signatories to UNCLOS are not allowed to make reservations nor amendments to the
principle.
111
There is a problematic perception among international lawyers that coastal states’
expected aggressiveness in asserting jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf, via
constant attempts to place as much ocean floor under national jurisdiction as
possible, symbolizes a decline of the common heritage principle. This chapter
identified a certain insistence among scholars in portraying coastal states’ jurisdictional ambitions as the source of evil in the law of the sea, a move that does not help
assess the difficulties ahead of the international community regarding the application
of the common heritage principle.
Finally, it was discussed the extent to which the common heritage principle has
influence the regime of resource exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm
and the practical challenges ahead of the implementation the revenue-sharing mechanism contained in Art. 82 UNCLOS. Overall, despite the challenges analyzed
supra, concerted efforts to create an international regime for the submerged spaces
beyond national jurisdiction have been successful. In view of overlapping norms
from different regimes of distinct maritime spaces, it is urgent to identify the coastal
states rights to regulate environmental issues on the outer continental shelf, a task in
which UNCLOS only partially helps. Given the environmental factor, and the
interconnectedness of international legal subsystems,
112 resorting to international
environmental law instruments is advisable.
Finally, it became clear the existence of a confrontation between calls for a
“renewed ethos” for the mare liberum doctrine, in which environmental rights are
better placed in the relationship with traditional freedoms of the seas, as opposed to
calls for a detachment from the “territorial mentality” that allegedly purports more
losses than gains to a holistic marine environmental ocean governance. Both forces
press against each other and the space of the outer continental shelf corresponds to
the optimal battlefield for both, given the confluence of elements of high seas
freedoms and territorial mentality governing the zone. Chapter 6 discusses those
opposing calls and takes a stance towards the better placement of environmental
rights and duties in the relationship with the traditional freedoms of the seas, for the
reasons and motives exposed therein.
References
Anand RP (2004) Studies in international law and history. Springer, Dordrecht
Bastos FL (2012) Setting the field for future ‘mineral rushes’: some reflections on the international
regime for the exploration and exploitation of marine minerals. In: Ribeiro MC (ed) 30 years
111 For Rüdiger Wolfrum, however, the common heritage principle does not impede deep seabed
mining by states not party to UNCLOS. See Wolfrum (1983), p. 313.
112 On the interaction between especial legal regimes and general international law, see Simma and
Pulkowski (2006), p. 483.
136
5 Jurisdictional Intersections Between the Continental Shelf and Other Maritime. . .
principle.
111
There is a problematic perception among international lawyers that coastal states’
expected aggressiveness in asserting jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf, via
constant attempts to place as much ocean floor under national jurisdiction as
possible, symbolizes a decline of the common heritage principle. This chapter
identified a certain insistence among scholars in portraying coastal states’ jurisdictional ambitions as the source of evil in the law of the sea, a move that does not help
assess the difficulties ahead of the international community regarding the application
of the common heritage principle.
Finally, it was discussed the extent to which the common heritage principle has
influence the regime of resource exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm
and the practical challenges ahead of the implementation the revenue-sharing mechanism contained in Art. 82 UNCLOS. Overall, despite the challenges analyzed
supra, concerted efforts to create an international regime for the submerged spaces
beyond national jurisdiction have been successful. In view of overlapping norms
from different regimes of distinct maritime spaces, it is urgent to identify the coastal
states rights to regulate environmental issues on the outer continental shelf, a task in
which UNCLOS only partially helps. Given the environmental factor, and the
interconnectedness of international legal subsystems,
112 resorting to international
environmental law instruments is advisable.
Finally, it became clear the existence of a confrontation between calls for a
“renewed ethos” for the mare liberum doctrine, in which environmental rights are
better placed in the relationship with traditional freedoms of the seas, as opposed to
calls for a detachment from the “territorial mentality” that allegedly purports more
losses than gains to a holistic marine environmental ocean governance. Both forces
press against each other and the space of the outer continental shelf corresponds to
the optimal battlefield for both, given the confluence of elements of high seas
freedoms and territorial mentality governing the zone. Chapter 6 discusses those
opposing calls and takes a stance towards the better placement of environmental
rights and duties in the relationship with the traditional freedoms of the seas, for the
reasons and motives exposed therein.
References
Anand RP (2004) Studies in international law and history. Springer, Dordrecht
Bastos FL (2012) Setting the field for future ‘mineral rushes’: some reflections on the international
regime for the exploration and exploitation of marine minerals. In: Ribeiro MC (ed) 30 years
111 For Rüdiger Wolfrum, however, the common heritage principle does not impede deep seabed
mining by states not party to UNCLOS. See Wolfrum (1983), p. 313.
112 On the interaction between especial legal regimes and general international law, see Simma and
Pulkowski (2006), p. 483.
136
5 Jurisdictional Intersections Between the Continental Shelf and Other Maritime. . .