the region, Russian cyberspace is a thriving and dynamic space, vital to economics,
society, and politics. Second, we outline three generations of cyberspace controls that
emerge from the research conducted by the ONI in this region. First-generation
controls—so-called Chinese-style filtering—are unpopular and infrequently applied.
While instances of filtering have been identified in just about all CIS countries, widescale national filtering is only pursued as a matter of state policy in two of the CIS
states. Rather, information control seems to be exercised by way of more subtle,
hidden, and temporally specific forms of denial. These controls can involve legal
and normative pressures and regulations designed to inculcate an environment of
self-censorship. Others, like denial-of-service attacks, result in Web sites and services
becoming unavailable, often during times of heightened political activity. Still others,
like mass blogging by political activists on opposition Web sites, cannot be characterized as an attack per se, although the outcome of silencing these Web sites is as effective as traditional filtering (if not more so).
These second- and third-generation controls are increasingly widespread, and they are
elusive to traditional ONI testing methods. They are difficult to measure and often require in-depth fieldwork to verify. Consequently, many of the examples in this chapter
are based on field investigations carried out by our ONI regional partners where technical testing was used to establish the characteristics of controls, rather than measure the
extent of them. We hypothesize that, although these next-generation controls
emerged in the CIS, they may in fact be increasingly practiced elsewhere. In the next
section of the chapter we turn our lens beyond the CIS to find examples of second- and
third-generation controls.
We conclude by arguing that, contrary to initial expectations, first-generation filtering techniques may become increasingly rare outside of a few select content categories,
raising serious public policy issues around accountability and transparency of information controls in cyberspace. The future of cyberspace controls, we argue, can be found
in RUNET.
RUNET
On July 6, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin fielded questions from the Internet
at an event organized by the leading Russian Web portal Yandex. 2 It was the first time
a Russian leader directly engaged and interacted with an Internet audience. The event
itself made few headlines in the international media, but in Russia it marked an important milestone. The Internet had graduated to the mainstream of Russian politics and
was being treated by the highest levels of state authority as equal in importance to television, radio, and newspapers. The question put to President Putin by the Internet audience also revealed a sense of the informal, irreverent culture of Russian cyberspace.
Over 5,640 netizens wrote in to ask when the President first had sex. More surprising,
perhaps, was that Putin replied. 3
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
17
society, and politics. Second, we outline three generations of cyberspace controls that
emerge from the research conducted by the ONI in this region. First-generation
controls—so-called Chinese-style filtering—are unpopular and infrequently applied.
While instances of filtering have been identified in just about all CIS countries, widescale national filtering is only pursued as a matter of state policy in two of the CIS
states. Rather, information control seems to be exercised by way of more subtle,
hidden, and temporally specific forms of denial. These controls can involve legal
and normative pressures and regulations designed to inculcate an environment of
self-censorship. Others, like denial-of-service attacks, result in Web sites and services
becoming unavailable, often during times of heightened political activity. Still others,
like mass blogging by political activists on opposition Web sites, cannot be characterized as an attack per se, although the outcome of silencing these Web sites is as effective as traditional filtering (if not more so).
These second- and third-generation controls are increasingly widespread, and they are
elusive to traditional ONI testing methods. They are difficult to measure and often require in-depth fieldwork to verify. Consequently, many of the examples in this chapter
are based on field investigations carried out by our ONI regional partners where technical testing was used to establish the characteristics of controls, rather than measure the
extent of them. We hypothesize that, although these next-generation controls
emerged in the CIS, they may in fact be increasingly practiced elsewhere. In the next
section of the chapter we turn our lens beyond the CIS to find examples of second- and
third-generation controls.
We conclude by arguing that, contrary to initial expectations, first-generation filtering techniques may become increasingly rare outside of a few select content categories,
raising serious public policy issues around accountability and transparency of information controls in cyberspace. The future of cyberspace controls, we argue, can be found
in RUNET.
RUNET
On July 6, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin fielded questions from the Internet
at an event organized by the leading Russian Web portal Yandex. 2 It was the first time
a Russian leader directly engaged and interacted with an Internet audience. The event
itself made few headlines in the international media, but in Russia it marked an important milestone. The Internet had graduated to the mainstream of Russian politics and
was being treated by the highest levels of state authority as equal in importance to television, radio, and newspapers. The question put to President Putin by the Internet audience also revealed a sense of the informal, irreverent culture of Russian cyberspace.
Over 5,640 netizens wrote in to ask when the President first had sex. More surprising,
perhaps, was that Putin replied. 3
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
17