example, winning elections is as much about mobilizing your supporters as it is about preventing the mobilization of opposition groups and parties. The relative ease and low cost of
conducting DoS or other CNAs makes it probable that such tactics will become part of the
normal way in which elections campaigns are run. It is also likely that activist groups from
across the political spectrum will employ these means as a way to raise awareness or cause
lasting damage to their opponents, indirectly causing damage to the openness of the Internet
by likely leading to further calls for regulation and policing. Indirectly, it may induce yet further
blowback against unfettered use of the Internet by civic networks.
Conclusions
As the evidence presented in this chapter makes clear, a simple correlation between the Internet environment and the expansion of global civil society can no longer be taken for granted.
While it is certain that civic networks, resistance networks, and dark nets exploded in the
1990s and early 2000s, the material and political conditions of the communications environment of the time were favorably structured for such an outcome. Largely oblivious to the unintended consequences of the Internet environment, policy-makers were actively encouraging
the growth and penetration of information and communications technologies worldwide
through FDI and development projects. Not until the appearance and impact of civic networks, resistance networks, and dark nets—human rights advocates, antiglobalization activists, militants, extremists, and jihadists—did state military, intelligence, and law enforcement
take active measures to secure the Internet through filtering and surveillance and begin to
rethink the encouragement of open and uncontrolled global communications networks. As
we show in this chapter, the scope, scale, and sophistication of Internet-content filtering and
surveillance and other methods of Internet control are growing rapidly and spreading globally.
Although these security practices are aimed primarily at ‘‘uncivil’’ society, dark nets, and those
actors considered to be a national security threat, the measures affect the operational environment for civic networks as well.
It is important to underline, however, that, notwithstanding these assertions of state power
and control, the Internet and civic networks likely will never fully be reigned in. A sprawling,
distributed, and highly potent sphere of global civic networks has been unleashed that moves
in and around sovereign states. These networks of autonomous agents are highly creative
and can be technologically sophisticated. Most noteworthy has been the growing solidification
and international presence of a formidable transnational social movement around Internet protection. This movement has put the filtering and surveillance activities of states and corporations under an intense ‘‘sous-veillance’’ grid, exposing unaccountable and nontransparent
practices while pushing for access to information and freedom of speech worldwide. Their
efforts include grassroots research and development initiatives to build software and advance
knowledge and capacity that helps secure human rights online. Although the pendulum pres146
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
conducting DoS or other CNAs makes it probable that such tactics will become part of the
normal way in which elections campaigns are run. It is also likely that activist groups from
across the political spectrum will employ these means as a way to raise awareness or cause
lasting damage to their opponents, indirectly causing damage to the openness of the Internet
by likely leading to further calls for regulation and policing. Indirectly, it may induce yet further
blowback against unfettered use of the Internet by civic networks.
Conclusions
As the evidence presented in this chapter makes clear, a simple correlation between the Internet environment and the expansion of global civil society can no longer be taken for granted.
While it is certain that civic networks, resistance networks, and dark nets exploded in the
1990s and early 2000s, the material and political conditions of the communications environment of the time were favorably structured for such an outcome. Largely oblivious to the unintended consequences of the Internet environment, policy-makers were actively encouraging
the growth and penetration of information and communications technologies worldwide
through FDI and development projects. Not until the appearance and impact of civic networks, resistance networks, and dark nets—human rights advocates, antiglobalization activists, militants, extremists, and jihadists—did state military, intelligence, and law enforcement
take active measures to secure the Internet through filtering and surveillance and begin to
rethink the encouragement of open and uncontrolled global communications networks. As
we show in this chapter, the scope, scale, and sophistication of Internet-content filtering and
surveillance and other methods of Internet control are growing rapidly and spreading globally.
Although these security practices are aimed primarily at ‘‘uncivil’’ society, dark nets, and those
actors considered to be a national security threat, the measures affect the operational environment for civic networks as well.
It is important to underline, however, that, notwithstanding these assertions of state power
and control, the Internet and civic networks likely will never fully be reigned in. A sprawling,
distributed, and highly potent sphere of global civic networks has been unleashed that moves
in and around sovereign states. These networks of autonomous agents are highly creative
and can be technologically sophisticated. Most noteworthy has been the growing solidification
and international presence of a formidable transnational social movement around Internet protection. This movement has put the filtering and surveillance activities of states and corporations under an intense ‘‘sous-veillance’’ grid, exposing unaccountable and nontransparent
practices while pushing for access to information and freedom of speech worldwide. Their
efforts include grassroots research and development initiatives to build software and advance
knowledge and capacity that helps secure human rights online. Although the pendulum pres146
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski