protests as to their legality and accordance with the literal wording of the
Convention.
Pursuant to both declarations, the South-American country asserted that the
UNCLOS provisions prohibiting the use of force against the integrity or independence of any State under Article 301 of the Convention would also apply in the
jurisdictional waters of the coastal State, i.e. the EEZ.
14 There, the freedoms of the
high seas prescribed in UNCLOS Article 87 (1) could not be invoked to justify
activities that imply threat or use of force against the coastal State. Such a threat or
use of force prevails—according to the Brazilian official interpretation—in exercises
and military maneuvers within 200 nm from the coast, a situation in which the
Brazilian Navy considers of diplomatic “good form” for other States to request
consent to carry out such activities in the zone.
15 With regard to the Brazilian
practice, it was possible to confirm with Navy officials that naval forces of other
States have requested consent for conducting military exercises within the Brazilian
EEZ. However, due to the sensitivity of this sort of information, it was not possible
for the authors to strengthen knowledge about that practice, nor to concretize the
episodes in which consent was requested.
Such a historical track of EEZ postures emphasizes how much the issue of coastal
State’s rights and powers over adjacent waters matters to the Brazilian State. As the
immediate geostrategic area offshore, interests in the EEZ are due to considerations
of national security, autonomous economic development and geopolitical influence
in the South Atlantic Ocean.
16 To grasp this is key to understanding Brazil’s position
14 In line with the Brazilian Interpretative Declaration, “[. . .]III. The Brazilian Government understands that the provision of Article 301, which prohibits “any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”, apply, in
particular, to the maritime areas under the sovereignty or the jurisdiction of the coastal State.
IV. The Brazilian Government understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize
other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone military exercises or maneuvers, in
particular those that imply the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal
State.[. . .]”. Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declara
tions.htm#Brazil%20Upon%20signature.
15 James Kraska considers that Brazil engages in a particular type of excessive maritime claim, one
in which the State “asserts sovereign rights or jurisdictional competence that goes beyond what is
permitted in the Convention. Typically, this approach takes the form of domestic laws and
regulations that unlawfully limit or diminish the right of the international community to conduct
activities in the zone. China and Brazil typify this model”. See Kraska (2011), p. 26.
16 In trying to explain Brazil’s positions in the Law of the Sea, namely towards the EEZ, James
Kraska claims the country is “captivated by a sense of ocean destiny that is defined in opposition to
its large northern neighbor, the United States”. See Kraska (2011), p. 308. The “sense of destiny”
mentioned by Kraska is to be found in a Report by the Brazilian Navy, in which the Admiral Paulo
de Castro Moreira da Silva remarked that “Brazilian maritiminess, more than a vocation, is a
destiny. It is not an alternative, but a necessity”. The Admiral’s prophetic word choice should be
seen more as a call to increased focus on the ocean in domestic public policies, than a transcendental
fate of conquering the world’s oceans. Each and every coastal State value the ocean link, due to the
plethora of benefits it comprises, but Brazil lacks a basic “maritime mentality”, on which such a
“sense of ocean destiny” could be erected. Data show that Brazilians lack knowledge about
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V. Alencar Mayer Feitosa Ventura and E. Cavalcanti Mello Filho
Convention.
Pursuant to both declarations, the South-American country asserted that the
UNCLOS provisions prohibiting the use of force against the integrity or independence of any State under Article 301 of the Convention would also apply in the
jurisdictional waters of the coastal State, i.e. the EEZ.
14 There, the freedoms of the
high seas prescribed in UNCLOS Article 87 (1) could not be invoked to justify
activities that imply threat or use of force against the coastal State. Such a threat or
use of force prevails—according to the Brazilian official interpretation—in exercises
and military maneuvers within 200 nm from the coast, a situation in which the
Brazilian Navy considers of diplomatic “good form” for other States to request
consent to carry out such activities in the zone.
15 With regard to the Brazilian
practice, it was possible to confirm with Navy officials that naval forces of other
States have requested consent for conducting military exercises within the Brazilian
EEZ. However, due to the sensitivity of this sort of information, it was not possible
for the authors to strengthen knowledge about that practice, nor to concretize the
episodes in which consent was requested.
Such a historical track of EEZ postures emphasizes how much the issue of coastal
State’s rights and powers over adjacent waters matters to the Brazilian State. As the
immediate geostrategic area offshore, interests in the EEZ are due to considerations
of national security, autonomous economic development and geopolitical influence
in the South Atlantic Ocean.
16 To grasp this is key to understanding Brazil’s position
14 In line with the Brazilian Interpretative Declaration, “[. . .]III. The Brazilian Government understands that the provision of Article 301, which prohibits “any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”, apply, in
particular, to the maritime areas under the sovereignty or the jurisdiction of the coastal State.
IV. The Brazilian Government understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize
other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone military exercises or maneuvers, in
particular those that imply the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal
State.[. . .]”. Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declara
tions.htm#Brazil%20Upon%20signature.
15 James Kraska considers that Brazil engages in a particular type of excessive maritime claim, one
in which the State “asserts sovereign rights or jurisdictional competence that goes beyond what is
permitted in the Convention. Typically, this approach takes the form of domestic laws and
regulations that unlawfully limit or diminish the right of the international community to conduct
activities in the zone. China and Brazil typify this model”. See Kraska (2011), p. 26.
16 In trying to explain Brazil’s positions in the Law of the Sea, namely towards the EEZ, James
Kraska claims the country is “captivated by a sense of ocean destiny that is defined in opposition to
its large northern neighbor, the United States”. See Kraska (2011), p. 308. The “sense of destiny”
mentioned by Kraska is to be found in a Report by the Brazilian Navy, in which the Admiral Paulo
de Castro Moreira da Silva remarked that “Brazilian maritiminess, more than a vocation, is a
destiny. It is not an alternative, but a necessity”. The Admiral’s prophetic word choice should be
seen more as a call to increased focus on the ocean in domestic public policies, than a transcendental
fate of conquering the world’s oceans. Each and every coastal State value the ocean link, due to the
plethora of benefits it comprises, but Brazil lacks a basic “maritime mentality”, on which such a
“sense of ocean destiny” could be erected. Data show that Brazilians lack knowledge about
268
V. Alencar Mayer Feitosa Ventura and E. Cavalcanti Mello Filho