To add to the complexity of the matter, the mode and extent of censorship and surveillance
varies substantially from one state to another as the data in this book make plain. There are
several ways for states to filter and monitor. The most direct means is through the use of technology. In its simplest form, the state requires the reprogramming of the routers that lie between the individual end-user and the broader network. The job of the new code is to block
certain packets from reaching their destination or simply to learn and record the contents of
those packets and who is sending or receiving them. Sometimes it is apparent to the endusers that their requests for certain Web pages have been blocked by the state thanks to special messages substituted for the destinations the users have sought; more often, it is not so
apparent. The manner and extent to which censorship takes place online is easier to prove,
while surveillance is more elusive.
Online censorship and, potentially, surveillance, is carried out through nontechnical means
as well. These controls are sometimes imposed by law: end-users might be prohibited from
accessing or publishing certain information that is deemed to undermine public order or other
state interests. Such laws are typically very broad, hard to understand, and even harder to follow with any degree of precision. These controls are also imposed most effectively as part of a
package of soft controls, whereby cultural norms drive censorship or surveillance into the
home or local community, often resulting in extensive self-censorship.
Integrated Modes of Online Control: Combining the Technical and the Legal
The most salient form of filtering is direct technical control implemented by legal controls
trained on private actors who lie between an end-user and the network at large.
3 The state,
unable to carry out filtering effectively on its own, requires private actors to carry out the censorship and surveillance for them. This requirement comes as a formal or informal condition of
holding a license to provide Internet-related services in that state.
So, for a large search engine like Google, the mandate from the state may be to ensure that
search results provided to citizens of that state do not include links to online content banned
in that jurisdiction. In some cases, like insistence by the German and French governments
that search results to Nazi propaganda be excised, Google’s censorship of search results is
controversial only to die-hard civil libertarians, especially when the ways to circumvent such
filtering are open secrets. (Germans wishing to search for Nazi propaganda can simply use
google.com instead of google.de.) In other cases, like China, where a much broader range
of politically and culturally sensitive results are excluded, the public response is one of broader
concern.
Likewise, the provider of a blog publishing tool may be prompted to include controls that
disallow an individual publisher from including certain words in the title of a blog post. Microsoft found itself in this quandary in 2005. After a successful launch of its MSN Spaces product
in the United States market, Microsoft rolled out a Chinese version of the service. MSN
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Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey
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