ently has swung in the direction of state control worldwide, hacktivists occasionally are able to
puncture through.
Alongside state efforts at control, as well as the emerging militarization of cyberspace, the
Internet has become an object of geopolitical contestation among states and nonstate actors
alike across each of its layers: infrastructure, code, law, and ideas. The outcome of this competing securitization process is not clear—for state sovereignty, for human rights, or for openness on the Internet. While states have more power and legal means to directly influence the
Internet, and together are creating mutually constitutive (if not explicitly defined) norms of control, civil society actors are able to create tools and publish information that expose and occasionally even undermine these measures. For the foreseeable future, then, we believe the
Internet will have no ‘‘natural’’ tendency; it will be a media environment that morphs in continuous tension, creating new forms of agency that in turn produce effects that shape the Internet itself. Given the multilayered complexity of this environment, it seems apparent that no one
agent will be able to dominate cyberspace entirely, but many will be able to push technologies, regulations, and norms that affect it.
Notes
1. See Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut Anheier, eds. Global Civil Society 2006/7 (London: Sage, 2005).
2. See, for example, David Rieff, ‘‘Civil Society and the Future of the Nation-State: Two Views,’’ The Nation, vol. 268,
no. 7 (1999): 11–16.
3. John Keane, Global Civil Society? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xv.
4. ‘‘What Is Civil Society?’’ The London School of Economics and Political Science, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm.
5. John Naughton, ‘‘Contested Space: The Internet and Global Civil Society,’’ in Global Civil Society, ed. Helmut
Anheier Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (London: Sage, 2001).
6. This section draws upon Ronald Deibert, ‘‘Deep Probe: The Evolution of Network Intelligence,’’ Intelligence and National Security, vol. 18, no. 4 (2004): 175–200.
7. Rory O’Brien and Andrew Clement, ‘‘The Association for Progressive Communications and the Networking of
Global Civil Society: APC at the 1992 Earth Summit,’’ The Association for Progressive Communications, www
.apc.org/english/about/history/rio_92.htm.
8. See Richard Price, ‘‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,’’ International Organization, vol. 52, no. 3 (1998): 613–644.
9. Kenneth Rutherford, ‘‘Internet Activism: NGOs and the Mine Ban Treaty,’’ The International Journal on Grey Literature, vol. 1, no. 3 (2000), 99–106.
10. Porta, Donatelladella, ‘‘Global-net for Global Movements? A Network of Networks for a Movement of Movements,’’
Journal of Public Policy, vol. 25, no. 1 (2005): 165–190.
11. See Ronald J. Deibert, ‘‘International Plug ’n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global Public Policy,’’ International Studies Perspectives, vol. 1 no. 3 (2000): 255–272.
12. A recent comprehensive survey of participants at five globalization protests found that 80 percent of those surveyed found out about the protests via the Internet. See Dana Fisher, ‘‘How Do Organizations Matter? Mobilization
and Support for Participants at Five Globalization Protests,’’ Social Problems, vol. 52, no. 1 (2005): 102–121.
13. For a nuanced analysis that compares that MAI and Zapatista cases with a discussion of the role of the Internet,
see Josee Johnston, ‘‘Solidarity in the Age of Globalization: Lessons from the Anti-MAI and Zapatista Struggles,’’
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet
147
puncture through.
Alongside state efforts at control, as well as the emerging militarization of cyberspace, the
Internet has become an object of geopolitical contestation among states and nonstate actors
alike across each of its layers: infrastructure, code, law, and ideas. The outcome of this competing securitization process is not clear—for state sovereignty, for human rights, or for openness on the Internet. While states have more power and legal means to directly influence the
Internet, and together are creating mutually constitutive (if not explicitly defined) norms of control, civil society actors are able to create tools and publish information that expose and occasionally even undermine these measures. For the foreseeable future, then, we believe the
Internet will have no ‘‘natural’’ tendency; it will be a media environment that morphs in continuous tension, creating new forms of agency that in turn produce effects that shape the Internet itself. Given the multilayered complexity of this environment, it seems apparent that no one
agent will be able to dominate cyberspace entirely, but many will be able to push technologies, regulations, and norms that affect it.
Notes
1. See Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut Anheier, eds. Global Civil Society 2006/7 (London: Sage, 2005).
2. See, for example, David Rieff, ‘‘Civil Society and the Future of the Nation-State: Two Views,’’ The Nation, vol. 268,
no. 7 (1999): 11–16.
3. John Keane, Global Civil Society? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xv.
4. ‘‘What Is Civil Society?’’ The London School of Economics and Political Science, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm.
5. John Naughton, ‘‘Contested Space: The Internet and Global Civil Society,’’ in Global Civil Society, ed. Helmut
Anheier Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (London: Sage, 2001).
6. This section draws upon Ronald Deibert, ‘‘Deep Probe: The Evolution of Network Intelligence,’’ Intelligence and National Security, vol. 18, no. 4 (2004): 175–200.
7. Rory O’Brien and Andrew Clement, ‘‘The Association for Progressive Communications and the Networking of
Global Civil Society: APC at the 1992 Earth Summit,’’ The Association for Progressive Communications, www
.apc.org/english/about/history/rio_92.htm.
8. See Richard Price, ‘‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,’’ International Organization, vol. 52, no. 3 (1998): 613–644.
9. Kenneth Rutherford, ‘‘Internet Activism: NGOs and the Mine Ban Treaty,’’ The International Journal on Grey Literature, vol. 1, no. 3 (2000), 99–106.
10. Porta, Donatelladella, ‘‘Global-net for Global Movements? A Network of Networks for a Movement of Movements,’’
Journal of Public Policy, vol. 25, no. 1 (2005): 165–190.
11. See Ronald J. Deibert, ‘‘International Plug ’n Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global Public Policy,’’ International Studies Perspectives, vol. 1 no. 3 (2000): 255–272.
12. A recent comprehensive survey of participants at five globalization protests found that 80 percent of those surveyed found out about the protests via the Internet. See Dana Fisher, ‘‘How Do Organizations Matter? Mobilization
and Support for Participants at Five Globalization Protests,’’ Social Problems, vol. 52, no. 1 (2005): 102–121.
13. For a nuanced analysis that compares that MAI and Zapatista cases with a discussion of the role of the Internet,
see Josee Johnston, ‘‘Solidarity in the Age of Globalization: Lessons from the Anti-MAI and Zapatista Struggles,’’
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet
147