permitting decision.
19 Where there are advisory bodies within national jurisdictions,
these are usually constituted via clear policies establishing the composition of their
membership (election rules, expertise requirements, gender balance, length of
term, etc.)
The ISA Secretariat has an Office of Environmental Management and Mineral
Resources, with a small staff. The role of this team as currently described in
published material is not an environmental monitoring and enforcement one.
20
There is some environmental science expertise within the ISA’s LTC.
21 But in any
event, neither the Secretariat nor the LTC has decision-making authority or compliance powers.
22 The Council—which does have relevant powers—is a body of
government officials (largely diplomats, not technical experts),
23 attending a
UN-style meeting once or twice a year, receiving limited regulatory information,
and operating under rules requiring it to reach decisions by consensus.
24
These gaps in the ISA’s institutional capacity to operate as a fit-for-purpose
environmental regulator
25 could undermine the ability of the ISA to comply with
its UNCLOS duties to protect the environment of the Area.
26
19 Craik (2017). Also supra n. 13.
20 ISA website: “The Office of Environmental Management and Mineral Resources (OEMMR) is the
economic [sic] arm of the Authority’s Secretariat providing scientific and technical inputs in the
preparation of rules, regulations and procedures for the conduct of activities in the Area. The office
is also responsible for the development and maintenance of information technology facilities to
support needs of the Authority and the central data repository resources of the international seabed
area and endeavours to promote and encourage the conduct of marine scientific research in the
Area, producing and distributing publications on the work of the Authority and monitoring trends
and developments of deep seabed mining activities relating to the prospecting and exploration of
the Area including areas reserved for the Authority.” See https://www.isa.org.jm/authority/officeenvironmental-management-and-mineral-resources.
21 It is not easy to access information about the professional qualification and expertise of the LTC
members (and CVs previously published on the ISA website had been removed at the time of
writing); but independent research suggests that perhaps three of the thirty LTC members specialise
in ecological science. Other commentators note the ‘current shortage of environmental expertise’ on
the LTC [New Zealand submission to the ISA: https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/
s3fspublic/documents/EN/Regs/2018/Comments/NZ.pdf].
22 Arts 166 and 165 of UNCLOS, respectively.
23 An example of the composition of Government delegations at the ISA’s Annual Sessions can be
seen here: https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/files/documents/isba-24a-crp4_0.pdf.
24 Arts 161 and 162, UNCLOS.
25 Supra n. 13, paragraph 6.4. For more discussion on this point, see the workshop papers from the
August 2017 event ‘From Paper to Practice: Implementing the Mining Code’, available at: https://
www.resolve.ngo/site-dsm/paper_to_practice.htm.
26 Bradley and Swaddling (2018).
18 Regulating the Common Heritage of Mankind: Challenges in Developing a Mining. . . 339
19 Where there are advisory bodies within national jurisdictions,
these are usually constituted via clear policies establishing the composition of their
membership (election rules, expertise requirements, gender balance, length of
term, etc.)
The ISA Secretariat has an Office of Environmental Management and Mineral
Resources, with a small staff. The role of this team as currently described in
published material is not an environmental monitoring and enforcement one.
20
There is some environmental science expertise within the ISA’s LTC.
21 But in any
event, neither the Secretariat nor the LTC has decision-making authority or compliance powers.
22 The Council—which does have relevant powers—is a body of
government officials (largely diplomats, not technical experts),
23 attending a
UN-style meeting once or twice a year, receiving limited regulatory information,
and operating under rules requiring it to reach decisions by consensus.
24
These gaps in the ISA’s institutional capacity to operate as a fit-for-purpose
environmental regulator
25 could undermine the ability of the ISA to comply with
its UNCLOS duties to protect the environment of the Area.
26
19 Craik (2017). Also supra n. 13.
20 ISA website: “The Office of Environmental Management and Mineral Resources (OEMMR) is the
economic [sic] arm of the Authority’s Secretariat providing scientific and technical inputs in the
preparation of rules, regulations and procedures for the conduct of activities in the Area. The office
is also responsible for the development and maintenance of information technology facilities to
support needs of the Authority and the central data repository resources of the international seabed
area and endeavours to promote and encourage the conduct of marine scientific research in the
Area, producing and distributing publications on the work of the Authority and monitoring trends
and developments of deep seabed mining activities relating to the prospecting and exploration of
the Area including areas reserved for the Authority.” See https://www.isa.org.jm/authority/officeenvironmental-management-and-mineral-resources.
21 It is not easy to access information about the professional qualification and expertise of the LTC
members (and CVs previously published on the ISA website had been removed at the time of
writing); but independent research suggests that perhaps three of the thirty LTC members specialise
in ecological science. Other commentators note the ‘current shortage of environmental expertise’ on
the LTC [New Zealand submission to the ISA: https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/
s3fspublic/documents/EN/Regs/2018/Comments/NZ.pdf].
22 Arts 166 and 165 of UNCLOS, respectively.
23 An example of the composition of Government delegations at the ISA’s Annual Sessions can be
seen here: https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/files/documents/isba-24a-crp4_0.pdf.
24 Arts 161 and 162, UNCLOS.
25 Supra n. 13, paragraph 6.4. For more discussion on this point, see the workshop papers from the
August 2017 event ‘From Paper to Practice: Implementing the Mining Code’, available at: https://
www.resolve.ngo/site-dsm/paper_to_practice.htm.
26 Bradley and Swaddling (2018).
18 Regulating the Common Heritage of Mankind: Challenges in Developing a Mining. . . 339