Sexing the Internet
67
potentially curb their citizens ’ freedom of expression and privacy. In reality, however,
distinct sociopolitical entities can be crucial agents in censorship and surveillance.
Regarding regulation including censorship, Lawrence Lessig has developed a useful
model that identifi es the interrelated levels of norms, laws, markets, and architecture.
7
Laws constrain through the punishment they threaten; norms constrain through the
stigma a community imposes; markets constrain through the price that they exact;
and architectures, including hardware and programming code, constrain through the
physical burdens or obstacles they impose.
8 Lessig makes the point that norms,
markets, and architectures may generate their own regulatory effects, or they may be
regulated by laws and thus pass on this state regulatory endeavor indirectly.
Jean K. Chalaby ’ s work adds important dimensions of censorship to those identifi ed
by Lessig.
9 Most notably, she also recognizes media administration as well as outright
state violence. Media administration includes obligations to obtain licenses, registrations, or authorizations and the requirement to deposit fi nancial guarantees for entities wanting to establish media. Tactics of state violence encompass arbitrary arrests
or physical attacks, and violent forms of censorship can also be exercised by nonstate
agents, either at the behest of authorities or on their own. In fact, as recent research
by the ONI in the Commonwealth of Independent States has shown, indirect and at
times unlawful forms of Internet censorship instigated by states seem to play an
increasing role. These next-generation information controls are often kept secret by
states and may be outsourced to private or even illegally operating networks, including
botnets that commit denial-of-service attacks. Next-generation controls even go
beyond blocking content and services and include outsourced information campaigns
designed to mislead, intimidate, fragment, confound, or hinder those perceived as
enemies of the state.
Implicit in much of the literature addressing censorship is thus a defi nition that is
not restricted to the suppression of content already produced. Censorship also means
erecting enough hurdles to systematically keep specifi c content from reaching a social
group, either at all or in a meaningful way, or to keep people from producing content
in the fi rst place. Experiences of censorship can in turn lead to self-censorship — the
“ slow internalization of the mechanisms of suppression. ”
10
Surveillance, like censorship, can be instigated and carried out by different actors.
States generally practice surveillance with the same rationales they cite for censorship,
that is, to enhance national security and maintain order. They do so either directly,
often within legal frameworks, or indirectly by requiring other actors to collaborate
in surveillance, most notably media administrators, businesses, software writers, and
other social entities. Big market players are also important agents of surveillance in
their own right, and their motive is profi t maximization, either by selling data trails
left by customers or by using these data trails for marketing and advertising. Software
writers may also be considered as autonomously involved in surveillance, at least to
67
potentially curb their citizens ’ freedom of expression and privacy. In reality, however,
distinct sociopolitical entities can be crucial agents in censorship and surveillance.
Regarding regulation including censorship, Lawrence Lessig has developed a useful
model that identifi es the interrelated levels of norms, laws, markets, and architecture.
7
Laws constrain through the punishment they threaten; norms constrain through the
stigma a community imposes; markets constrain through the price that they exact;
and architectures, including hardware and programming code, constrain through the
physical burdens or obstacles they impose.
8 Lessig makes the point that norms,
markets, and architectures may generate their own regulatory effects, or they may be
regulated by laws and thus pass on this state regulatory endeavor indirectly.
Jean K. Chalaby ’ s work adds important dimensions of censorship to those identifi ed
by Lessig.
9 Most notably, she also recognizes media administration as well as outright
state violence. Media administration includes obligations to obtain licenses, registrations, or authorizations and the requirement to deposit fi nancial guarantees for entities wanting to establish media. Tactics of state violence encompass arbitrary arrests
or physical attacks, and violent forms of censorship can also be exercised by nonstate
agents, either at the behest of authorities or on their own. In fact, as recent research
by the ONI in the Commonwealth of Independent States has shown, indirect and at
times unlawful forms of Internet censorship instigated by states seem to play an
increasing role. These next-generation information controls are often kept secret by
states and may be outsourced to private or even illegally operating networks, including
botnets that commit denial-of-service attacks. Next-generation controls even go
beyond blocking content and services and include outsourced information campaigns
designed to mislead, intimidate, fragment, confound, or hinder those perceived as
enemies of the state.
Implicit in much of the literature addressing censorship is thus a defi nition that is
not restricted to the suppression of content already produced. Censorship also means
erecting enough hurdles to systematically keep specifi c content from reaching a social
group, either at all or in a meaningful way, or to keep people from producing content
in the fi rst place. Experiences of censorship can in turn lead to self-censorship — the
“ slow internalization of the mechanisms of suppression. ”
10
Surveillance, like censorship, can be instigated and carried out by different actors.
States generally practice surveillance with the same rationales they cite for censorship,
that is, to enhance national security and maintain order. They do so either directly,
often within legal frameworks, or indirectly by requiring other actors to collaborate
in surveillance, most notably media administrators, businesses, software writers, and
other social entities. Big market players are also important agents of surveillance in
their own right, and their motive is profi t maximization, either by selling data trails
left by customers or by using these data trails for marketing and advertising. Software
writers may also be considered as autonomously involved in surveillance, at least to