material is considered to be an acceptable form
of censorship.”
11
The mandate for technical filtering in the
UAE derives from the TRA and is executed at the
ISP level. Etisalat prohibits the use of its services
for any “criminal or unlawful purpose such as but
not limited to vice, gambling or obscenity, or for
carrying out any activity which is contrary to the
social, cultural, political, economical or religious
values of the UAE.” 12 Emerging competitor du is
also moving toward compliance with the TRA’s
filtering policies. In January 2007, the company
defended its decision to block the use of Voiceover Internet Protocol (VoIP) in the free zone, saying that TRA rules and guidelines mandated the
ban. 13 This decision heralded a comprehensive
plan to implement technical filtering throughout
the Dubai free zone in 2007. 14
The UAE government has also issued a federal law on combating cybercrimes. Cyber-Crime
Law No. 2 of 2006 considers any intentional act
that abolishes, destroys, or reveals secrets, or
that results in the republishing of personal or official information, to be a crime. 15 Individuals may
be imprisoned for using the Internet to abuse
Islamic holy shrines and rituals, insult any recognized religion, incite or promote sins, or oppose
the Islamic religion. 16 Anyone convicted of “transcending family principles and values”
17
or setting up a Web site for groups “calling for, facilitating and promoting ideas in breach of the general
order and public decency” 18 may be jailed.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted tests on the UAE’s two ISPs:
Etisalat, which services most of the country; and
du, which (at the time of testing) serviced only
Dubai Media City, Dubai Internet City, and some
residential areas associated with the free zone.
To conduct the tests, ONI used dialup, broadband, and wireless connections. Access in the
Dubai free zone was unfettered, while considerable filtering behavior was exhibited on the
Etisalat ISP.
Testing in the UAE points to selective filtering
of Web sites that express alternative political or
religious views. www.UAEprison.com, a site hosting testimonials of former prisoners and critiques
of the government’s human rights practices, was
blocked, as was the site of the U.S.-based Arab
Times (www.arabtimes.com). Several sites presenting unorthodox perspectives on Islam
(www.thekoran.com,
www.islamreview.com,
www.secularislam.org) were blocked, along with
a handful of sites promoting minority faiths
(www.albrhan.org, www.ansarweb.net). Among
the few extremist sites filtered in the UAE
were www.hinduunity.org, a site advocating
Hindu solidarity and resistance to Islam, and
www.kahanetzadak.com, a site devoted to the
founder of the militant Jewish Defense League.
Meanwhile, the state continued to deny access to
all sites on the Israeli country code top-level
domain “.il.”
Testing revealed pervasive filtering of pornographic and gay and lesbian sites, which were
extensively blocked. Web pages relating to sexual health (www.circumcision.org) and education
(www.sexualhealth.com) or containing provocative attire (www.lingerie.com) were filtered to lesser
degrees. Sites promoting alcohol and drug use
or facilitating online gambling or dating were also
blocked in large numbers.
ONI found substantial filtering of Internet
tools in the UAE, including translation (www.
systranbox.com), hacking (www.thesecretlist.com)
and anonymizer (www.surfsecret.com) sites.
Numerous VoIP sites (www.skype.com,
www.pc2call.com) were blocked in accordance
with the national ban on such applications. In
October 2006, the UAE unblocked access to
social networking and multimedia sharing sites,
including www.youtube.com, www.flickr.com,
www.metacafe.com, and www.myspace.com.
However, sections of these sites containing
objectionable material remain unavailable.
Country Summaries
407
of censorship.”
11
The mandate for technical filtering in the
UAE derives from the TRA and is executed at the
ISP level. Etisalat prohibits the use of its services
for any “criminal or unlawful purpose such as but
not limited to vice, gambling or obscenity, or for
carrying out any activity which is contrary to the
social, cultural, political, economical or religious
values of the UAE.” 12 Emerging competitor du is
also moving toward compliance with the TRA’s
filtering policies. In January 2007, the company
defended its decision to block the use of Voiceover Internet Protocol (VoIP) in the free zone, saying that TRA rules and guidelines mandated the
ban. 13 This decision heralded a comprehensive
plan to implement technical filtering throughout
the Dubai free zone in 2007. 14
The UAE government has also issued a federal law on combating cybercrimes. Cyber-Crime
Law No. 2 of 2006 considers any intentional act
that abolishes, destroys, or reveals secrets, or
that results in the republishing of personal or official information, to be a crime. 15 Individuals may
be imprisoned for using the Internet to abuse
Islamic holy shrines and rituals, insult any recognized religion, incite or promote sins, or oppose
the Islamic religion. 16 Anyone convicted of “transcending family principles and values”
17
or setting up a Web site for groups “calling for, facilitating and promoting ideas in breach of the general
order and public decency” 18 may be jailed.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted tests on the UAE’s two ISPs:
Etisalat, which services most of the country; and
du, which (at the time of testing) serviced only
Dubai Media City, Dubai Internet City, and some
residential areas associated with the free zone.
To conduct the tests, ONI used dialup, broadband, and wireless connections. Access in the
Dubai free zone was unfettered, while considerable filtering behavior was exhibited on the
Etisalat ISP.
Testing in the UAE points to selective filtering
of Web sites that express alternative political or
religious views. www.UAEprison.com, a site hosting testimonials of former prisoners and critiques
of the government’s human rights practices, was
blocked, as was the site of the U.S.-based Arab
Times (www.arabtimes.com). Several sites presenting unorthodox perspectives on Islam
(www.thekoran.com,
www.islamreview.com,
www.secularislam.org) were blocked, along with
a handful of sites promoting minority faiths
(www.albrhan.org, www.ansarweb.net). Among
the few extremist sites filtered in the UAE
were www.hinduunity.org, a site advocating
Hindu solidarity and resistance to Islam, and
www.kahanetzadak.com, a site devoted to the
founder of the militant Jewish Defense League.
Meanwhile, the state continued to deny access to
all sites on the Israeli country code top-level
domain “.il.”
Testing revealed pervasive filtering of pornographic and gay and lesbian sites, which were
extensively blocked. Web pages relating to sexual health (www.circumcision.org) and education
(www.sexualhealth.com) or containing provocative attire (www.lingerie.com) were filtered to lesser
degrees. Sites promoting alcohol and drug use
or facilitating online gambling or dating were also
blocked in large numbers.
ONI found substantial filtering of Internet
tools in the UAE, including translation (www.
systranbox.com), hacking (www.thesecretlist.com)
and anonymizer (www.surfsecret.com) sites.
Numerous VoIP sites (www.skype.com,
www.pc2call.com) were blocked in accordance
with the national ban on such applications. In
October 2006, the UAE unblocked access to
social networking and multimedia sharing sites,
including www.youtube.com, www.flickr.com,
www.metacafe.com, and www.myspace.com.
However, sections of these sites containing
objectionable material remain unavailable.
Country Summaries
407