tise to other CIS states. Since late 2000, Russia’s ‘‘Doctrine of Information Security’’ has
been adapted (in various forms and guises) as the basic precept defining the national
strategic value of the Internet and the ‘‘national informational space’’ in most CIS
countries. 14
Governments see the Internet as a very direct and personal media that reaches into
people’s homes faster and deeper than traditional media. As it is subject to less
regulation and less control than the traditional media, its potential impact on national
security is seen as greater than that of mass media. Consequently, several governments
have actively moved to restrict foreign influences ostensibly to safeguard the citizens
from being exposed to any ‘‘damaging’’ and subversive content online. This is the
case in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and in 2009 the issue of designating the Internet as a national strategic sector of the economy was included in Russian legislation for
a second time. 15 Such a designation would limit the percentage of foreign investment
in Internet companies and would expose the sector to a number of usage restrictions.
Surveillance
Russia’s legal approach to Internet surveillance for law enforcement (that is, the System
for Operational-Investigative Activities or SORM-II, which allows security services
unfettered physical access to ISP networks) has influenced the way in which other CIS
countries have approached surveillance of the Internet.
At the regulatory and technical level, SORM-II, (which came into effect in Russia in
2000 16 ) requires ISPs to provide the Federal Security Service (FSB) with statistics about
all Internet traffic that goes through the ISP servers (including the time of an online
session, the IP address of the user, and the data that were transmitted). 17 The ISPs
themselves are responsible for the cost and maintenance of the hardware and connections. Providers’ objections to SORM-II, which raised concerns about individual
privacy, resulted in the ISPs being stripped of their licenses. 18
In many respects, SORM-II is not unlike a combination of the United States’ Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 19 and the recent ‘‘warrantless’’ provisions for wiretapping, including the PATRIOT Act 20 passed after the attacks
of 9/11. Russian legislation formally protects individual privacy, prohibiting wiretapping of any kind without a court order. 21 As a consequence, SORM-II requires government personnel to obtain a court order to intercept telephone conversations,
electronic communications, or postal correspondence. In reality, however, the FSB
does not bother to seek a warrant. Recently, a senior FSB official sought to apply similar
registration requirements for all mobile phones with Internet capabilities. However,
despite this formidable surveillance potential, there is doubt about the actual capacity
of the FSB to analyze the data collected. 22
Most CIS countries have followed Russia’s lead in implementing Internet surveillance. These include the following:
CIS Overview
127
been adapted (in various forms and guises) as the basic precept defining the national
strategic value of the Internet and the ‘‘national informational space’’ in most CIS
countries. 14
Governments see the Internet as a very direct and personal media that reaches into
people’s homes faster and deeper than traditional media. As it is subject to less
regulation and less control than the traditional media, its potential impact on national
security is seen as greater than that of mass media. Consequently, several governments
have actively moved to restrict foreign influences ostensibly to safeguard the citizens
from being exposed to any ‘‘damaging’’ and subversive content online. This is the
case in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and in 2009 the issue of designating the Internet as a national strategic sector of the economy was included in Russian legislation for
a second time. 15 Such a designation would limit the percentage of foreign investment
in Internet companies and would expose the sector to a number of usage restrictions.
Surveillance
Russia’s legal approach to Internet surveillance for law enforcement (that is, the System
for Operational-Investigative Activities or SORM-II, which allows security services
unfettered physical access to ISP networks) has influenced the way in which other CIS
countries have approached surveillance of the Internet.
At the regulatory and technical level, SORM-II, (which came into effect in Russia in
2000 16 ) requires ISPs to provide the Federal Security Service (FSB) with statistics about
all Internet traffic that goes through the ISP servers (including the time of an online
session, the IP address of the user, and the data that were transmitted). 17 The ISPs
themselves are responsible for the cost and maintenance of the hardware and connections. Providers’ objections to SORM-II, which raised concerns about individual
privacy, resulted in the ISPs being stripped of their licenses. 18
In many respects, SORM-II is not unlike a combination of the United States’ Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 19 and the recent ‘‘warrantless’’ provisions for wiretapping, including the PATRIOT Act 20 passed after the attacks
of 9/11. Russian legislation formally protects individual privacy, prohibiting wiretapping of any kind without a court order. 21 As a consequence, SORM-II requires government personnel to obtain a court order to intercept telephone conversations,
electronic communications, or postal correspondence. In reality, however, the FSB
does not bother to seek a warrant. Recently, a senior FSB official sought to apply similar
registration requirements for all mobile phones with Internet capabilities. However,
despite this formidable surveillance potential, there is doubt about the actual capacity
of the FSB to analyze the data collected. 22
Most CIS countries have followed Russia’s lead in implementing Internet surveillance. These include the following:
CIS Overview
127