We have evidence of more filtering at the edges than in a centralized manner, especially in
the Commonwealth of Independent States. One might also consider the cybercafe ´-based
controls in China, say, as compared to the approach of setting up the ‘‘Great Firewall’’ at
the state’s geopolitical boundaries. Those states that have not developed centralized filtering systems may find it more effective to build them at the edges. This phenomenon
suggests that those who lobby against network blockages may have to expand their
view of the network to include the devices that attach to it.
We have observed an increase in alternative modes of filtering, both in engineering technique and through increased licensing, registration, and reporting requirements in some
states.
We have uncovered evidence of filtering undertaken by some Internet sites depending
on where they believe their users to be located. In these instances, the entity that is publishing the sites—rather than the state where the person accessing or publishing the information is located—is limiting who can access its site. This process, combined with
geolocation of the source of a request for a Web page, has occasionally been prompted
in the past by a legal proceeding, such as the French insistence that Yahoo! not provide
its citizens with access to certain Nazi-related items in the Yahoo! auction sites. More
recently, our data show that gambling sites, U.S. military Web sites in the ‘‘.mil’’ domain,
and some dating sites are filtered from the server side.
States continue to be most concerned with blocking of sites in the local language, as
opposed to sites in nonlocal languages—even though commercial filtering software
sometimes accomplishes the inverse. In the Commonwealth of Independent States,
blocking is almost exclusively of local-language sites. In the Middle East and North Africa,
much of the blocking focuses on local-language sites, with some blockage of English
sites—especially where commercial filtering systems developed in the United States are
in use.
Internet filtering is increasingly being used to block access to certain online applications
beyond Web sites accessed by Web browsers. This trend is particularly important as software transitions toward more and more of an online service model. Google Earth and
Skype, among other Voice-over Internet Protocol services, are blocked in some states.
Other online applications, such as non-Web-based anonymizers that allow anonymous
Internet usage, are consistently blocked in many places.
Normative Analysis of Internet Filtering
Few would condemn all those who would seek to filter Internet content; in fact, nearly every
society filters Internet content in one way or another. Certainly all states regulate the information environment in some fashion, as Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu’s work makes plain.
28 The
purpose of this research is to provide the empirical data needed to understand this form of
state control online, what it means for the future of the Internet, and what choices are involved
in a state’s decision to filter the Internet.
The perspective in support of state-mandated Internet filtering is straightforward. States
have the sovereign right to carry out Internet filtering as they see fit. The same goes for
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
43
the Commonwealth of Independent States. One might also consider the cybercafe ´-based
controls in China, say, as compared to the approach of setting up the ‘‘Great Firewall’’ at
the state’s geopolitical boundaries. Those states that have not developed centralized filtering systems may find it more effective to build them at the edges. This phenomenon
suggests that those who lobby against network blockages may have to expand their
view of the network to include the devices that attach to it.
We have observed an increase in alternative modes of filtering, both in engineering technique and through increased licensing, registration, and reporting requirements in some
states.
We have uncovered evidence of filtering undertaken by some Internet sites depending
on where they believe their users to be located. In these instances, the entity that is publishing the sites—rather than the state where the person accessing or publishing the information is located—is limiting who can access its site. This process, combined with
geolocation of the source of a request for a Web page, has occasionally been prompted
in the past by a legal proceeding, such as the French insistence that Yahoo! not provide
its citizens with access to certain Nazi-related items in the Yahoo! auction sites. More
recently, our data show that gambling sites, U.S. military Web sites in the ‘‘.mil’’ domain,
and some dating sites are filtered from the server side.
States continue to be most concerned with blocking of sites in the local language, as
opposed to sites in nonlocal languages—even though commercial filtering software
sometimes accomplishes the inverse. In the Commonwealth of Independent States,
blocking is almost exclusively of local-language sites. In the Middle East and North Africa,
much of the blocking focuses on local-language sites, with some blockage of English
sites—especially where commercial filtering systems developed in the United States are
in use.
Internet filtering is increasingly being used to block access to certain online applications
beyond Web sites accessed by Web browsers. This trend is particularly important as software transitions toward more and more of an online service model. Google Earth and
Skype, among other Voice-over Internet Protocol services, are blocked in some states.
Other online applications, such as non-Web-based anonymizers that allow anonymous
Internet usage, are consistently blocked in many places.
Normative Analysis of Internet Filtering
Few would condemn all those who would seek to filter Internet content; in fact, nearly every
society filters Internet content in one way or another. Certainly all states regulate the information environment in some fashion, as Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu’s work makes plain.
28 The
purpose of this research is to provide the empirical data needed to understand this form of
state control online, what it means for the future of the Internet, and what choices are involved
in a state’s decision to filter the Internet.
The perspective in support of state-mandated Internet filtering is straightforward. States
have the sovereign right to carry out Internet filtering as they see fit. The same goes for
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
43