rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—including members of the European Union
(EU)—are (perhaps unintentionally) leading the way toward the establishment of a
global norm around filtering of political content with the introduction of proposals to
censor hate speech and militant Islamic content on the Internet. This follows already
existing measures in the UK, Canada, and elsewhere aimed at eliminating access to
child pornography. Recently and amid great controversy, Australia announced plans
to create a nationwide filtering system for Internet connectivity in that country. Although the proposal has ultimately languished, it shows the extent of this growing
norm. No longer is consideration of state-sanctioned Internet censorship confined to
authoritarian regimes or hidden from public view. Internet censorship is becoming a
global norm.
At the same time, states have also become more cognizant of the strategic importance of cyberspace (of which the Internet is an important constituent component). Cyberspace has become militarized. A clever use of the Internet by insurgents
and militants in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, the significance of the Internet
Box 1.1
The ONI employs a unique ‘‘fusion’’ methodology that combines field investigations, technical reconnaissance, and data mining, fusion, analysis, and visualization. Our aim is to uncover evidence of Internet content filtering in countries under investigation. The ONI’s
tests consist of running special software programs within countries under investigation
that connect back to databases that contain lists of thousands of URLs, IPs, and keywords.
The lists are broken down into two categories: global lists include URLs, IPs, and keywords
that are tested in every country, and which help us make general comparisons of accessibility
across countries. Global lists also provide a ‘‘snapshot’’ of accessibility to content typically
blocked by filtering software programs, and can help us understand whether particular software programs are being used in a specific context. Local lists are unique for each country
and are usually made up of content in local languages. These are high-impact URLs, IPs,
and keywords, meaning they are content that is likely to, or has been reported to have
been, targeted for filtering. Our aim is to run tests on each of the main ISPs in a country
over an extended period of time—typically at least two weeks on at least two occasions.
Our accessibility depends very much on our in-country testers, and for security and other
reasons we are not always able to perform comprehensive tests, meaning in some cases we
have only partial results on which to make inferences. Our specially designed software
checks access both within the country and from one or more control locations simultaneously. Anomalies are analyzed and determinations are made as to whether a site is accessible or not, and if the latter, how the inaccessibility occurs. In some instances, block-pages—
Web sites that explicitly confirm blocking—are yielded for requests for banned content. In
other instances, connections are simply broken. In some cases, special filtering software is
employed, while in others routers are manually configured to block.
Beyond Denial
5
(EU)—are (perhaps unintentionally) leading the way toward the establishment of a
global norm around filtering of political content with the introduction of proposals to
censor hate speech and militant Islamic content on the Internet. This follows already
existing measures in the UK, Canada, and elsewhere aimed at eliminating access to
child pornography. Recently and amid great controversy, Australia announced plans
to create a nationwide filtering system for Internet connectivity in that country. Although the proposal has ultimately languished, it shows the extent of this growing
norm. No longer is consideration of state-sanctioned Internet censorship confined to
authoritarian regimes or hidden from public view. Internet censorship is becoming a
global norm.
At the same time, states have also become more cognizant of the strategic importance of cyberspace (of which the Internet is an important constituent component). Cyberspace has become militarized. A clever use of the Internet by insurgents
and militants in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, the significance of the Internet
Box 1.1
The ONI employs a unique ‘‘fusion’’ methodology that combines field investigations, technical reconnaissance, and data mining, fusion, analysis, and visualization. Our aim is to uncover evidence of Internet content filtering in countries under investigation. The ONI’s
tests consist of running special software programs within countries under investigation
that connect back to databases that contain lists of thousands of URLs, IPs, and keywords.
The lists are broken down into two categories: global lists include URLs, IPs, and keywords
that are tested in every country, and which help us make general comparisons of accessibility
across countries. Global lists also provide a ‘‘snapshot’’ of accessibility to content typically
blocked by filtering software programs, and can help us understand whether particular software programs are being used in a specific context. Local lists are unique for each country
and are usually made up of content in local languages. These are high-impact URLs, IPs,
and keywords, meaning they are content that is likely to, or has been reported to have
been, targeted for filtering. Our aim is to run tests on each of the main ISPs in a country
over an extended period of time—typically at least two weeks on at least two occasions.
Our accessibility depends very much on our in-country testers, and for security and other
reasons we are not always able to perform comprehensive tests, meaning in some cases we
have only partial results on which to make inferences. Our specially designed software
checks access both within the country and from one or more control locations simultaneously. Anomalies are analyzed and determinations are made as to whether a site is accessible or not, and if the latter, how the inaccessibility occurs. In some instances, block-pages—
Web sites that explicitly confirm blocking—are yielded for requests for banned content. In
other instances, connections are simply broken. In some cases, special filtering software is
employed, while in others routers are manually configured to block.
Beyond Denial
5