1 Kazakhstan followed the Russian example, requiring ISPs to install SORM-II in order
to register and maintain electronic records of customers’ Internet activities.
1 Azerbaijan made an unsuccessful attempt to employ technologies similar to SORM-II.
As of 2009, surveillance does occur, but mainly by way of visits to ISPs and Internet
cafe ´s by officials from the State Security Service.
1 In Uzbekistan, the principal intelligence agency, the National Security Service (SNB),
monitors the Uzbek segment of the Internet and works with the main regulatory body
to impose censorship. As all ISPs must rent channels from the state monopoly provider,
available evidence strongly suggests that Internet traffic is recorded and monitored by
means of a centralized system. SNB officers frequently visit ISPs and Internet cafe ´st o
monitor compliance.
1 In Ukraine, the security services have developed a capacity to monitor Internet traffic,
and legislation has been proposed to limit access to ‘‘questionable’’ content for reasons
of national security. The security services are also empowered to initiate criminal investigations and use wiretapping devices.
1 In Belarus, special services conduct active and warrantless surveillance of Internet
activities under the pretext of national security using a system similar to SORM-II.
Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine have all established specialized units under
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Department ‘‘K’’) trained in combating cyber crime.
Specialized technical units have also been established in other security services and
ministries of defense in these countries.
Other Means to Control the Internet
The ONI has documented the use of a wide range of measures to control the Internet—
legal, administrative, and technological, as well as psychological: threats and physical
violence, which usually are designed to cultivate a culture of self-censorship among
Internet users. In some cases these measures are used only at times of heightened political tensions and are limited in scope and duration, making them difficult to document
and report.
The following subsections list some of the second- and third-generation techniques
documented by the ONI during the last four years.
Event-Based Interventions The CIS is the first region in which ONI research documented the presence of ‘‘event-based’’ filtering. This form of filtering differs in technical execution from more conventional filtering forms (such as those that rely on block
lists) and is more difficult to track and definitively ascertain.
The Case of Kyrgyzstan (2005) During Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 parliamentary elections,
two ISPs were disrupted by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Following the
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CIS Overview
to register and maintain electronic records of customers’ Internet activities.
1 Azerbaijan made an unsuccessful attempt to employ technologies similar to SORM-II.
As of 2009, surveillance does occur, but mainly by way of visits to ISPs and Internet
cafe ´s by officials from the State Security Service.
1 In Uzbekistan, the principal intelligence agency, the National Security Service (SNB),
monitors the Uzbek segment of the Internet and works with the main regulatory body
to impose censorship. As all ISPs must rent channels from the state monopoly provider,
available evidence strongly suggests that Internet traffic is recorded and monitored by
means of a centralized system. SNB officers frequently visit ISPs and Internet cafe ´st o
monitor compliance.
1 In Ukraine, the security services have developed a capacity to monitor Internet traffic,
and legislation has been proposed to limit access to ‘‘questionable’’ content for reasons
of national security. The security services are also empowered to initiate criminal investigations and use wiretapping devices.
1 In Belarus, special services conduct active and warrantless surveillance of Internet
activities under the pretext of national security using a system similar to SORM-II.
Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine have all established specialized units under
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Department ‘‘K’’) trained in combating cyber crime.
Specialized technical units have also been established in other security services and
ministries of defense in these countries.
Other Means to Control the Internet
The ONI has documented the use of a wide range of measures to control the Internet—
legal, administrative, and technological, as well as psychological: threats and physical
violence, which usually are designed to cultivate a culture of self-censorship among
Internet users. In some cases these measures are used only at times of heightened political tensions and are limited in scope and duration, making them difficult to document
and report.
The following subsections list some of the second- and third-generation techniques
documented by the ONI during the last four years.
Event-Based Interventions The CIS is the first region in which ONI research documented the presence of ‘‘event-based’’ filtering. This form of filtering differs in technical execution from more conventional filtering forms (such as those that rely on block
lists) and is more difficult to track and definitively ascertain.
The Case of Kyrgyzstan (2005) During Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 parliamentary elections,
two ISPs were disrupted by distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Following the
128
CIS Overview