are appealing because they strengthen the degree of national control over Internet
content. They also appeal to consumers, since access to them is less costly and the
resources that can be found there are almost exclusively in the local language.
Other aspects of third-generation controls, such as state-sponsored information campaigns in cyberspace, are difficult to document, as they use surveillance, interaction,
and direct physical action to achieve a disruption of target groups or networks. The intent of these campaigns is to effect cognitive change rather than to deny access to online information or services. The ultimate source of these campaigns is also difficult to
attribute and can only be established through careful research or insider knowledge,
since they are designed to render opaque the role of state actors. These techniques include employing ‘‘Internet Brigades’’ to engage, confuse, or discredit individuals or
sources. Such action can include the posting of prepackaged propaganda, kompromat,
and disinformation through mass blogging and participation in Internet polls, or harassment of individual users, including the posting of personal information. 31 This
technique, along with the use of surveillance of Internet traffic to affect direct action,
saw a marked increase in the run-up to parliamentary and presidential polls in Russia.
Numerous accounts allege that progovernment forces monitored opposition Web sites
and disrupted planned rallies and marches. In some cases, members of the opposition
were warned by cell phone not to participate in rallies or risk being beaten. In other
cases, false information was disseminated by progovernment forces, leading to confusion among opposition supporters and, in one documented case, leading them into an
ambush by progovernment supporters where several were severely beaten.
Assessing the Evolution of Next-Generation Controls in the CIS
The three generations of controls are not mutually exclusive, and several can exist concurrently. Taken together, they form a pattern of control that is both unique to each
country and generalizable to the region as a whole. However, the degree to which a
country is more or less authoritarian does seem to influence the choice of ‘‘generational mix’’ applied. Countries with stronger authoritarian tendencies tend to apply
more comprehensive information controls in cyberspace, often using all three generations of controls. Conversely, countries that are ‘‘more democratic’’ tend to favor
second- and third-generation strategies. None of the six countries scoring as ‘‘hybrid
regimes’’ or ‘‘flawed democracies’’ applied first-generation controls (see Figure 2.1).
Several factors can explain this pattern. The most obvious explanation of the general
tendency is that authoritarian states will seek to dominate the public sphere. These
states tend to be the most vulnerable to mass unrest, prompting additional efforts by
security forces to ensure that all channels of potential mobilization are controlled. A
second factor worth noting is that these six counties are also experiencing the fastest
rates of Internet growth and, with the exception of Belarus, have among the lowest
28
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
content. They also appeal to consumers, since access to them is less costly and the
resources that can be found there are almost exclusively in the local language.
Other aspects of third-generation controls, such as state-sponsored information campaigns in cyberspace, are difficult to document, as they use surveillance, interaction,
and direct physical action to achieve a disruption of target groups or networks. The intent of these campaigns is to effect cognitive change rather than to deny access to online information or services. The ultimate source of these campaigns is also difficult to
attribute and can only be established through careful research or insider knowledge,
since they are designed to render opaque the role of state actors. These techniques include employing ‘‘Internet Brigades’’ to engage, confuse, or discredit individuals or
sources. Such action can include the posting of prepackaged propaganda, kompromat,
and disinformation through mass blogging and participation in Internet polls, or harassment of individual users, including the posting of personal information. 31 This
technique, along with the use of surveillance of Internet traffic to affect direct action,
saw a marked increase in the run-up to parliamentary and presidential polls in Russia.
Numerous accounts allege that progovernment forces monitored opposition Web sites
and disrupted planned rallies and marches. In some cases, members of the opposition
were warned by cell phone not to participate in rallies or risk being beaten. In other
cases, false information was disseminated by progovernment forces, leading to confusion among opposition supporters and, in one documented case, leading them into an
ambush by progovernment supporters where several were severely beaten.
Assessing the Evolution of Next-Generation Controls in the CIS
The three generations of controls are not mutually exclusive, and several can exist concurrently. Taken together, they form a pattern of control that is both unique to each
country and generalizable to the region as a whole. However, the degree to which a
country is more or less authoritarian does seem to influence the choice of ‘‘generational mix’’ applied. Countries with stronger authoritarian tendencies tend to apply
more comprehensive information controls in cyberspace, often using all three generations of controls. Conversely, countries that are ‘‘more democratic’’ tend to favor
second- and third-generation strategies. None of the six countries scoring as ‘‘hybrid
regimes’’ or ‘‘flawed democracies’’ applied first-generation controls (see Figure 2.1).
Several factors can explain this pattern. The most obvious explanation of the general
tendency is that authoritarian states will seek to dominate the public sphere. These
states tend to be the most vulnerable to mass unrest, prompting additional efforts by
security forces to ensure that all channels of potential mobilization are controlled. A
second factor worth noting is that these six counties are also experiencing the fastest
rates of Internet growth and, with the exception of Belarus, have among the lowest
28
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski