The government struck back with an initiative in 2004 that requires ISPs to renew contracts
with TelOne, the government-owned telecommunications company, with the stipulation that they
report any e-mail with “offensive or dangerous”
content. 21 In essence, this requires ISPs to do
what the Supreme Court has ruled is unconstitutional. As of yet, no ISPs have signed new agreements. 22
The government responded again with the
Interception of Communications Bill of 2006.
Under its provisions, the government would
establish a telecommunications agency called
the
Monitoring
and
Interception
of
Communications Center to monitor, among other
things, all telecommunications. 23 The government withdrew the bill in November 2006 over
constitutionality
objections
from
the
Parliamentary Legal Committee and plans to
revise it. 24 Even without explicit powers, the
authorities appear to be pursuing a crackdown
on e-mail dissent unabated. In 2005, for example,
authorities arrested forty people in a raid on a
local Internet café because an e-mail insulting
President Robert Mugabe allegedly was sent
from the location. 25
ONI testing results
ONI testing of two Zimbabwean ISPs, Econet and
YoAfrica, revealed no evidence of a filtration
regime in the country. Despite the ZANU-PF
regime’s record of repression, this is not an unexpected finding. Internet use in Zimbabwe is
extremely low and, as mentioned earlier, is generally limited to e-mail rather than Web browsing.
As a result, Zimbabwe’s main efforts toward control of the Internet are e-mail focused. A largescale Internet filtration system in all likelihood
does not hold much value to the Zimbabwean
government relative to the price of its implementation.
Conclusion
Zimbabwe is a highly repressive country with a
failing economy and a poverty-stricken population. Internet penetration is extremely low and the
Internet is mainly used for e-mail. As a result, the
government restricts its efforts toward Internet
control to e-mail monitoring and censorship.
Though its legal authority to pursue such measures is contested, the government appears to be
following through on its wishes to crack down on
dissent via e-mail. If Internet usage were to rapidly expand and increasingly spill over to Web
browsing, it is likely, given its history, that
Zimbabwe would move to Web site filtration.
Given the state of the country, however, this does
not appear imminent.
NOTES
1. Freedom House, Zimbabwe: Country Report, 2005,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=
22&year=2005&country=6866.
2. U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in
Zimbabwe, Report of the Fact Finding Mission to
Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of
Operation Murambatsvina, 2005, http://www.
zimbabwesituation.com/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf.
3. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007:
Zimbabwe, 2007, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/
docs/2007/01/11/zimbab14720.htm.
4. U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements
Issues in Zimbabwe, Report of the Fact Finding
Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and
Impact of Operation Murambatsvina, 2005,
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf.
5. Ibid.
6. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007:
Zimbabwe, 2007, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/
2007/01/11/zimbab14720.htm.
7. Ibid.
8. Reporters Without Borders, Zimbabwe: Annual
Report 2007, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?
id_article=20744&Valider=OK.
9. Ibid.
10. International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
11. Zimbabwe Internet Usage and Marketing Report,
2005, http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/zw.htm.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
Country Summaries
431
with TelOne, the government-owned telecommunications company, with the stipulation that they
report any e-mail with “offensive or dangerous”
content. 21 In essence, this requires ISPs to do
what the Supreme Court has ruled is unconstitutional. As of yet, no ISPs have signed new agreements. 22
The government responded again with the
Interception of Communications Bill of 2006.
Under its provisions, the government would
establish a telecommunications agency called
the
Monitoring
and
Interception
of
Communications Center to monitor, among other
things, all telecommunications. 23 The government withdrew the bill in November 2006 over
constitutionality
objections
from
the
Parliamentary Legal Committee and plans to
revise it. 24 Even without explicit powers, the
authorities appear to be pursuing a crackdown
on e-mail dissent unabated. In 2005, for example,
authorities arrested forty people in a raid on a
local Internet café because an e-mail insulting
President Robert Mugabe allegedly was sent
from the location. 25
ONI testing results
ONI testing of two Zimbabwean ISPs, Econet and
YoAfrica, revealed no evidence of a filtration
regime in the country. Despite the ZANU-PF
regime’s record of repression, this is not an unexpected finding. Internet use in Zimbabwe is
extremely low and, as mentioned earlier, is generally limited to e-mail rather than Web browsing.
As a result, Zimbabwe’s main efforts toward control of the Internet are e-mail focused. A largescale Internet filtration system in all likelihood
does not hold much value to the Zimbabwean
government relative to the price of its implementation.
Conclusion
Zimbabwe is a highly repressive country with a
failing economy and a poverty-stricken population. Internet penetration is extremely low and the
Internet is mainly used for e-mail. As a result, the
government restricts its efforts toward Internet
control to e-mail monitoring and censorship.
Though its legal authority to pursue such measures is contested, the government appears to be
following through on its wishes to crack down on
dissent via e-mail. If Internet usage were to rapidly expand and increasingly spill over to Web
browsing, it is likely, given its history, that
Zimbabwe would move to Web site filtration.
Given the state of the country, however, this does
not appear imminent.
NOTES
1. Freedom House, Zimbabwe: Country Report, 2005,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=
22&year=2005&country=6866.
2. U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in
Zimbabwe, Report of the Fact Finding Mission to
Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of
Operation Murambatsvina, 2005, http://www.
zimbabwesituation.com/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf.
3. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007:
Zimbabwe, 2007, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/
docs/2007/01/11/zimbab14720.htm.
4. U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements
Issues in Zimbabwe, Report of the Fact Finding
Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and
Impact of Operation Murambatsvina, 2005,
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf.
5. Ibid.
6. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2007:
Zimbabwe, 2007, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/
2007/01/11/zimbab14720.htm.
7. Ibid.
8. Reporters Without Borders, Zimbabwe: Annual
Report 2007, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?
id_article=20744&Valider=OK.
9. Ibid.
10. International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
11. Zimbabwe Internet Usage and Marketing Report,
2005, http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/zw.htm.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
Country Summaries
431