interrupted because of financial difficulties and opposition from ISPs and the Internet
community.
In order to deal with cyber attacks, the MCIT is planning to establish a council dealing with Internet-related problems. 26 The Azerbaijani Internet community is hoping
that the proposed council will be able to decrease cyber security risks without undermining the privacy of users. Another recent MCIT initiative is the launch of an Internet antihackers agency.
There are several reported cases of people arrested because of content posted online.
The author of the Web site http://www.pur.gen.az, infamous for its biting humorous
content, posted a caricature of the president of Azerbaijan in 2006. In 2007, the Ministry of National Security searched one of the Internet cafe ´s in Baku and discovered
this caricature on the cache page. The author and the webmaster of the site, as well
as several cafe ´ guests, were arrested and indicted for organized criminal activities. The
individuals were released several days later, but the Web site was shut down by its
owners in order to avoid further prosecution.
Another case followed the rapid increase of the price of petrol, gas, and electricity in
the country in January 2007. The author of http://www.susmayaq.biz 27 published a
protest letter to the president online. As a result, the author was arrested, and the
Web site was temporarily inaccessible on ten Azerbaijani ISPs from January to March
2007. 28 After a protest by youth organizations, the author was released without charges.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative tested for content filtering on four ISPs—
AzNet, DeltaTelecom, AzerOnline, and AzEuroTel, as well as several end user locations
(such as Internet cafe ´s). Most of the ISPs in the country purchase international traffic
from Delta Telecom and utilize the infrastructure of AzTelecom for local traffic. It
appears that most of the filtering occurs on Delta Telecom lines. The ONI found reverse
filtering on a number of U.S. military sites.
Evidence of second-generation controls was also evident in the run-up to the 2008
parliamentary elections. The political section of the most popular online forum (http://
www.day.az/forum) in Azerbaijan was removed around 20 days before the elections
and was still inactive in May 2009.
The popular opposition Web blog Tinsohbeti.com was blocked in March 2008 after
it published an article detailing the political and economic problems in Azerbaijan.
Earlier, in 2006, the same Web site was blocked because it posted satirical cartoons of
the president. 29 Before the presidential elections in October 2008, the Web site was
unblocked, but by then the original domain registration had expired and no longer
hosted the opposition Web blog.
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Azerbaijan
community.
In order to deal with cyber attacks, the MCIT is planning to establish a council dealing with Internet-related problems. 26 The Azerbaijani Internet community is hoping
that the proposed council will be able to decrease cyber security risks without undermining the privacy of users. Another recent MCIT initiative is the launch of an Internet antihackers agency.
There are several reported cases of people arrested because of content posted online.
The author of the Web site http://www.pur.gen.az, infamous for its biting humorous
content, posted a caricature of the president of Azerbaijan in 2006. In 2007, the Ministry of National Security searched one of the Internet cafe ´s in Baku and discovered
this caricature on the cache page. The author and the webmaster of the site, as well
as several cafe ´ guests, were arrested and indicted for organized criminal activities. The
individuals were released several days later, but the Web site was shut down by its
owners in order to avoid further prosecution.
Another case followed the rapid increase of the price of petrol, gas, and electricity in
the country in January 2007. The author of http://www.susmayaq.biz 27 published a
protest letter to the president online. As a result, the author was arrested, and the
Web site was temporarily inaccessible on ten Azerbaijani ISPs from January to March
2007. 28 After a protest by youth organizations, the author was released without charges.
ONI Testing Results
In 2007 and 2008, the OpenNet Initiative tested for content filtering on four ISPs—
AzNet, DeltaTelecom, AzerOnline, and AzEuroTel, as well as several end user locations
(such as Internet cafe ´s). Most of the ISPs in the country purchase international traffic
from Delta Telecom and utilize the infrastructure of AzTelecom for local traffic. It
appears that most of the filtering occurs on Delta Telecom lines. The ONI found reverse
filtering on a number of U.S. military sites.
Evidence of second-generation controls was also evident in the run-up to the 2008
parliamentary elections. The political section of the most popular online forum (http://
www.day.az/forum) in Azerbaijan was removed around 20 days before the elections
and was still inactive in May 2009.
The popular opposition Web blog Tinsohbeti.com was blocked in March 2008 after
it published an article detailing the political and economic problems in Azerbaijan.
Earlier, in 2006, the same Web site was blocked because it posted satirical cartoons of
the president. 29 Before the presidential elections in October 2008, the Web site was
unblocked, but by then the original domain registration had expired and no longer
hosted the opposition Web blog.
156
Azerbaijan