ers and modems, claiming that the machines
were illegal or were used against the government. 25 The lack of private materials forces most
Cubans to use public access points. These sites
generally require ID and registration, and many
only access national e-mail and Cuban intranets;
the government limits use of most hotel and
cybercafé Internet connections to foreign
tourists. 26 Additionally, the Cuban government
openly prohibits the use of IP telephony.
27
The government further restricts Internet use
by having all legal Cuban Internet traffic pass
through state-run ISPs, which use software to
detect politically dissident information. 28 This
filtering includes the monitoring of e-mail messages
prior to their being sent or received. 29 Tests and
investigation by Reporters Without Borders found
that very few Web sites are actually blocked from
access, but e-mail and word processing programs automatically close for “state security reasons” upon detecting mention of dissidents or
other politically sensitive issues. 30
For those who gain Internet access and use
it illegally, the penalties are severe. In 2002 thirty-one
people were sanctioned for improper Internet use
or use of e-mail addresses that did not belong to
them. 31 Penalties for Internet violations include
twenty years in prison for “counter-revolutionary”
article writing and five years for connecting illegally. 32 Twenty-four independent journalists currently are serving prison sentences in Cuba of up
to twenty-seven years for Internet activity. 33
The harsh penalties and pervasive monitoring, particularly when combined with requirement
of name and ID for access, makes free Internet
usage difficult and dangerous. E-mail users
restrict the contents of their messages because
of fear of state monitoring. 34 Cuban Internet policies lead to self-censorship.
Reported reverse filtering by the United
States
Historically the U.S. government has placed
considerable emphasis on influencing Cuban
communications, creating specific policies for
these technologies and spending considerable
time and resources on anti-Castro radio and television programming, such as TV Martí. 35 The
United States exerts some open control over the
Cuban Internet, preventing U.S. investors from
spending on the Cuban telecommunications
market, requiring special U.S. Department of
Treasury licensing for Cuban satellite connections, and prohibiting the direct sale of U.S. hardware and software. 36
However, the United States is also suspected of engaging in less-public controls by reverse
filtering and the promotion of reverse filtering. In
a memo of April 15, 1994, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) included Cuba on a list of
countries to block from using NSF servers, a policy reversed several months later under pressure
from anti-Castro politicians who wanted to use
information technology to sway the population
against the Cuban government. 37 Although this
particular block is no longer in effect, it does set
a precedent for U.S. governmental interest in
using route-filtering to prevent Cuban access.
More recently, in 2004, a report was made of a
private Web site being requested by the U.S.
government to refrain from conducting business
with Cuba, among other countries. 38
Conclusion
Cuba does not have the resources to provide
Internet access for all of its citizens, particularly
considering the higher prices caused by the U.S.
trade embargo. However, the resources the government does devote to Internet development do
not promote broad and open access. Government
monitors, harsh penalties, and self-censorship
discourage the transfer of politically sensitive
information, and access is limited to governmentapproved individuals. The approved Cuban
users may also be limited by reverse filtering. The
Cuban Internet environment obstructs freedom of
information and freedom of expression.
274
Country Summaries
were illegal or were used against the government. 25 The lack of private materials forces most
Cubans to use public access points. These sites
generally require ID and registration, and many
only access national e-mail and Cuban intranets;
the government limits use of most hotel and
cybercafé Internet connections to foreign
tourists. 26 Additionally, the Cuban government
openly prohibits the use of IP telephony.
27
The government further restricts Internet use
by having all legal Cuban Internet traffic pass
through state-run ISPs, which use software to
detect politically dissident information. 28 This
filtering includes the monitoring of e-mail messages
prior to their being sent or received. 29 Tests and
investigation by Reporters Without Borders found
that very few Web sites are actually blocked from
access, but e-mail and word processing programs automatically close for “state security reasons” upon detecting mention of dissidents or
other politically sensitive issues. 30
For those who gain Internet access and use
it illegally, the penalties are severe. In 2002 thirty-one
people were sanctioned for improper Internet use
or use of e-mail addresses that did not belong to
them. 31 Penalties for Internet violations include
twenty years in prison for “counter-revolutionary”
article writing and five years for connecting illegally. 32 Twenty-four independent journalists currently are serving prison sentences in Cuba of up
to twenty-seven years for Internet activity. 33
The harsh penalties and pervasive monitoring, particularly when combined with requirement
of name and ID for access, makes free Internet
usage difficult and dangerous. E-mail users
restrict the contents of their messages because
of fear of state monitoring. 34 Cuban Internet policies lead to self-censorship.
Reported reverse filtering by the United
States
Historically the U.S. government has placed
considerable emphasis on influencing Cuban
communications, creating specific policies for
these technologies and spending considerable
time and resources on anti-Castro radio and television programming, such as TV Martí. 35 The
United States exerts some open control over the
Cuban Internet, preventing U.S. investors from
spending on the Cuban telecommunications
market, requiring special U.S. Department of
Treasury licensing for Cuban satellite connections, and prohibiting the direct sale of U.S. hardware and software. 36
However, the United States is also suspected of engaging in less-public controls by reverse
filtering and the promotion of reverse filtering. In
a memo of April 15, 1994, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) included Cuba on a list of
countries to block from using NSF servers, a policy reversed several months later under pressure
from anti-Castro politicians who wanted to use
information technology to sway the population
against the Cuban government. 37 Although this
particular block is no longer in effect, it does set
a precedent for U.S. governmental interest in
using route-filtering to prevent Cuban access.
More recently, in 2004, a report was made of a
private Web site being requested by the U.S.
government to refrain from conducting business
with Cuba, among other countries. 38
Conclusion
Cuba does not have the resources to provide
Internet access for all of its citizens, particularly
considering the higher prices caused by the U.S.
trade embargo. However, the resources the government does devote to Internet development do
not promote broad and open access. Government
monitors, harsh penalties, and self-censorship
discourage the transfer of politically sensitive
information, and access is limited to governmentapproved individuals. The approved Cuban
users may also be limited by reverse filtering. The
Cuban Internet environment obstructs freedom of
information and freedom of expression.
274
Country Summaries