architecture of control—through technology, regulation, norms, and political calculus
—has emerged to shape a new geopolitical information landscape.
In 2008, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) published its first global study—Access Denied:
The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering 4 —which documented how states are
seeking to establish borders in cyberspace. Our snapshot of 41 countries discovered
that states were busy constructing defensive perimeters to deny access to unwanted
content. For the most part, these methods consisted of building firewalls at key Internet choke points. The People’s Republic of China was among the first to adopt national
filtering systems at the backbone of the country’s Internet—popularly known as the
‘‘Great Firewall of China’’—and it has become a paradigm of Internet censorship ever
since. ‘‘Chinese-style’’ filtering—as we call it here—represents the first generation of
Internet control techniques.
In Chinese-style filtering, lists of Internet protocol (IP) addresses, keywords, and/or
domains are programmed into routers or software packages that are situated at key
Internet choke points, typically at international gateways or among major Internet service providers (ISPs). 5 Requests that are made for any information contained in the
block lists are denied for citizens living within those jurisdictions. The latter can happen in a variety of ways, with greater and lesser degrees of transparency, but it is almost
always static, fixed in time, and relatively easy to discern using the methods developed
over time by the OpenNet Initiative’s researchers (see box on ONI’s methodology).
Moreover, determined Internet users can circumvent them with relative ease.
Not all countries have been as forthright with their rationale for filtering Internet
content as China. Our research for Access Denied also found coyness on the part of
many states to admit seeking to control Internet content. In many cases, denial of access occurred extralegally, or under the guise of opaque national security laws. Often,
ISPs were simply asked or told to block access to specific content without any reference
to existing law. Other times, blockages were difficult to distinguish from network errors
or other technical problems, like denial of service attacks, but seemed suspiciously connected to political events. Many of the countries listed in our first report denied that
they were in fact blocking access to Internet content or had any connection to attacks
on services. We saw these events as anomalies insofar as they did not fit the paradigm
of Chinese style filtering and largely eluded the methodologies that we had developed
to test for Internet censorship. 6
We have subsequently come to learn that these anomalies were, in fact, emerging
norms. Since our research for Access Denied was conducted, a sea change has occurred
in the policies and practices of Internet controls. States no longer fear pariah status by
openly declaring their intent to regulate and control cyberspace. The convenient rubric
of terrorism, child pornography, and cyber security has contributed to a growing expectation that states should enforce order in cyberspace, including policing unwanted
content. Paradoxically, advanced democratic states within the Organization for Secu4
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
—has emerged to shape a new geopolitical information landscape.
In 2008, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) published its first global study—Access Denied:
The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering 4 —which documented how states are
seeking to establish borders in cyberspace. Our snapshot of 41 countries discovered
that states were busy constructing defensive perimeters to deny access to unwanted
content. For the most part, these methods consisted of building firewalls at key Internet choke points. The People’s Republic of China was among the first to adopt national
filtering systems at the backbone of the country’s Internet—popularly known as the
‘‘Great Firewall of China’’—and it has become a paradigm of Internet censorship ever
since. ‘‘Chinese-style’’ filtering—as we call it here—represents the first generation of
Internet control techniques.
In Chinese-style filtering, lists of Internet protocol (IP) addresses, keywords, and/or
domains are programmed into routers or software packages that are situated at key
Internet choke points, typically at international gateways or among major Internet service providers (ISPs). 5 Requests that are made for any information contained in the
block lists are denied for citizens living within those jurisdictions. The latter can happen in a variety of ways, with greater and lesser degrees of transparency, but it is almost
always static, fixed in time, and relatively easy to discern using the methods developed
over time by the OpenNet Initiative’s researchers (see box on ONI’s methodology).
Moreover, determined Internet users can circumvent them with relative ease.
Not all countries have been as forthright with their rationale for filtering Internet
content as China. Our research for Access Denied also found coyness on the part of
many states to admit seeking to control Internet content. In many cases, denial of access occurred extralegally, or under the guise of opaque national security laws. Often,
ISPs were simply asked or told to block access to specific content without any reference
to existing law. Other times, blockages were difficult to distinguish from network errors
or other technical problems, like denial of service attacks, but seemed suspiciously connected to political events. Many of the countries listed in our first report denied that
they were in fact blocking access to Internet content or had any connection to attacks
on services. We saw these events as anomalies insofar as they did not fit the paradigm
of Chinese style filtering and largely eluded the methodologies that we had developed
to test for Internet censorship. 6
We have subsequently come to learn that these anomalies were, in fact, emerging
norms. Since our research for Access Denied was conducted, a sea change has occurred
in the policies and practices of Internet controls. States no longer fear pariah status by
openly declaring their intent to regulate and control cyberspace. The convenient rubric
of terrorism, child pornography, and cyber security has contributed to a growing expectation that states should enforce order in cyberspace, including policing unwanted
content. Paradoxically, advanced democratic states within the Organization for Secu4
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski