Tajikistan does not have an official policy on Internet filtering. However, state
authorities have been known to restrict access to some Web sites at politically sensitive
times by communicating their ‘‘recommendations’’ to all top-level ISPs—an example
of second-generation controls. Prior to the 2006 presidential election, the government-controlled Communications Regulation Agency issued a ‘‘Recommendation on
Filtering’’ that advised ISPs that, ‘‘for the purpose of information security,’’ they should
‘‘engage in filtering and block access to Web sites that aim to undermine the state
policy in the sphere of information.’’ 29 As a result, several oppositional news Web sites
hosted in Russia or Tajikistan were inaccessible to Tajik users for several days. 30 Although officials offered unclear reasons for shutting down the Web sites, independent
media sources believe that the block list will grow in the future. 31
Surveillance
Several government agencies possess the right to inspect ISPs’ activities and premises,
and require information on their users. The rights and obligations of ISPs in this regard
are envisioned in the Annex to the ‘‘Internet Services Provision Rules within the
Republic of Tajikistan’’ (herein referred to as the Rules). According to Section 4, paragraph 15, of the Rules, the provider is obliged to ‘‘render its activity in accordance
with the current Rules’’ and ‘‘provide an easy access to its facilities for employees of
the State Communications Inspectorate of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Security and other state agencies granted under the corresponding
rules, provide on their demand information, for which they are authorized to ask and
fulfill their instructions on time.’’
In 2006, the government signaled its intention to create an agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport and Communications that would control the
ISP sector. All telecoms and ISPs were required to provide direct access to the state
inspectorate in a manner similar to Russian surveillance legislation (SORM). In 2009,
the high cost of the project as well as lobbying from telecom operators halted its
realization. 32
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative tested in Tajikistan on four key ISPs: Babilon-T,
Eastera, Tajiktelecom, and TARENA. Testing in Tajikistan yielded no evidence of Internet filtering. This extends to pornographic content, and with the exception of TARENA
(which services schools and universities), the major ISPs do not filter such content on
the backbone level. However, accessing pornographic content at Internet cafe ´s is illegal. Any persons caught accessing such content is subject to a fine ranging from USD
15 to USD 100, and violators may be criminally prosecuted. The ONI’s investigation
232
Tajikistan
authorities have been known to restrict access to some Web sites at politically sensitive
times by communicating their ‘‘recommendations’’ to all top-level ISPs—an example
of second-generation controls. Prior to the 2006 presidential election, the government-controlled Communications Regulation Agency issued a ‘‘Recommendation on
Filtering’’ that advised ISPs that, ‘‘for the purpose of information security,’’ they should
‘‘engage in filtering and block access to Web sites that aim to undermine the state
policy in the sphere of information.’’ 29 As a result, several oppositional news Web sites
hosted in Russia or Tajikistan were inaccessible to Tajik users for several days. 30 Although officials offered unclear reasons for shutting down the Web sites, independent
media sources believe that the block list will grow in the future. 31
Surveillance
Several government agencies possess the right to inspect ISPs’ activities and premises,
and require information on their users. The rights and obligations of ISPs in this regard
are envisioned in the Annex to the ‘‘Internet Services Provision Rules within the
Republic of Tajikistan’’ (herein referred to as the Rules). According to Section 4, paragraph 15, of the Rules, the provider is obliged to ‘‘render its activity in accordance
with the current Rules’’ and ‘‘provide an easy access to its facilities for employees of
the State Communications Inspectorate of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Security and other state agencies granted under the corresponding
rules, provide on their demand information, for which they are authorized to ask and
fulfill their instructions on time.’’
In 2006, the government signaled its intention to create an agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport and Communications that would control the
ISP sector. All telecoms and ISPs were required to provide direct access to the state
inspectorate in a manner similar to Russian surveillance legislation (SORM). In 2009,
the high cost of the project as well as lobbying from telecom operators halted its
realization. 32
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative tested in Tajikistan on four key ISPs: Babilon-T,
Eastera, Tajiktelecom, and TARENA. Testing in Tajikistan yielded no evidence of Internet filtering. This extends to pornographic content, and with the exception of TARENA
(which services schools and universities), the major ISPs do not filter such content on
the backbone level. However, accessing pornographic content at Internet cafe ´s is illegal. Any persons caught accessing such content is subject to a fine ranging from USD
15 to USD 100, and violators may be criminally prosecuted. The ONI’s investigation
232
Tajikistan