was common for prominent sites to be made
inaccessible, only to be unblocked after a period
of time.
ONI conducted testing after the coup on
three major ISPs: KSC, LoxInfo, and True. Of the
sites tested, only a small percentage were actually blocked. The Thai government does implement filtering and primarily blocks access to
pornography, online gambling sites, and circumvention tools. Outside these categories, only a
few sites were blocked by all three ISPs. Two of
these sites were inaccessible and suspected to
be blocked. One of these sites, the anti-coup
Web site www.19sep.com received significant
media coverage for being blocked six times over
a period of three months. 36 The other, the Web
site of the Patani United Liberation Organisation
(www.puloinfo.net) considered by the government to be a Malay Muslim separatist group,
appears to be a recent incarnation of the site
www.pulo.org that was also blocked and has
since been taken down.
Although it has long been declared a top priority of filtering in Thailand, a minority of the Thairelated pornography sites ONI tested were actually blocked by all three ISPs. Only one pornography site (www.sex.com) on the global list was
blocked by all three ISPs.
Filtering is demonstrated by redirection to
an MICT blockpage. Although it has been reported that ISPs are required to block a list of banned
Web sites distributed by the NITC, ONI testing
found that filtering varies across ISPs. LoxInfo
and True showed significant overlap in sites
filtered, blocking a substantial number of
circumvention tools and anonymous proxies
(www.guardster.com; www.stayinvisible.com), as
well as pornography and gaming sites. A few
sites promoting human rights, such as the
Patani Malay Human Rights Organisation
(www.pmhro.org), were also blocked by both
ISPs.
Only KSC appeared to address the issue of
lèse majesté, blocking a number of pages on
Amazon.com and other commerce sites featuring biographies of the king. These present an
example of URL filtering in Thailand, as various
Amazon.com URLs were blocked but the domain
(www.amazon.com) remained available on all
ISPs tested.
Conclusion
The current official approach toward filtering is in
flux, especially in the face of questions about the
legal authority and procedures for censorship
after the abolishment of the 1997 Constitution.
However, evidence from ONI testing suggests
that targets for blocking have remained consistent, with a strong focus on pornography and
lesser priorities made of gaming and circumvention tools. Only a small number of sites with sensitive political content, particularly about the Thai
monarchy and insurgents in the south, continue
to be inaccessible. It remains to be seen whether
the harsh legacy of censorship of all media created by the former prime minister’s government
will be carried forward in post-coup Thailand.
NOTES
1. For example, the Shin Corporation sought four hundred million baht (USD10 million) in defamation suits
from the Thai Post newspaper and the first defendant, Supinya Klangnarong, a media freedom
activist with the NGO Campaign for Popular Media
Reform. See also Reporters Without Borders,
Thailand:Annual Report 2006, http://www.rsf.org/
article.php3?id_article=17364.
2. Council for Democratic Reform, Announcement No.
3, September 19, 2006.
3. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., ThailandInternet, 2006, p. 1.
4. Steven Huter, Sirin Palasri, and Zita Wenzel, The
History of the Internet in Thailand. Network Startup
Resource Center: University of Oregon Books,
http://www.nsrc.org/case-studies/thailand/english/
conclusion.html.
5. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., ThailandInternet, 2006, p. 1.
6. National Statistical Office: Thailand, 2005 Information
and Communication Technology Survey,
http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/stat/ict/ict05_rep.pdf.
Country Summaries
393
inaccessible, only to be unblocked after a period
of time.
ONI conducted testing after the coup on
three major ISPs: KSC, LoxInfo, and True. Of the
sites tested, only a small percentage were actually blocked. The Thai government does implement filtering and primarily blocks access to
pornography, online gambling sites, and circumvention tools. Outside these categories, only a
few sites were blocked by all three ISPs. Two of
these sites were inaccessible and suspected to
be blocked. One of these sites, the anti-coup
Web site www.19sep.com received significant
media coverage for being blocked six times over
a period of three months. 36 The other, the Web
site of the Patani United Liberation Organisation
(www.puloinfo.net) considered by the government to be a Malay Muslim separatist group,
appears to be a recent incarnation of the site
www.pulo.org that was also blocked and has
since been taken down.
Although it has long been declared a top priority of filtering in Thailand, a minority of the Thairelated pornography sites ONI tested were actually blocked by all three ISPs. Only one pornography site (www.sex.com) on the global list was
blocked by all three ISPs.
Filtering is demonstrated by redirection to
an MICT blockpage. Although it has been reported that ISPs are required to block a list of banned
Web sites distributed by the NITC, ONI testing
found that filtering varies across ISPs. LoxInfo
and True showed significant overlap in sites
filtered, blocking a substantial number of
circumvention tools and anonymous proxies
(www.guardster.com; www.stayinvisible.com), as
well as pornography and gaming sites. A few
sites promoting human rights, such as the
Patani Malay Human Rights Organisation
(www.pmhro.org), were also blocked by both
ISPs.
Only KSC appeared to address the issue of
lèse majesté, blocking a number of pages on
Amazon.com and other commerce sites featuring biographies of the king. These present an
example of URL filtering in Thailand, as various
Amazon.com URLs were blocked but the domain
(www.amazon.com) remained available on all
ISPs tested.
Conclusion
The current official approach toward filtering is in
flux, especially in the face of questions about the
legal authority and procedures for censorship
after the abolishment of the 1997 Constitution.
However, evidence from ONI testing suggests
that targets for blocking have remained consistent, with a strong focus on pornography and
lesser priorities made of gaming and circumvention tools. Only a small number of sites with sensitive political content, particularly about the Thai
monarchy and insurgents in the south, continue
to be inaccessible. It remains to be seen whether
the harsh legacy of censorship of all media created by the former prime minister’s government
will be carried forward in post-coup Thailand.
NOTES
1. For example, the Shin Corporation sought four hundred million baht (USD10 million) in defamation suits
from the Thai Post newspaper and the first defendant, Supinya Klangnarong, a media freedom
activist with the NGO Campaign for Popular Media
Reform. See also Reporters Without Borders,
Thailand:Annual Report 2006, http://www.rsf.org/
article.php3?id_article=17364.
2. Council for Democratic Reform, Announcement No.
3, September 19, 2006.
3. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., ThailandInternet, 2006, p. 1.
4. Steven Huter, Sirin Palasri, and Zita Wenzel, The
History of the Internet in Thailand. Network Startup
Resource Center: University of Oregon Books,
http://www.nsrc.org/case-studies/thailand/english/
conclusion.html.
5. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., ThailandInternet, 2006, p. 1.
6. National Statistical Office: Thailand, 2005 Information
and Communication Technology Survey,
http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/stat/ict/ict05_rep.pdf.
Country Summaries
393