concluded that currently most Internet cafe ´s do not filter access to pornographic content. However, they do employ monitoring software that notifies them when a client is
attempting to retrieve such content.
Conclusion
The Tajik government has adopted an e-strategy aimed at developing an information
society and employing ICT potential for spurring economic growth. At the same time
it does not seek to encourage independent online publishers, journalists, and bloggers.
Media freedom is widely challenged and subject to de facto censorship, although the
constitution provides that ‘‘state censorship and prosecution for criticism are forbidden.’’ 33 State filtering is unlikely to be officially supported as ISPs remain independent,
often linked to political or criminal interests with influence within state bodies. Tajikistan is also dependent on international aid, which has some influence over the direction of state policy in this sector, although this may change as Tajikistan moves closer
to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (discussed further below). The Tajik government, however, has in place policies and instruments to maintain firm control over the
distribution of information, particularly before elections. The government is engaged
in developing programs aimed at restricting citizens’ Internet access, following on
from President Rahmon’s message that ‘‘Western values aren’t always applicable’’ to
Eastern countries. 34
Future tendencies on the political agenda include the increasing role of regional
organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, which may lead to a harmonization of more repressive laws. This possibility combined with the regime’s authoritarian tendencies may lead to the emergence
of further second-generation controls (especially event-driven filtering and legal restrictions on categories of content).
Notes
1. Joanna Lillis, ‘‘Tajikistan: No Surprises in Presidential Elections,’’ Eurasia Insight, November 6,
2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110606a.shtml; Deutsche Welle,
‘‘Nigora Buhari-zade, ‘‘Oppositsionery v Tajikistane Protestuyut’’ [The Opposition Raises Protests],
August 29, 2006, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2150509,00.html.
2. In 2005, the State Licensing Commission formally denied BBC a license, basing its argumentations on a complex interpretation of the Law on Licensing Certain Types of Activities. In addition,
in 2005 the leader of the main opposition party, Iskandarov, was convicted on terrorism and corruption charges and sentenced to a 23-year prison term. See Eurasia Insight, ‘‘Tajik Government
‘Tightening the Screws’ on Independent Media,’’ August 25, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/insight/articles/eav082506a.shtml.
Tajikistan
233
attempting to retrieve such content.
Conclusion
The Tajik government has adopted an e-strategy aimed at developing an information
society and employing ICT potential for spurring economic growth. At the same time
it does not seek to encourage independent online publishers, journalists, and bloggers.
Media freedom is widely challenged and subject to de facto censorship, although the
constitution provides that ‘‘state censorship and prosecution for criticism are forbidden.’’ 33 State filtering is unlikely to be officially supported as ISPs remain independent,
often linked to political or criminal interests with influence within state bodies. Tajikistan is also dependent on international aid, which has some influence over the direction of state policy in this sector, although this may change as Tajikistan moves closer
to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (discussed further below). The Tajik government, however, has in place policies and instruments to maintain firm control over the
distribution of information, particularly before elections. The government is engaged
in developing programs aimed at restricting citizens’ Internet access, following on
from President Rahmon’s message that ‘‘Western values aren’t always applicable’’ to
Eastern countries. 34
Future tendencies on the political agenda include the increasing role of regional
organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, which may lead to a harmonization of more repressive laws. This possibility combined with the regime’s authoritarian tendencies may lead to the emergence
of further second-generation controls (especially event-driven filtering and legal restrictions on categories of content).
Notes
1. Joanna Lillis, ‘‘Tajikistan: No Surprises in Presidential Elections,’’ Eurasia Insight, November 6,
2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110606a.shtml; Deutsche Welle,
‘‘Nigora Buhari-zade, ‘‘Oppositsionery v Tajikistane Protestuyut’’ [The Opposition Raises Protests],
August 29, 2006, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2150509,00.html.
2. In 2005, the State Licensing Commission formally denied BBC a license, basing its argumentations on a complex interpretation of the Law on Licensing Certain Types of Activities. In addition,
in 2005 the leader of the main opposition party, Iskandarov, was convicted on terrorism and corruption charges and sentenced to a 23-year prison term. See Eurasia Insight, ‘‘Tajik Government
‘Tightening the Screws’ on Independent Media,’’ August 25, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/insight/articles/eav082506a.shtml.
Tajikistan
233