strong economic zone under broad coastal State rights; and secondly, the Brazilian
military forces intended to guarantee State security. It can be anticipated that Brazil
(and other States) have been successful in achieving the first objective, but have not
achieved so much success over the latter, as analysed below.
Among the rights sought by coastal States in general, was the exclusive access to
the EEZ resources, in particular high market-value fisheries. The 200-miles zone
emerged to protect the fishing and hydrocarbons’ industry of least developed
countries, as those resources are more abundant in shallower regions not so distant
from the shore. Brazil’s fishing potential has been the subject of studies and scientific
surveys by the Interministerial Commission on Marine Resources (CIRM), chaired
by the Brazilian Navy. This is the case of the Program for Evaluation of the
Sustainable Potential of Living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone
(REVIZEE) instituted in 1994, together with UNCLOS’ entry into force. In this
regard, the Convention established a system of exclusive access, subject to rational
and sustainable development standards.
11
With regard to the consolidation of coastal State security variables in the EEZ, the
UNCLOS was not as explicit as Brazil intended it to be. During the Conference, the
country repeatedly opposed the legality of military manoeuvres with the use of
weapons and explosives in jurisdictional waters without the coastal State’s consent,
striving to make the Convention more unambiguous on the rights and duties of States
within the EEZ.
12 The objective was to prevent military activities and drills that
could be perceived as posing a threat to security on land from being legally carried
out in the zone without coastal State consent. However, intransigence of the great
naval powers and their allies, backed by the consensus rule adopted by the Conference, rendered the text ambiguous.
13
After “losing” the negotiation’s battle, Brazil lodged interpretative declarations
containing its stances on the hermeneutic scope of certain parts of the Convention.
Because it was negotiated under the package deal methodology, the UNCLOS did
not allow for reservations at the time of signature, in accordance with Article 309 of
the Convention, but signatory States were able to offer interpretative declarations, in
which their understanding of a particular provision was made public. Brazil submitted two interpretative declarations referring to specific provisions of the final text of
the treaty: one at the time of signature on December 10, 1982; and another at the time
of ratification, on December 22, 1988. The explicit objective was to consolidate the
positions held by the country during UNCLOS negotiations and to demonstrate
coherence to the international community, even though the positions could raise
11 Arts 61 and 62 of UNCLOS, on the conservation and utilization of living resources respectively.
12 During UNCLOS negotiations, the Brazilian delegate, Mr. Calero Rodrigues, emphasized that
“military activities such as manoeuvres with the use of weapons and explosives should not be
carried out in the zone without the consent of the coastal State”. See A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.53 53rd
meeting of the Second Committee Extract from the Official Records of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IX, para. 3.
13 Longo (2014), p. 47.
15 The Legal Status of the São Pedro and São Paulo Archipelago in Light of Article. . .
267
military forces intended to guarantee State security. It can be anticipated that Brazil
(and other States) have been successful in achieving the first objective, but have not
achieved so much success over the latter, as analysed below.
Among the rights sought by coastal States in general, was the exclusive access to
the EEZ resources, in particular high market-value fisheries. The 200-miles zone
emerged to protect the fishing and hydrocarbons’ industry of least developed
countries, as those resources are more abundant in shallower regions not so distant
from the shore. Brazil’s fishing potential has been the subject of studies and scientific
surveys by the Interministerial Commission on Marine Resources (CIRM), chaired
by the Brazilian Navy. This is the case of the Program for Evaluation of the
Sustainable Potential of Living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone
(REVIZEE) instituted in 1994, together with UNCLOS’ entry into force. In this
regard, the Convention established a system of exclusive access, subject to rational
and sustainable development standards.
11
With regard to the consolidation of coastal State security variables in the EEZ, the
UNCLOS was not as explicit as Brazil intended it to be. During the Conference, the
country repeatedly opposed the legality of military manoeuvres with the use of
weapons and explosives in jurisdictional waters without the coastal State’s consent,
striving to make the Convention more unambiguous on the rights and duties of States
within the EEZ.
12 The objective was to prevent military activities and drills that
could be perceived as posing a threat to security on land from being legally carried
out in the zone without coastal State consent. However, intransigence of the great
naval powers and their allies, backed by the consensus rule adopted by the Conference, rendered the text ambiguous.
13
After “losing” the negotiation’s battle, Brazil lodged interpretative declarations
containing its stances on the hermeneutic scope of certain parts of the Convention.
Because it was negotiated under the package deal methodology, the UNCLOS did
not allow for reservations at the time of signature, in accordance with Article 309 of
the Convention, but signatory States were able to offer interpretative declarations, in
which their understanding of a particular provision was made public. Brazil submitted two interpretative declarations referring to specific provisions of the final text of
the treaty: one at the time of signature on December 10, 1982; and another at the time
of ratification, on December 22, 1988. The explicit objective was to consolidate the
positions held by the country during UNCLOS negotiations and to demonstrate
coherence to the international community, even though the positions could raise
11 Arts 61 and 62 of UNCLOS, on the conservation and utilization of living resources respectively.
12 During UNCLOS negotiations, the Brazilian delegate, Mr. Calero Rodrigues, emphasized that
“military activities such as manoeuvres with the use of weapons and explosives should not be
carried out in the zone without the consent of the coastal State”. See A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.53 53rd
meeting of the Second Committee Extract from the Official Records of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IX, para. 3.
13 Longo (2014), p. 47.
15 The Legal Status of the São Pedro and São Paulo Archipelago in Light of Article. . .
267