number of the session, duration of time spent
online, IP address of the user, and speed of data
receipt and transmission. The ISPs are also
required to prohibit their customers from disseminating (via Internet) pornographic, extremist, or
terrorist materials or any other information not in
accordance with the country’s laws. 10
The Kazakhstan Association of ITCompanies is the officially recognized administrator of the “.kz” domain. It is registered as a
nongovernment organization but, in fact, it has 80
percent government ownership. The rules of registration and management of the “.kz” domain
are issued by the AIC. The constitution guarantees freedom of speech and prohibits censorship, but the government often resorts to various
mechanisms to suppress “inappropriate” information or to shut down oppositional domain
names. These rules mean that an applicant may
be denied registration if the resource server
resides outside of Kazakhstan. Use of the
Internet by political parties in Kazakhstan is limited, and few opposition or illegal parties have
made the move to go online.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing on three main ISPs:
Kazakhtelecom, Megaline, and Nursat. The evidence gathered from the testing is not sufficient
to conclusively confirm the existence of a systematic filtering regime. However, a number of
sites with sensitive political content, including
locally sensitive topics and regional issues of
concern to the Kazakh government, were inaccessible. Several of these inaccessible sites are
hosted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. ONI found
some political sites were inaccessible for users of
two ISPs (Kazakhtelecom and Megaline), while
they remained accessible to Nursat users.
Generally most of the inaccessible sites contained content related to political dissidents, allegations of government corruption, human rights
issues, and strongly expressed criticism of the
president.
Kazakh authorities also de-register Web
sites that do not comply with its restrictive rules
for registering domains within the “.kz” domain,
and filters sites within this domain. 11 In 2005
Kazakh authorities de-registered a Web site created by the producers of Borat, (claiming that the
site violated the rules by hosting the site outside
of Kazakhstan and providing false contact information). 12
ONI suspects that filtering practices in
Kazakhstan have changed and are now performed at the network backbone. All traffic
should pass through the Kazakhtelecom network
and thus be subject to filters put in place by the
state-controlled ISP. However, not all incoming
and outgoing traffic passes through the network,
which results in inconsistent patterns of blocking.
Most of the users are also on “edge” networks, such as cybercafés and corporate networks. Kazakhstan companies apply filtering
mechanisms on a user level to prevent employees from accessing pornography, music, films,
and dating Web sites. However, ONI testing
found that Kazakhstan does not block any pornographic content or sites related to drug and alcohol use.
Conclusion
The Kazakh government has harnessed efforts to
liberalize the IT sector, promote Internet use, and
encourage e-government in order to spur social
development. However, it has also put in place a
complex security system that is capable of state
surveillance of Internet traffic, and suppression of
undesirable Internet content. Given government
pressure on opposition media, self-censorship
may also be an issue among online media
publishers and bloggers. The technical sophistication of the Kazakhstan Internet environment
and government’s tendency toward stricter
online controls warrant closer examination and
monitoring.
Country Summaries
315
online, IP address of the user, and speed of data
receipt and transmission. The ISPs are also
required to prohibit their customers from disseminating (via Internet) pornographic, extremist, or
terrorist materials or any other information not in
accordance with the country’s laws. 10
The Kazakhstan Association of ITCompanies is the officially recognized administrator of the “.kz” domain. It is registered as a
nongovernment organization but, in fact, it has 80
percent government ownership. The rules of registration and management of the “.kz” domain
are issued by the AIC. The constitution guarantees freedom of speech and prohibits censorship, but the government often resorts to various
mechanisms to suppress “inappropriate” information or to shut down oppositional domain
names. These rules mean that an applicant may
be denied registration if the resource server
resides outside of Kazakhstan. Use of the
Internet by political parties in Kazakhstan is limited, and few opposition or illegal parties have
made the move to go online.
ONI testing results
ONI conducted testing on three main ISPs:
Kazakhtelecom, Megaline, and Nursat. The evidence gathered from the testing is not sufficient
to conclusively confirm the existence of a systematic filtering regime. However, a number of
sites with sensitive political content, including
locally sensitive topics and regional issues of
concern to the Kazakh government, were inaccessible. Several of these inaccessible sites are
hosted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. ONI found
some political sites were inaccessible for users of
two ISPs (Kazakhtelecom and Megaline), while
they remained accessible to Nursat users.
Generally most of the inaccessible sites contained content related to political dissidents, allegations of government corruption, human rights
issues, and strongly expressed criticism of the
president.
Kazakh authorities also de-register Web
sites that do not comply with its restrictive rules
for registering domains within the “.kz” domain,
and filters sites within this domain. 11 In 2005
Kazakh authorities de-registered a Web site created by the producers of Borat, (claiming that the
site violated the rules by hosting the site outside
of Kazakhstan and providing false contact information). 12
ONI suspects that filtering practices in
Kazakhstan have changed and are now performed at the network backbone. All traffic
should pass through the Kazakhtelecom network
and thus be subject to filters put in place by the
state-controlled ISP. However, not all incoming
and outgoing traffic passes through the network,
which results in inconsistent patterns of blocking.
Most of the users are also on “edge” networks, such as cybercafés and corporate networks. Kazakhstan companies apply filtering
mechanisms on a user level to prevent employees from accessing pornography, music, films,
and dating Web sites. However, ONI testing
found that Kazakhstan does not block any pornographic content or sites related to drug and alcohol use.
Conclusion
The Kazakh government has harnessed efforts to
liberalize the IT sector, promote Internet use, and
encourage e-government in order to spur social
development. However, it has also put in place a
complex security system that is capable of state
surveillance of Internet traffic, and suppression of
undesirable Internet content. Given government
pressure on opposition media, self-censorship
may also be an issue among online media
publishers and bloggers. The technical sophistication of the Kazakhstan Internet environment
and government’s tendency toward stricter
online controls warrant closer examination and
monitoring.
Country Summaries
315