 2006 Presidential Election in Belarus (and
its implications),’’ OpenNet Initiative Internet Watch Report 001, April 2006, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/
belarus/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf (last accessed January 15, 2007).
26. Ibid.
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
55
the director of Saudi Arabia’s Internet Services Unit director ‘‘knows that anyone with much knowledge of the Internet and computers can blow right by the Saudi content filters’’ and ‘‘sees the filtering as a way to protect children
and other innocents from Internet evils, and not much more than that’’).
12. ‘‘Appeal Court Confirms Prison for Cyber-Dissident While Blogger is Re-imprisoned,’’ Iran: Reporters sans Frontie `res, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12564 (accessed February 15, 2005) (‘‘Javad Tavaf, a student
leader and the editor of the popular news website Rangin Kaman, which for a year had been criticising the Guide
of the Islamic Revolution, was arrested at his home on 16 January 2003 by people who said they were from the
military judiciary, which later denied it had arrested him.’’). Internet—China, China: Reporters Sans Frontie `res,
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10749. Internet—Vietnam, Vietnam: Reporters Sans Frontie `res, http://
www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10778.
13. See ‘‘Blocking Web Sites,’’ Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/4.htm#_Toc119125716
(last accessed February 15, 2007).
14. See Elijah Zarwan, ‘‘False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa,’’ Human Rights Watch,
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/ (last accessed January 15, 2007). In addition to his work for HRW, Zarwan
contributed research to the ONI work in 2006.
15. See Amnesty International, ‘‘Egypt: New Concerns about Freedom of Expression,’’ http://www.amnestyusa.org/
news/document.do?id=ENGMDE120182006 (last accessed January 15, 2007).
16. Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N. M. Watson, ‘‘Ignoring the Great Firewall of China,’’ http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ ~ rnc1/ignoring.pdf (last accessed January 15, 2007).
17. See, for instance, ‘‘Syria,’’ Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/6.htm#_Toc119125750
(last accessed February 15, 2007), a report on Syrian blocking for which ONI provided technical testing support.
18. The effectiveness of such a maneuver will be limited by the need to publicize to users that the content can be found
at the alternate site without bringing it to the attention of those managing the filtering.
19. This appears to have been the choice facing Saudi Arabia, where our research indicates that the category was generally allowed but the URLs for anonymizers were added to its local block list. Subsequent versions of SmartFilter
have instituted separate categories for these two types of sites.
20. UAE has elected to block sites falling within the ‘‘dating’’ category, resulting in very high levels of blocking for
English-language dating sites, but we found no blocking of Arabic-language dating sites.
21. The same default structure will also be applied to the ‘‘2006_swimsuit’’ directory: SmartFilter assigns the category
of ‘‘provocative attire/mature’’ to a request for sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/2006_swimsuit/does_not_exist.
Again, the assignment of a default is always subject to a more granular categorization. We checked URL categorizations via the SmartFilterWhere tool at http://www.securecomputing.com/sfwhere (last accessed December 29,
2006).
22. See ‘‘Internet Filtering in Pakistan,’’ Internet Censorship Explorer, http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=204 (last accessed
February 15, 2007).
23. Chinese official Yang Xiaokun stated at the 2006 Internet Governance Forum (IGF): ‘‘In China, we don’t have software blocking Internet sites. Sometimes we have trouble accessing them. But that’s a different problem. . . . We do
not have restrictions at all.’’ See transcript for October 31, 2006 ‘‘Openness’’ session, at http://www.intgovforum
.org/IGF-Panel2-311006am.txt. The Uzbek government has also denied filtering, calling it ‘‘impossible.’’ See
Ferghana.Ru news agency, ‘‘Foreign Minister Eljer Ganiyev: We lack the capacities to restrict access to Internet,’’
June 3, 2005, at http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=969; RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, ‘‘Rights Group Lists
‘Enemies of Internet’ at UN Summit,’’ November 15, 2005, at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/2fdba63a153a-4268-af4b-e6ebcf54e9ef.html (last accessed September January 3, 2007).
24. ‘‘The Old User Survey Results,’’ Internet Services Unit, http://www.isu.net.sa/surveys-&-statistics/user-survey.htm
(last accessed September 7, 2004), reporting an online survey of 260 users from July through September 1999.
25. Rafal Rohozinski and Deirdre Collings, ‘‘The Internet and Elections: The 2006 Presidential Election in Belarus (and
its implications),’’ OpenNet Initiative Internet Watch Report 001, April 2006, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/
belarus/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf (last accessed January 15, 2007).
26. Ibid.
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
55