relevant first-order regulation is the extent to which states have required corporations to censor search results, to configure software in such a manner as to block certain expression, to
collect and turn over data, and so forth.
Second-Order Regulation of the Online Environment: More State Control, Greater
Pressure on Private Parties
As more states place pressure on intermediaries to help control the online space, other states
may try to prevent such control, often by imposing their own regulations—a form of secondorder regulation of the online environment. This notion of second-order regulation presents
a new issue: how to evaluate the regulation that some states place on some firms, based in
other jurisdictions, when it comes to activity in the online environment.
This issue has arisen most prominently in the context of the United States Congress inquiring into the activities of several of its most prominent technology firms in the Chinese markets,
though as we argue in this chapter, the issue is much broader than such a precise frame
would suggest. The first-order regulation is China’s requirement that a search engine censor
the results that are presented to users in response to a search query, as part of broader practices prohibiting online service providers from disseminating information that may ‘‘jeopardize
state security and disrupt social stability.’’
2 At issue is not simply whether the first-order regulation is warranted, but rather whether the United States should regulate the activity of the firm
chartered in its jurisdiction when it competes in the Chinese markets. In some cases, no firstorder regulation has yet been applied, but regulation of the second-order type—of the export
control variety—has been proposed.
One reason for focusing on this ethical problem at an early stage of its development is that
in a global technology marketplace, such second-order regulatory issues are likely to continue
to arise. A mode of responding to these issues in the context of online censorship and surveillance may pay dividends over time as structurally similar quandaries come to the fore.
New Markets, New Modes of Control, New Challenges
As Faris and Villeneuve’s review of the data in chapter 1 indicates, Internet filtering occurs primarily in three regions of the world: the Middle East and North Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and
the Commonwealth of Independent States. China continues to be the case that garners the
most public attention, given the size of its market and the extent to which the state has set
in motion the world’s most sophisticated filtering regime. But China is far from alone, as
more than two dozen states carry out some form of Internet censorship and surveillance online. Further, large, regionally powerful states—China, the Russian Federation, and India, for
instance—that provide downstream Internet service to smaller states are poised to pass
along their filtering as well.
Corporate Ethics on a Filtered Internet
107
collect and turn over data, and so forth.
Second-Order Regulation of the Online Environment: More State Control, Greater
Pressure on Private Parties
As more states place pressure on intermediaries to help control the online space, other states
may try to prevent such control, often by imposing their own regulations—a form of secondorder regulation of the online environment. This notion of second-order regulation presents
a new issue: how to evaluate the regulation that some states place on some firms, based in
other jurisdictions, when it comes to activity in the online environment.
This issue has arisen most prominently in the context of the United States Congress inquiring into the activities of several of its most prominent technology firms in the Chinese markets,
though as we argue in this chapter, the issue is much broader than such a precise frame
would suggest. The first-order regulation is China’s requirement that a search engine censor
the results that are presented to users in response to a search query, as part of broader practices prohibiting online service providers from disseminating information that may ‘‘jeopardize
state security and disrupt social stability.’’
2 At issue is not simply whether the first-order regulation is warranted, but rather whether the United States should regulate the activity of the firm
chartered in its jurisdiction when it competes in the Chinese markets. In some cases, no firstorder regulation has yet been applied, but regulation of the second-order type—of the export
control variety—has been proposed.
One reason for focusing on this ethical problem at an early stage of its development is that
in a global technology marketplace, such second-order regulatory issues are likely to continue
to arise. A mode of responding to these issues in the context of online censorship and surveillance may pay dividends over time as structurally similar quandaries come to the fore.
New Markets, New Modes of Control, New Challenges
As Faris and Villeneuve’s review of the data in chapter 1 indicates, Internet filtering occurs primarily in three regions of the world: the Middle East and North Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and
the Commonwealth of Independent States. China continues to be the case that garners the
most public attention, given the size of its market and the extent to which the state has set
in motion the world’s most sophisticated filtering regime. But China is far from alone, as
more than two dozen states carry out some form of Internet censorship and surveillance online. Further, large, regionally powerful states—China, the Russian Federation, and India, for
instance—that provide downstream Internet service to smaller states are poised to pass
along their filtering as well.
Corporate Ethics on a Filtered Internet
107