The autonomous republic of Nakhchivan, an exclave of Azerbaijan, closed down
Internet cafe ´s for several days in March 2008, according to the Azerbaijani press. 30
The reasons behind the ban remain unclear, but restrictive policies on seeking and
distributing information in the republic are not isolated cases. At the end of 2008, a
number of Web sites were locally blocked in Nakhchivan. 31
At the Internet cafe ´ level, many owners impose restrictions that prevent users from
downloading large attachments and visiting certain pornographic sites. But these policies are not universal, and they are implemented at the discretion of Internet cafe ´
owners.
At the business level, most employers limit access to the Internet through the use of
intelligent firewalls that restrict the downloading of files with certain extensions (.mp3,
.avi, .mpg, .mov, etc.), as well as access to storage file servers and to the servers of
instant messaging clients such as ICQ, MSN, Skype, and others.
The ongoing cyberwar between Azerbaijani and Armenian hackers has also caused
disruptions to some Web sites and ISPs. In early 2007, five Armenian Web sites were
inaccessible, and users were displayed a block page commenting on the political affiliation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 32 At the same time, the Web site of the
Azerbaijani Public Television ITV was taken down. 33 Since most of the allegedly inaccessible sites contained oppositional political content, there are allegations that the
Azerbaijani government was involved in the attacks. However, ONI testing could not
confirm these suspicions. The ONI did not test for political issues related to the proclaimed independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 34
Conclusion
The Internet in Azerbaijan remains for the most part ‘‘free and open’’ as a result of the
government’s strong interest in converting the country into an ‘‘ICT hub’’ for the region. However, evidence of second- and third-generation controls is mounting. As the
IT market is not yet fully liberalized, the commercial ISPs operate under economically
inconvenient conditions set by the state monopolist, which stifle smaller competitors.
Government pressure on content providers is not isolated and takes different manifestations ranging from surveillance to the shutting down of commercial activities.
Instances of ‘‘just-in-time’’ filtering appeared to result from ‘‘informal’’ requests by
state officials to ISP operators and were limited in duration and scope. Moreover, public
pressure led to a swift reversal of the policies. That said, the filtering requests appear to
be directed through informal channels. Given the prospect of increased use of the
Internet by Azerbaijani opposition groups and the government’s sensitivity to opposition, we may expect to see some attempts to regulate Internet content and further
instances of ‘‘just-in-time’’ filtering affecting opposition Web sites.
Azerbaijan
157
Internet cafe ´s for several days in March 2008, according to the Azerbaijani press. 30
The reasons behind the ban remain unclear, but restrictive policies on seeking and
distributing information in the republic are not isolated cases. At the end of 2008, a
number of Web sites were locally blocked in Nakhchivan. 31
At the Internet cafe ´ level, many owners impose restrictions that prevent users from
downloading large attachments and visiting certain pornographic sites. But these policies are not universal, and they are implemented at the discretion of Internet cafe ´
owners.
At the business level, most employers limit access to the Internet through the use of
intelligent firewalls that restrict the downloading of files with certain extensions (.mp3,
.avi, .mpg, .mov, etc.), as well as access to storage file servers and to the servers of
instant messaging clients such as ICQ, MSN, Skype, and others.
The ongoing cyberwar between Azerbaijani and Armenian hackers has also caused
disruptions to some Web sites and ISPs. In early 2007, five Armenian Web sites were
inaccessible, and users were displayed a block page commenting on the political affiliation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 32 At the same time, the Web site of the
Azerbaijani Public Television ITV was taken down. 33 Since most of the allegedly inaccessible sites contained oppositional political content, there are allegations that the
Azerbaijani government was involved in the attacks. However, ONI testing could not
confirm these suspicions. The ONI did not test for political issues related to the proclaimed independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 34
Conclusion
The Internet in Azerbaijan remains for the most part ‘‘free and open’’ as a result of the
government’s strong interest in converting the country into an ‘‘ICT hub’’ for the region. However, evidence of second- and third-generation controls is mounting. As the
IT market is not yet fully liberalized, the commercial ISPs operate under economically
inconvenient conditions set by the state monopolist, which stifle smaller competitors.
Government pressure on content providers is not isolated and takes different manifestations ranging from surveillance to the shutting down of commercial activities.
Instances of ‘‘just-in-time’’ filtering appeared to result from ‘‘informal’’ requests by
state officials to ISP operators and were limited in duration and scope. Moreover, public
pressure led to a swift reversal of the policies. That said, the filtering requests appear to
be directed through informal channels. Given the prospect of increased use of the
Internet by Azerbaijani opposition groups and the government’s sensitivity to opposition, we may expect to see some attempts to regulate Internet content and further
instances of ‘‘just-in-time’’ filtering affecting opposition Web sites.
Azerbaijan
157