Of course, the cessation of gas extraction operations in the Odessa field does not
resolve the question of Chernomorneftegaz’s ownership (the subject of the aforementioned investor-State arbitral proceedings commenced by Naftogaz); of compensation for past breach (Russia has extracted about 3.5 billion cubic meters of gas
from the Odessa gas field alone)
212 ; or of sovereignty over the field, which Russia
has not explicitly ceded. It also does not address the other elements of Ukraine’s
claim.
213 However, insofar as the claim concerns Russia’s breaches of duties owed
in Ukraine’s maritime zone, the conduct is directly referable.
Overall, this decision’s effect on the substance of Ukraine’s claim regarding the
Black Sea, and its temporal proximity to Ukraine’s institution of arbitration proceedings, indicate a prima facie causal relationship. Russia’s shift to compliance, if
primarily for the sake of averting an arbitral claim, exemplifies the effectiveness of
international law in guiding State behaviour.
4.2.3 The Context of Russia’s Conduct and Its External Causes
However, while relevant, Ukraine’s suit is not the sole cause of Russia’s conduct: the
broader political and economic context is a vital consideration, and problematise the
preceding account.
First, the move reflects Russia’s inclination to avoid further tension with Ukraine
in the Black Sea. These tensions came to a head in December 2015, when Russia
moved two of Chernomorneftegaz’s drillings rigs in the Odessa gas field closer to the
territorial sea off the Crimean Peninsula.
214 In a statement on 16 December 2015,
Ukraine accused Russia of ‘pillaging’ its rigs, describing the move as ‘provocative’,
215 and Russia reportedly deployed a military escort ship to the area.
216
Subsequently, domestic Ukrainian courts made arrest orders in absentia on two
rigs.
217 Russian commentators have observed that these tensions were relevant to the
212 ‘Rossija ukrala bolee 3,5 mlrd ukbometrov ukrainsogo gaza’, supra note 186.
213 Ukraine v. Russia (Press Release, 31 August 2018).
214 See, e.g., ‘Ukraine says Russia looted two Crimean oil rigs’, Reuters (online), 17 December
2015: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-energy/ukraine-says-russia-lootedtwo-crimean-oil-rigs-idUSKBN0TZ22G20151216.
215 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Press Release of 16 December 2015: http://mfa.gov.ua/
to-gross-violation-by-the-russian-federation-of-the-united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-thesea.
216 See ‘FSB sends escort ship to protect Chernomorneftegaz boring rigs from Ukrainian warships’,
Russian News Agency TASS (online), 16 December 2015: https://tass.com/politics/844375; Yuri
Barsukov and Yanina Sokolovskaya, ‘Otstuplenie v burovom porjadke: Zachem
‘Chernomorneftegazu’ voennyj konvoj’ Kommersant (online), 15 December 2015: https://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/2877578.
217 ‘Odessa court seizes four floating drilling rigs in the Black Sea that were captured by Russia’,
UAWire (online), 7 February 2017: http://www.uawire.org/news/the-odessa-court-arrested-inabsentia-four-floating-drilling-rigs-in-the-black-sea-captured-by-russia; ‘Court arrests four drilling
16 Implementing the Law of the Sea: Russia and Arbitrations Under Annex VII to. . .
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