Elcat, KyrgyzTelecom, SaimaTelecom, Totel, and
Transfer. The testing did not detect activity that is
indicative of any deliberate or even selective pattern of filtering. Some U.S. military sites were
inaccessible, but these are likely the result of
“supply side” blocking by U.S. authorities or poor
domain name propagation. Kyrgyzstan does not
block the sites of religious or extremist groups.
Past work by ONI leads us to suspect that
there may be just-in-time or event-based tampering applied during politically sensitive periods.
This was the case during the 2005 parliamentary
elections, when ONI documented the extensive
use of DoS attacks against opposition and media
Web sites and Kyrgyz ISPs. 14
Blocking of voice traffic is carried out in
order to limit access to non-Kyrgyz providers
offering IP-telephony service, to thereby compel
the use of local providers. Voice traffic is filtered
in all the standard ports on all popular nonKyrgyz providers of IP-telephony. Allegedly, Cisco
(Pix) and Huawei (EuDemon) products are used
for blocking voice content. Filtering also exists at
the enterprise level (NGOs, corporate clients) in
order to block access of content deemed irrelevant and to economize Internet traffic.
Conclusion
Kyrgyzstan does not officially engage in filtering
of Internet content. Although the government
generally encourages Internet development, a
shift toward greater restriction may be emerging.
The regime appears to be struggling to find a balance between maintaining control over the ICT
sector and allowing the necessary freedom for
spurring economic growth. Potential limits in
Internet freedom are posed by generally poor
access, the possibility of “in-stream filtering”
resulting from dependence on Russian and
Chinese connections, and the possibility of
sporadic targeted filtering triggered by state
instability. However, Kyrgyzstan is an aiddependent country, and is therefore unlikely to
pursue open filtering of Internet content.
NOTES
1. International Eurasian Institute for Economic and
Political Research, http://www.iicas.org/libr_en/kg/
libr_06_10_05kg.htm.
2. Department of Economic and Social Affairs; UN
Global E-Government Readiness Report 2005, at 56,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/un/unpan021888.pdf.
3. International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
4. According to the Expert Consulting Agency, the
number of Internet users reached 550,000 in 2005,
suggesting Internet penetration of more than 10
percent.
5. International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
6. Telecoms Markets and Statistics, 2006.
7. Ibid.
8. For more information see http://www.domain.kg/.
9. http://www.ict.gov.kg/index.php?name=
EZCMS&menu=2501&page_id=71.
10. See National ICT Action Plan, http://www.ict.gov.kg/
index.php?name=EZCMS&menu=37&page_id=96.
11. The government gate portal is www.govservices.kg.
12. These are: the Moia Strana Party, the Democratic
Party Turan, and the Ar-Namys Party, whose previous
leader is today’s Prime Minister F. Koulov.
13. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Telecoms
Markets and Statistics, 2006.
14. See OpenNet Initiative, Special Report: Kyrgyzstan
Election Monitoring in Kyrgyzstan (February 2005),
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/special/kg/.
320
Country Summaries
Transfer. The testing did not detect activity that is
indicative of any deliberate or even selective pattern of filtering. Some U.S. military sites were
inaccessible, but these are likely the result of
“supply side” blocking by U.S. authorities or poor
domain name propagation. Kyrgyzstan does not
block the sites of religious or extremist groups.
Past work by ONI leads us to suspect that
there may be just-in-time or event-based tampering applied during politically sensitive periods.
This was the case during the 2005 parliamentary
elections, when ONI documented the extensive
use of DoS attacks against opposition and media
Web sites and Kyrgyz ISPs. 14
Blocking of voice traffic is carried out in
order to limit access to non-Kyrgyz providers
offering IP-telephony service, to thereby compel
the use of local providers. Voice traffic is filtered
in all the standard ports on all popular nonKyrgyz providers of IP-telephony. Allegedly, Cisco
(Pix) and Huawei (EuDemon) products are used
for blocking voice content. Filtering also exists at
the enterprise level (NGOs, corporate clients) in
order to block access of content deemed irrelevant and to economize Internet traffic.
Conclusion
Kyrgyzstan does not officially engage in filtering
of Internet content. Although the government
generally encourages Internet development, a
shift toward greater restriction may be emerging.
The regime appears to be struggling to find a balance between maintaining control over the ICT
sector and allowing the necessary freedom for
spurring economic growth. Potential limits in
Internet freedom are posed by generally poor
access, the possibility of “in-stream filtering”
resulting from dependence on Russian and
Chinese connections, and the possibility of
sporadic targeted filtering triggered by state
instability. However, Kyrgyzstan is an aiddependent country, and is therefore unlikely to
pursue open filtering of Internet content.
NOTES
1. International Eurasian Institute for Economic and
Political Research, http://www.iicas.org/libr_en/kg/
libr_06_10_05kg.htm.
2. Department of Economic and Social Affairs; UN
Global E-Government Readiness Report 2005, at 56,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/un/unpan021888.pdf.
3. International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
4. According to the Expert Consulting Agency, the
number of Internet users reached 550,000 in 2005,
suggesting Internet penetration of more than 10
percent.
5. International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
6. Telecoms Markets and Statistics, 2006.
7. Ibid.
8. For more information see http://www.domain.kg/.
9. http://www.ict.gov.kg/index.php?name=
EZCMS&menu=2501&page_id=71.
10. See National ICT Action Plan, http://www.ict.gov.kg/
index.php?name=EZCMS&menu=37&page_id=96.
11. The government gate portal is www.govservices.kg.
12. These are: the Moia Strana Party, the Democratic
Party Turan, and the Ar-Namys Party, whose previous
leader is today’s Prime Minister F. Koulov.
13. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., Telecoms
Markets and Statistics, 2006.
14. See OpenNet Initiative, Special Report: Kyrgyzstan
Election Monitoring in Kyrgyzstan (February 2005),
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/special/kg/.
320
Country Summaries