Regional Overviews
173
allowing them to intercept communications
where a telecommunications service warrant
would not have been authorized. 67
Further, in 2003 the Australian Internet
Industry Association (IIA) attempted to establish
a code of practice requiring ISP signatories to
retain user information for six or twelve months
and provide it to law enforcement upon official
request. Specifically, personal data—such as
name, address, and credit card details—were to
be retained by ISPs for six months after a customer ends service with that ISP or twelve
months after the record is created, whichever is
longer. Operational data, such as proxy logs and
email information, were to be kept for six months
after creation of the data. 68 Law enforcement
could request this information using the certificate system set up in the Telecommunications
Act 1997, 69 which allows private information to be
disclosed if “an authorised officer of a criminal
law-enforcement agency has certified that the
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
enforcement of the criminal law.” 70 The code was
skewered by privacy advocates,
71
and it is still
listed as “not yet ratified” and “in public consultation” on the IIA’s Web site, even though it was
released four years ago. 72
In New Zealand, the most relevant piece of
legislation to Internet security is Supplemental
Order Paper 85 to the Crimes Amendment Bill
No. 6, passed in 2003. The act essentially makes
it illegal to hack or intercept electronic communications, but exempts the Police, Security
Intelligence Service, and the Government
Communications Security Bureau acting under
interception warrants as described by the Crimes
Act 1961. As Keith Locke of the Green Party
points out, however, these warrants “can be quite
broad in their application and cover a class of
people.” 73
Conclusion
Australian laws and policies toward the Internet
are restrictive relative to similar Western countries,
while New Zealand is less stringent. The
Australian government has instituted a strict takedown regime for offensive content, and various
states and territories have made distribution of
said content a criminal offense. The government
is pursuing voluntary programs to increase home
filtration of the Internet, and Australia’s evolving
hate speech, copyright, defamation, and security
policies offer further justification for restricting
Internet content. So far, the government has
resisted calls to implement ISP-level blocking of
offensive content on a countrywide basis, though
there is significant political backing to implement
one.
New Zealand, on the other hand, has instituted a more limited classification system—
though it does include hate speech—with no
takedown notices and has not even formally
adopted copyright legislation that applies to the
Internet. Its broad defamation and security policies, however, are more reminiscent of Australia.
Overall, though, Australia’s Internet censorship regime is strikingly severe relative to both its
neighbor and similar Western states. It is not,
however, at the level of the most repressive
regimes that ONI has examined.
Author: Evan Croen
NOTES
1. Roy Jordan, “Free Speech and the Constitution,”
Parliamentary Library, June 4, 2002,
http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/Pubs/RN/200102/02rn42.htm.
2. See Australian Constitution, §51(v),
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/1/641/0/PA
000700.htm.
3. Electronic Frontiers Australia, “Internet censorship
laws in Australia,” March 31, 2006,
http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens1.html.
4. Australian Constitution, §51(v), http://scaleplus.law.
gov.au/html/pasteact/1/641/0/PA000700.htm.
173
allowing them to intercept communications
where a telecommunications service warrant
would not have been authorized. 67
Further, in 2003 the Australian Internet
Industry Association (IIA) attempted to establish
a code of practice requiring ISP signatories to
retain user information for six or twelve months
and provide it to law enforcement upon official
request. Specifically, personal data—such as
name, address, and credit card details—were to
be retained by ISPs for six months after a customer ends service with that ISP or twelve
months after the record is created, whichever is
longer. Operational data, such as proxy logs and
email information, were to be kept for six months
after creation of the data. 68 Law enforcement
could request this information using the certificate system set up in the Telecommunications
Act 1997, 69 which allows private information to be
disclosed if “an authorised officer of a criminal
law-enforcement agency has certified that the
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the
enforcement of the criminal law.” 70 The code was
skewered by privacy advocates,
71
and it is still
listed as “not yet ratified” and “in public consultation” on the IIA’s Web site, even though it was
released four years ago. 72
In New Zealand, the most relevant piece of
legislation to Internet security is Supplemental
Order Paper 85 to the Crimes Amendment Bill
No. 6, passed in 2003. The act essentially makes
it illegal to hack or intercept electronic communications, but exempts the Police, Security
Intelligence Service, and the Government
Communications Security Bureau acting under
interception warrants as described by the Crimes
Act 1961. As Keith Locke of the Green Party
points out, however, these warrants “can be quite
broad in their application and cover a class of
people.” 73
Conclusion
Australian laws and policies toward the Internet
are restrictive relative to similar Western countries,
while New Zealand is less stringent. The
Australian government has instituted a strict takedown regime for offensive content, and various
states and territories have made distribution of
said content a criminal offense. The government
is pursuing voluntary programs to increase home
filtration of the Internet, and Australia’s evolving
hate speech, copyright, defamation, and security
policies offer further justification for restricting
Internet content. So far, the government has
resisted calls to implement ISP-level blocking of
offensive content on a countrywide basis, though
there is significant political backing to implement
one.
New Zealand, on the other hand, has instituted a more limited classification system—
though it does include hate speech—with no
takedown notices and has not even formally
adopted copyright legislation that applies to the
Internet. Its broad defamation and security policies, however, are more reminiscent of Australia.
Overall, though, Australia’s Internet censorship regime is strikingly severe relative to both its
neighbor and similar Western states. It is not,
however, at the level of the most repressive
regimes that ONI has examined.
Author: Evan Croen
NOTES
1. Roy Jordan, “Free Speech and the Constitution,”
Parliamentary Library, June 4, 2002,
http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/Pubs/RN/200102/02rn42.htm.
2. See Australian Constitution, §51(v),
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/1/641/0/PA
000700.htm.
3. Electronic Frontiers Australia, “Internet censorship
laws in Australia,” March 31, 2006,
http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens1.html.
4. Australian Constitution, §51(v), http://scaleplus.law.
gov.au/html/pasteact/1/641/0/PA000700.htm.