Council economic sanctions since the early 1990s. After Chairman Kim Jong-un
succeeded his father Kim Jong-il to become Supreme Leader of North Korea in
2011, these weapons programmes intensified. The Security Council has responded
with a variety of Resolutions, utilizing similar tactics to those employed against Iran.
Again, these have increasingly focused on maritime activities.
24
With economic pressure from the sanctions mounting, in 2017 North Korea once
again engaged in a number of provocative weapons tests, including firing long-range
missiles over the Japanese prefecture of Hokkaido. This brought the Korean peninsula to the precipice of war, as US president Donald Trump infamously threatened
North Korea with ‘fire and fury like the world has never seen’.
25 But tempers cooled,
and less than a year later, President Trump and Chairman Kim met at a diplomatic
summit at the Singaporean resort island of Sentosa.
26 The Trump-Kim summit
initially appeared to be successful with the announcement that North Korea would
take steps to verifiably reverse its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for a roll
back of international sanctions. At the time of this writing in early 2019, all sanctions
remain in place as these diplomatic efforts continue, but no further Security Council
Resolutions have been issued on the matter since 2017.
In response to these threats in both Iran and North Korea, the international
community refined targeted sanctions techniques through a variety of maritime
regulations. These tactics attempt to apply economic pressure without the use of a
naval blockade and in a more precise method than a general embargo. An overview
of these specific techniques are explored below.
3.3 Blacklists of Maritime Entities and Vessels
One of the Security Council’s tactics for targeted sanctions is designating certain
entities as subject to asset freezes, travel bans, or other financial restrictions. By
naming individuals, businesses, and organizations as explicitly subject to Member
State prohibitions of financial transactions, the Security Council can avoid generalized prohibitions that have more sweeping economic impact.
The Security Council has designated a number of shipping businesses or statecontrolled maritime assets in its Resolutions, effectively ‘blacklisting’ them by
obliging Member States to freeze funds and prohibit other financial transactions
involving them. For example, UNSC Res 1929 (2010) explicitly imposes restrictions
on Iran’s state maritime assets, including, ‘the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL). . .and to any person or entity action on their behalf or at
their direction’.
27 Annex III to the same Resolution provides a list of shipping
24 Kraska (2019) and Huish (2017).
25 Baker and Sang-Hun (2017).
26 Rich (2018).
27 UNSC Res 1929 (2010) para 19.
164
R. L. Kilpatrick
succeeded his father Kim Jong-il to become Supreme Leader of North Korea in
2011, these weapons programmes intensified. The Security Council has responded
with a variety of Resolutions, utilizing similar tactics to those employed against Iran.
Again, these have increasingly focused on maritime activities.
24
With economic pressure from the sanctions mounting, in 2017 North Korea once
again engaged in a number of provocative weapons tests, including firing long-range
missiles over the Japanese prefecture of Hokkaido. This brought the Korean peninsula to the precipice of war, as US president Donald Trump infamously threatened
North Korea with ‘fire and fury like the world has never seen’.
25 But tempers cooled,
and less than a year later, President Trump and Chairman Kim met at a diplomatic
summit at the Singaporean resort island of Sentosa.
26 The Trump-Kim summit
initially appeared to be successful with the announcement that North Korea would
take steps to verifiably reverse its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for a roll
back of international sanctions. At the time of this writing in early 2019, all sanctions
remain in place as these diplomatic efforts continue, but no further Security Council
Resolutions have been issued on the matter since 2017.
In response to these threats in both Iran and North Korea, the international
community refined targeted sanctions techniques through a variety of maritime
regulations. These tactics attempt to apply economic pressure without the use of a
naval blockade and in a more precise method than a general embargo. An overview
of these specific techniques are explored below.
3.3 Blacklists of Maritime Entities and Vessels
One of the Security Council’s tactics for targeted sanctions is designating certain
entities as subject to asset freezes, travel bans, or other financial restrictions. By
naming individuals, businesses, and organizations as explicitly subject to Member
State prohibitions of financial transactions, the Security Council can avoid generalized prohibitions that have more sweeping economic impact.
The Security Council has designated a number of shipping businesses or statecontrolled maritime assets in its Resolutions, effectively ‘blacklisting’ them by
obliging Member States to freeze funds and prohibit other financial transactions
involving them. For example, UNSC Res 1929 (2010) explicitly imposes restrictions
on Iran’s state maritime assets, including, ‘the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL). . .and to any person or entity action on their behalf or at
their direction’.
27 Annex III to the same Resolution provides a list of shipping
24 Kraska (2019) and Huish (2017).
25 Baker and Sang-Hun (2017).
26 Rich (2018).
27 UNSC Res 1929 (2010) para 19.
164
R. L. Kilpatrick