newspaper websites—continued to publish print editions while claiming that they were
being ‘‘censored’’ by the government.
Of the Belarus election, Rohozinski and Collings wrote,
[T]he quality and consistency of access to some sites varied considerably, and on critical days, up to 37 opposition and independent sites across 25 different ISPs were inaccessible from within the state-owned Beltelecom network. On election day and after
the website of the main opposition candidate (Aleksandr Milinkevich) was ‘‘dead,’’ as
was another opposition site—Charter 97. On the day that the police cleared the last
remaining protesters from October Square (25 March) Internet connectivity by way of
Minsk telephone dial-up services failed.
And, there were three instances of confirmed ‘‘odd DNS errors’’ affecting opposition
websites. While no case yielded conclusive evidence of government inspired tampering, the pattern of failures as well as the fact that mostly opposition and independent
media sites were affected, suggests that something other than chance was afoot.
26
The just-in-time filtering phenomenon has reared its head in the Middle East region as
well. Bahrain blocked several Web sites in the run-up to the country’s parliamentary elections in 2006 and Yemen banned access to several media and local politics Web sites
ahead of the country’s 2006 presidential elections. Bahrain also briefly blocked access to
Google Earth in 2006, citing security reasons. For about a month in 2006, Jordan blocked
access to the VoIP Web site skype.com, also citing security concerns.
Our most recent data, collected in 2006 and 2007, suggest that we may also be seeing,
for the first time, the emergence of in-stream filtering. This process involves entities based
in large states—possibly including Chinese, Russian, and Indian ISPs—that provide Internet service to other states, passing along the filtering practices to their customer states.
While the data are inconclusive that such in-stream filtering is taking place extensively, the
hallmarks of such activity are present in our recent findings. We will continue to monitor
closely for the emergence of this phenomenon, as it might point to a new series of security concerns.
There is a continued growth in the creation of online information by citizens, including citizen journalism, in many parts of the world, but filtering is having an impact on how people
carry it out. In some cases, the existence of a filtering regime leads these citizen journalists to limit the topics that they cover. For instance, environmental activists writing online in
China have tended to stick closely to the issues related to the environment, which tend
not to be blocked, while steering clear of related political topics that are censored. In other
cases, such as the Middle East region, citizens banter with the censors. In the Commonwealth of Independent States we may be witnessing a backlash, in the form of Internet
filtering, because of the perceived influence of citizen media on the outcome of elections
there.
27
Citizens and citizen journalists practice self-censorship. For example, moderators of online discussion forums remove contributions that could lead to the blocking of the forums.
On the other hand, cyberactivists exploit alternative technologies to circumvent filtering
systems. Many Web sites that discuss sensitive issues use online groups such as Yahoo!
Groups as part of their contingency plans, so once a Web site is blocked, users continue
the discussion and the exchange of content via the group e-mails.
42
Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey
being ‘‘censored’’ by the government.
Of the Belarus election, Rohozinski and Collings wrote,
[T]he quality and consistency of access to some sites varied considerably, and on critical days, up to 37 opposition and independent sites across 25 different ISPs were inaccessible from within the state-owned Beltelecom network. On election day and after
the website of the main opposition candidate (Aleksandr Milinkevich) was ‘‘dead,’’ as
was another opposition site—Charter 97. On the day that the police cleared the last
remaining protesters from October Square (25 March) Internet connectivity by way of
Minsk telephone dial-up services failed.
And, there were three instances of confirmed ‘‘odd DNS errors’’ affecting opposition
websites. While no case yielded conclusive evidence of government inspired tampering, the pattern of failures as well as the fact that mostly opposition and independent
media sites were affected, suggests that something other than chance was afoot.
26
The just-in-time filtering phenomenon has reared its head in the Middle East region as
well. Bahrain blocked several Web sites in the run-up to the country’s parliamentary elections in 2006 and Yemen banned access to several media and local politics Web sites
ahead of the country’s 2006 presidential elections. Bahrain also briefly blocked access to
Google Earth in 2006, citing security reasons. For about a month in 2006, Jordan blocked
access to the VoIP Web site skype.com, also citing security concerns.
Our most recent data, collected in 2006 and 2007, suggest that we may also be seeing,
for the first time, the emergence of in-stream filtering. This process involves entities based
in large states—possibly including Chinese, Russian, and Indian ISPs—that provide Internet service to other states, passing along the filtering practices to their customer states.
While the data are inconclusive that such in-stream filtering is taking place extensively, the
hallmarks of such activity are present in our recent findings. We will continue to monitor
closely for the emergence of this phenomenon, as it might point to a new series of security concerns.
There is a continued growth in the creation of online information by citizens, including citizen journalism, in many parts of the world, but filtering is having an impact on how people
carry it out. In some cases, the existence of a filtering regime leads these citizen journalists to limit the topics that they cover. For instance, environmental activists writing online in
China have tended to stick closely to the issues related to the environment, which tend
not to be blocked, while steering clear of related political topics that are censored. In other
cases, such as the Middle East region, citizens banter with the censors. In the Commonwealth of Independent States we may be witnessing a backlash, in the form of Internet
filtering, because of the perceived influence of citizen media on the outcome of elections
there.
27
Citizens and citizen journalists practice self-censorship. For example, moderators of online discussion forums remove contributions that could lead to the blocking of the forums.
On the other hand, cyberactivists exploit alternative technologies to circumvent filtering
systems. Many Web sites that discuss sensitive issues use online groups such as Yahoo!
Groups as part of their contingency plans, so once a Web site is blocked, users continue
the discussion and the exchange of content via the group e-mails.
42
Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey