The Principal Motives and Targets of Filtering
On September 19, 2006, a military-led coup in Thailand overthrew the democratically elected
government headed by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thailand is not unfamiliar with
such upheavals. There have been seventeen coups in the past sixty years. This time, however,
Internet users noticed a marked increase in the number of Web sites that were not accessible,
including several sites critical of the military coup.
5 A year earlier in Nepal, the king shut down
the Internet along with international telephone lines and cellular communication networks
when he seized power from the parliament and prime minister. In Bahrain, during the run-up
to the fall 2006 election, the government chose to block access to a number of key opposition
sites. These events are part of a growing global trend. Claiming control of the Internet has become an essential element in any government strategy to rein in dissent—the twenty-first century parallel to taking over television and radio stations.
In contrast to these exceptional events, the constant blocking of a swath of the Internet has
become part of the everyday political and cultural reality of many states. A growing number of
countries are blocking access to pornography, led by a handful of states in the Persian Gulf
region. Other countries, including South Korea and Pakistan, block Web sites that are perceived as a threat to national security.
Notwithstanding the wide range of topics filtered around the world, there are essentially
three motives or rationales for Internet filtering: politics and power, social norms and morals,
and security concerns. Accordingly, most of the topics subject to filtering (see table 1.2) fall
under one of three thematic headings: political, social, and security. A fourth theme—Internet
tools—encompasses the networking tools and applications that allow the sharing of information relating to the first three themes. Included here are translation tools, anonymizers, blogging services, and other Web-based applications categorized in table 1.2.
Protecting intellectual property rights is another important driver of Internet content regulation, particularly in western Europe and North America. However, in the forty countries that
were tested in 2006, this is not a major objective of filtering.
6
Figure 1.2 compares the political and social filtering practices of these same twenty-seven
countries. On one extreme is Saudi Arabia, which heavily censors social content. While there
is also substantial political filtering carried out in Saudi Arabia, it is done with less scope and
depth. On the other fringe are Syria and China, focusing much more of their extensive filtering
on political topics. Myanmar and Vietnam are also notable for their primary focus on political
issues, which in the case of Vietnam contradicts the stated reason for filtering the Internet.
7
Iran stands out for its pervasive filtering of both political and social material.
Filtering directed at political opposition to the ruling government is a common type of blocking that spans many countries. Politically motivated filtering is characteristic of authoritarian
and repressive regimes. The list of countries that engage in substantial political blocking includes Bahrain, China, Libya, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,
Measuring Global Internet Filtering
9
On September 19, 2006, a military-led coup in Thailand overthrew the democratically elected
government headed by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thailand is not unfamiliar with
such upheavals. There have been seventeen coups in the past sixty years. This time, however,
Internet users noticed a marked increase in the number of Web sites that were not accessible,
including several sites critical of the military coup.
5 A year earlier in Nepal, the king shut down
the Internet along with international telephone lines and cellular communication networks
when he seized power from the parliament and prime minister. In Bahrain, during the run-up
to the fall 2006 election, the government chose to block access to a number of key opposition
sites. These events are part of a growing global trend. Claiming control of the Internet has become an essential element in any government strategy to rein in dissent—the twenty-first century parallel to taking over television and radio stations.
In contrast to these exceptional events, the constant blocking of a swath of the Internet has
become part of the everyday political and cultural reality of many states. A growing number of
countries are blocking access to pornography, led by a handful of states in the Persian Gulf
region. Other countries, including South Korea and Pakistan, block Web sites that are perceived as a threat to national security.
Notwithstanding the wide range of topics filtered around the world, there are essentially
three motives or rationales for Internet filtering: politics and power, social norms and morals,
and security concerns. Accordingly, most of the topics subject to filtering (see table 1.2) fall
under one of three thematic headings: political, social, and security. A fourth theme—Internet
tools—encompasses the networking tools and applications that allow the sharing of information relating to the first three themes. Included here are translation tools, anonymizers, blogging services, and other Web-based applications categorized in table 1.2.
Protecting intellectual property rights is another important driver of Internet content regulation, particularly in western Europe and North America. However, in the forty countries that
were tested in 2006, this is not a major objective of filtering.
6
Figure 1.2 compares the political and social filtering practices of these same twenty-seven
countries. On one extreme is Saudi Arabia, which heavily censors social content. While there
is also substantial political filtering carried out in Saudi Arabia, it is done with less scope and
depth. On the other fringe are Syria and China, focusing much more of their extensive filtering
on political topics. Myanmar and Vietnam are also notable for their primary focus on political
issues, which in the case of Vietnam contradicts the stated reason for filtering the Internet.
7
Iran stands out for its pervasive filtering of both political and social material.
Filtering directed at political opposition to the ruling government is a common type of blocking that spans many countries. Politically motivated filtering is characteristic of authoritarian
and repressive regimes. The list of countries that engage in substantial political blocking includes Bahrain, China, Libya, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,
Measuring Global Internet Filtering
9