provision of fuel or supplies’ to this broadly defined class of vessels.
35 It further
requests that Member States communicate any information regarding IRISL
attempts to avoid application of the sanctions by ‘renaming or re-registering’
vessels.
36
The Security Council implemented a particularly impactful approach in the Iran
context by prohibiting insurance coverage over certain vessels with an Iran nexus.
UNSC Res 1929 (2010) specifically calls on Member States to ‘. . .prevent the
provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance. . .’ if there are
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that this could contribute to Iran’s weapons
programmes.
37 A similar approach has been utilized in the North Korea context
under UNSC Res 2321 (2016), which requires Member States to prohibit ‘insurance
or re- insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated, including through
illicit means, by the DPRK. . . .’
38
3.5 Prohibitions on Importing and Exporting
Designated Cargo
The Security Council Resolutions have also prohibited trade of certain cargo to Iran
and North Korea. The most fundamental prohibition covers nuclear technology and
military equipment. But the Security Council has also incrementally applied more
comprehensive prohibitions in certain commodity sectors in efforts to enhance
diplomatic pressure.
In the Iran context, as early as 2006, the Security Council mandated that Member
States take measures to stop ‘the supply, sale, or transfer directly or indirectly from
their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels’ of designated goods
and equipment that could ‘. . .contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or
heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems. . .’
39 Enumerating the precise scope of goods prohibited, UNSC Res 1737
(2006) incorporates a list compiled by the IAEA describing materials that could be
used for nuclear weapon development purposes.
40 Subsequent resolutions include
prohibitions on using vessels flying the flag of a Member State to facilitate Iran’s
procurement of ‘any arms or related material’.
41 Likewise, Member States are
prohibited from procuring banned items from Iran.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 UNSC Res 2321 (2016).
39 UNSC Res 1737 (2006) para 3.
40 Ibid.
41 UNSC Res 1929 (2010) para 8.
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R. L. Kilpatrick
35 It further
requests that Member States communicate any information regarding IRISL
attempts to avoid application of the sanctions by ‘renaming or re-registering’
vessels.
36
The Security Council implemented a particularly impactful approach in the Iran
context by prohibiting insurance coverage over certain vessels with an Iran nexus.
UNSC Res 1929 (2010) specifically calls on Member States to ‘. . .prevent the
provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance. . .’ if there are
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that this could contribute to Iran’s weapons
programmes.
37 A similar approach has been utilized in the North Korea context
under UNSC Res 2321 (2016), which requires Member States to prohibit ‘insurance
or re- insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated, including through
illicit means, by the DPRK. . . .’
38
3.5 Prohibitions on Importing and Exporting
Designated Cargo
The Security Council Resolutions have also prohibited trade of certain cargo to Iran
and North Korea. The most fundamental prohibition covers nuclear technology and
military equipment. But the Security Council has also incrementally applied more
comprehensive prohibitions in certain commodity sectors in efforts to enhance
diplomatic pressure.
In the Iran context, as early as 2006, the Security Council mandated that Member
States take measures to stop ‘the supply, sale, or transfer directly or indirectly from
their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels’ of designated goods
and equipment that could ‘. . .contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or
heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems. . .’
39 Enumerating the precise scope of goods prohibited, UNSC Res 1737
(2006) incorporates a list compiled by the IAEA describing materials that could be
used for nuclear weapon development purposes.
40 Subsequent resolutions include
prohibitions on using vessels flying the flag of a Member State to facilitate Iran’s
procurement of ‘any arms or related material’.
41 Likewise, Member States are
prohibited from procuring banned items from Iran.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 UNSC Res 2321 (2016).
39 UNSC Res 1737 (2006) para 3.
40 Ibid.
41 UNSC Res 1929 (2010) para 8.
166
R. L. Kilpatrick