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Vee Vian Thien
The blogosphere is less able to respond effectively to these new measures than to
overt, linear regulatory controls. For example, MCMC ’ s broad interpretation of its
statutory powers is harder to utilize as a rallying point to mobilize the masses, when
compared to the state ’ s 2007 overwhelmingly disproportionate reliance on national
security laws to detain bloggers. Similarly, the blogosphere could neither marshal
technical resources to effectively resolve DDoS attacks nor concentrate criticism on
state actors to attract international sympathy, unlike its public campaign to evade the
DNS block. Although the blogosphere uncovered original photographs in the incidents involving circulated doctored images, criticism was limited to and directed
against pro-BN bloggers when no direct state-link was conclusively established.
Reasons for this shift are manifold. One view rests on a cynical assumption that
the Malaysian government ’ s actual goal is to extend existing state control over the
mainstream media to the Internet. By this account, the shift is simply the result of a
discovery that nonlinear controls have the twofold benefi ts of effi cacy and a lower
political price, as they are inherently more diffi cult to attribute to the state — which is
especially appealing to the embattled BN administration. An opposite interpretation
sees these controls as a positive sign of increased engagement between the state and
its subjects. Regardless of which view is taken, the pivotal point here is that the government has changed tack. Its change is signifi cant in the historical context because
the Malaysian government is rarely swayed by public pressure. For example, the most
widely circulated newspaper, The Star , was once a vocal critic of the Malaysian government. The state responded swiftly in 1987, revoking The Star ’ s publishing license in a
concerted strike against growing political dissent. When reinstated several months
later, The Star was and remains a pale version of its former self. Thus the Malaysian
government ’ s willingness to react and adapt to the blogosphere ’ s resistance, regardless
of its motivations for doing so, is unique.
My second suggestion is that there is now a dialogue between the state and the
political blogosphere. A combination of factors has created fertile ground for the
Malaysian blogosphere to take deep root in its current form in the Malaysian public
consciousness. They range from the inadvertent, such as a decade-old pledge not to
censor the Internet and BN ’ s current political vulnerability, to the unexpected, such
as the continuing Anwar sodomy saga and the fervency of online civil society activism. Arguably, the blogosphere has more successfully contested linear forms of governmental control than any other nonstate actor, forcing the Malaysian government
to engage in an asynchronous dialogue. The script of this colloquy is as follows: the
government initiated contact by attempting to impose hierarchical control over the
blogosphere and was met with ferocious resistance. This prompted the state to retreat
and rechannel its efforts instead through subtler means and competing with its own
information campaign. Features of the sociopolitical blogosphere that enabled this
initial exchange may now work to its disadvantage. For example, its decentralized
Vee Vian Thien
The blogosphere is less able to respond effectively to these new measures than to
overt, linear regulatory controls. For example, MCMC ’ s broad interpretation of its
statutory powers is harder to utilize as a rallying point to mobilize the masses, when
compared to the state ’ s 2007 overwhelmingly disproportionate reliance on national
security laws to detain bloggers. Similarly, the blogosphere could neither marshal
technical resources to effectively resolve DDoS attacks nor concentrate criticism on
state actors to attract international sympathy, unlike its public campaign to evade the
DNS block. Although the blogosphere uncovered original photographs in the incidents involving circulated doctored images, criticism was limited to and directed
against pro-BN bloggers when no direct state-link was conclusively established.
Reasons for this shift are manifold. One view rests on a cynical assumption that
the Malaysian government ’ s actual goal is to extend existing state control over the
mainstream media to the Internet. By this account, the shift is simply the result of a
discovery that nonlinear controls have the twofold benefi ts of effi cacy and a lower
political price, as they are inherently more diffi cult to attribute to the state — which is
especially appealing to the embattled BN administration. An opposite interpretation
sees these controls as a positive sign of increased engagement between the state and
its subjects. Regardless of which view is taken, the pivotal point here is that the government has changed tack. Its change is signifi cant in the historical context because
the Malaysian government is rarely swayed by public pressure. For example, the most
widely circulated newspaper, The Star , was once a vocal critic of the Malaysian government. The state responded swiftly in 1987, revoking The Star ’ s publishing license in a
concerted strike against growing political dissent. When reinstated several months
later, The Star was and remains a pale version of its former self. Thus the Malaysian
government ’ s willingness to react and adapt to the blogosphere ’ s resistance, regardless
of its motivations for doing so, is unique.
My second suggestion is that there is now a dialogue between the state and the
political blogosphere. A combination of factors has created fertile ground for the
Malaysian blogosphere to take deep root in its current form in the Malaysian public
consciousness. They range from the inadvertent, such as a decade-old pledge not to
censor the Internet and BN ’ s current political vulnerability, to the unexpected, such
as the continuing Anwar sodomy saga and the fervency of online civil society activism. Arguably, the blogosphere has more successfully contested linear forms of governmental control than any other nonstate actor, forcing the Malaysian government
to engage in an asynchronous dialogue. The script of this colloquy is as follows: the
government initiated contact by attempting to impose hierarchical control over the
blogosphere and was met with ferocious resistance. This prompted the state to retreat
and rechannel its efforts instead through subtler means and competing with its own
information campaign. Features of the sociopolitical blogosphere that enabled this
initial exchange may now work to its disadvantage. For example, its decentralized