was a similar campaign (also allegedly organized by nationalist pro-government Russian hackers) that occurred at the same time as major combat operations in Georgia
(August 2008). The latter campaign targeting Georgian online media and government
Web sites led Georgian authorities to filter access to Russian Internet sites (allegedly as
a means of self-defense against Russian cyber propaganda) and resulted in an information vacuum in Tbilisi during the critical days where it was unclear whether Russian
troops would stop their advance into Georgia.
Next-generation Internet controls have also been utilized during elections. For example, reports indicate that in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and (allegedly) Russia 1 pro-government
forces selectively used denial-of-service (DoS) attacks during elections in order to silence
opposition and independent media. During periods of heightened political tensions,
countries such as Armenia and Belarus have employed legal and technical means to
seize control of domain space, or shut down access to the Internet.
In the last 20 years, rapid changes have been a constant phenomenon in the CIS, but
Western-sponsored democratic reforms have only been partially successful. In recent
years a new authoritarianism has emerged in the region, with many governments seeking to reassert control over the national information sphere.
At the same time, many countries of the CIS have adopted national development
strategies that emphasize information technology (IT) as a means for economic
growth, with some even declaring their intent to become regional ‘‘IT powerhouses.’’
However, as a consequence of the color revolutions in the early to mid-2000s in
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, many CIS states—particularly those with authoritarian tendencies—are aware of the consequences that this ‘‘technological
empowerment’’ may prompt. Many in the region now see the Internet and other
communications channels in national strategic terms, and these countries have increasingly turned to security-based arguments—such as the need to secure ‘‘national
informational space’’—to justify regulation of the sector. Consequently, the region is
a leader in the development of next-generation information controls.
In 2007 and 2008, ONI tested for the presence of filtering in all CIS countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The results of ONI testing yield significant patterns of first-generation filtering in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan pursued pervasive filtering of the kind
found in China and Iran. Turkmenistan’s Internet is even more tightly restricted, with
access available only through a single government provider. In other countries, strong
evidence of second- and third-generation controls is emerging, with filtering occurring
at strategic junctures, as well as in indirect and less detectable ways often supported by
restrictive legal regimes. In almost all countries, filtering also occurred on corporate
networks (such as educational and research networks), where accepted usage policies
(AUPs) dictated that inappropriate content was not permitted; or in ‘‘edge locations’’
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CIS Overview
(August 2008). The latter campaign targeting Georgian online media and government
Web sites led Georgian authorities to filter access to Russian Internet sites (allegedly as
a means of self-defense against Russian cyber propaganda) and resulted in an information vacuum in Tbilisi during the critical days where it was unclear whether Russian
troops would stop their advance into Georgia.
Next-generation Internet controls have also been utilized during elections. For example, reports indicate that in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and (allegedly) Russia 1 pro-government
forces selectively used denial-of-service (DoS) attacks during elections in order to silence
opposition and independent media. During periods of heightened political tensions,
countries such as Armenia and Belarus have employed legal and technical means to
seize control of domain space, or shut down access to the Internet.
In the last 20 years, rapid changes have been a constant phenomenon in the CIS, but
Western-sponsored democratic reforms have only been partially successful. In recent
years a new authoritarianism has emerged in the region, with many governments seeking to reassert control over the national information sphere.
At the same time, many countries of the CIS have adopted national development
strategies that emphasize information technology (IT) as a means for economic
growth, with some even declaring their intent to become regional ‘‘IT powerhouses.’’
However, as a consequence of the color revolutions in the early to mid-2000s in
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, many CIS states—particularly those with authoritarian tendencies—are aware of the consequences that this ‘‘technological
empowerment’’ may prompt. Many in the region now see the Internet and other
communications channels in national strategic terms, and these countries have increasingly turned to security-based arguments—such as the need to secure ‘‘national
informational space’’—to justify regulation of the sector. Consequently, the region is
a leader in the development of next-generation information controls.
In 2007 and 2008, ONI tested for the presence of filtering in all CIS countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The results of ONI testing yield significant patterns of first-generation filtering in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan pursued pervasive filtering of the kind
found in China and Iran. Turkmenistan’s Internet is even more tightly restricted, with
access available only through a single government provider. In other countries, strong
evidence of second- and third-generation controls is emerging, with filtering occurring
at strategic junctures, as well as in indirect and less detectable ways often supported by
restrictive legal regimes. In almost all countries, filtering also occurred on corporate
networks (such as educational and research networks), where accepted usage policies
(AUPs) dictated that inappropriate content was not permitted; or in ‘‘edge locations’’
120
CIS Overview