evolved several generations ahead of those used in other regions of the world (including China and the Middle East). In RUNET, control strategies tend to be more subtle
and sophisticated and designed to shape and affect when and how information is
received by users, rather than denying access outright.
One reason for this difference may be the prior experiences of governments and opposition groups in the region. State authorities are aware of the Internet’s potential for
mobilizing opposition and protest that goes far beyond the nature of content that can
be downloaded from Web sites, chat rooms, and blogs. These technologies have the
potential to enable regime change, as demonstrated by the eponymous color revolutions
in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. By the same token, state actors have also come to
recognize that these technologies make opposition movements vulnerable, and that
disruption, intimidation, and disinformation can also cause these movements to fragment and fail. The failure of opposition movements in Belarus and Azerbaijan to ignite
a wider social mobilization, along with the role that targeted information controls played in fragmenting and limiting the effectiveness of these movements, also
points to the possible trajectory in which controls aimed at Russian cyberspace may
be moving.
Our chapter unfolds in several steps. We begin by describing some of the unique
characteristics of the ‘‘hidden’’ information revolution that has taken place in Russian
cyberspace since the end of the cold war. Contrary to widespread perceptions outside of
Table 2.1
INDEX OF DEMOCRACY
Less Authoritarian
World Ranking
Ukraine
53
Flawed democracy
Moldova
62
Georgia
104
Hybrid regime
Russia
107
Armenia
113
Kyrgyzstan
114
Kazakhstan
127
Authoritarian
Belarus
132
Azerbaijan
135
Tajikistan
150
Uzbekistan
164
Turkmenistan
165
More Authoritarian
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008,’’
2008, http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf.
16
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
and sophisticated and designed to shape and affect when and how information is
received by users, rather than denying access outright.
One reason for this difference may be the prior experiences of governments and opposition groups in the region. State authorities are aware of the Internet’s potential for
mobilizing opposition and protest that goes far beyond the nature of content that can
be downloaded from Web sites, chat rooms, and blogs. These technologies have the
potential to enable regime change, as demonstrated by the eponymous color revolutions
in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. By the same token, state actors have also come to
recognize that these technologies make opposition movements vulnerable, and that
disruption, intimidation, and disinformation can also cause these movements to fragment and fail. The failure of opposition movements in Belarus and Azerbaijan to ignite
a wider social mobilization, along with the role that targeted information controls played in fragmenting and limiting the effectiveness of these movements, also
points to the possible trajectory in which controls aimed at Russian cyberspace may
be moving.
Our chapter unfolds in several steps. We begin by describing some of the unique
characteristics of the ‘‘hidden’’ information revolution that has taken place in Russian
cyberspace since the end of the cold war. Contrary to widespread perceptions outside of
Table 2.1
INDEX OF DEMOCRACY
Less Authoritarian
World Ranking
Ukraine
53
Flawed democracy
Moldova
62
Georgia
104
Hybrid regime
Russia
107
Armenia
113
Kyrgyzstan
114
Kazakhstan
127
Authoritarian
Belarus
132
Azerbaijan
135
Tajikistan
150
Uzbekistan
164
Turkmenistan
165
More Authoritarian
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008,’’
2008, http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf.
16
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski