46
Vee Vian Thien
“ linear, ” imposition of state power over cyberspace. First, it expanded its application of
existing defamation, sedition, and “ offensive content ” laws to bloggers. Second, it
proposed regulatory measures specifi cally targeted at bloggers or the Internet.
In January 2007, a landmark defamation suit was instigated by NSTP Corporation,
a publication company with close ties to BN, against two prominent political bloggers.
14 Subsequently, the government began detaining blogger-critics under various
national security laws from 2007 to 2008. Floods of complaints were also fi led with
the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), the main
Internet regulatory body, against sociopolitical bloggers for the criminal offense of
posting “ offensive content ” online.
15
Malaysian Internet service providers (ISPs) are required by law to comply with
written requests from MCMC to assist in preventing the commission of criminal
offenses, including the improper use of the Internet to circulate “ offensive content. ”
16
On August 27, 2008, MCMC issued an order to all Malaysian ISPs to deny access to
the controversial but popular Malaysia Today run by Raja Petra Kamarudin.
17 Only
TMNet, the main Malaysian ISP, complied with this order, applying a domain-name
block on Malaysia Today. This type of block is known as DNS tampering. It was signifi cant for its unprecedented utilization of MCMC ’ s broad statutory powers against
a Web site for offensive as opposed to fraudulent content. The timing of the block also
coincided with a highly symbolic parliamentary by-election in Permatang Pauh on
August 26, 2008, which saw the offi cial return of Anwar Ibrahim to parliament after
his incarceration in 1998.
Subsequently, the two main distributed denial of service (DDoS)
18 attacks on Malaysia Today occurred in September 2009 and September 2010, after Raja Petra released
stories on governmental corruption running to billions of ringgit that were corroborated by leaked classifi ed documents.
19 As with the 2008 DNS block, these attacks were
strategically timed, occurring when Internet traffi c to the site was exceptionally high.
Raja Petra has suggested that the intermittent and focused nature of the attacks indicates that its instigators were professional for-hire hackers.
20 Two other sites, Anwar
Ibrahim ’ s blog and Free Malaysia Today, an independent news portal, also reported
DDoS attacks on September 10, 2010.
21
In 2007, the Malaysian government announced plans to introduce two additional
regulatory measures specifi c to the political blogosphere. First, a Singapore-styled
registration scheme was proposed, which would have rendered registration compulsory for bloggers designated as “ political ” by MCMC.
22 In Singapore this scheme has
arguably chilled online political speech. In 2001 the founder of a popular and active
Singaporean political discussion board, Sintercom, chose to shut the site down upon
receiving notifi cation that Sintercom had been designated “ political ” because registration would hold him personally liable for all content appearing on Sintercom. This
includes anonymous libelous comments, thus exposing him to the risk of ruinous
Vee Vian Thien
“ linear, ” imposition of state power over cyberspace. First, it expanded its application of
existing defamation, sedition, and “ offensive content ” laws to bloggers. Second, it
proposed regulatory measures specifi cally targeted at bloggers or the Internet.
In January 2007, a landmark defamation suit was instigated by NSTP Corporation,
a publication company with close ties to BN, against two prominent political bloggers.
14 Subsequently, the government began detaining blogger-critics under various
national security laws from 2007 to 2008. Floods of complaints were also fi led with
the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), the main
Internet regulatory body, against sociopolitical bloggers for the criminal offense of
posting “ offensive content ” online.
15
Malaysian Internet service providers (ISPs) are required by law to comply with
written requests from MCMC to assist in preventing the commission of criminal
offenses, including the improper use of the Internet to circulate “ offensive content. ”
16
On August 27, 2008, MCMC issued an order to all Malaysian ISPs to deny access to
the controversial but popular Malaysia Today run by Raja Petra Kamarudin.
17 Only
TMNet, the main Malaysian ISP, complied with this order, applying a domain-name
block on Malaysia Today. This type of block is known as DNS tampering. It was signifi cant for its unprecedented utilization of MCMC ’ s broad statutory powers against
a Web site for offensive as opposed to fraudulent content. The timing of the block also
coincided with a highly symbolic parliamentary by-election in Permatang Pauh on
August 26, 2008, which saw the offi cial return of Anwar Ibrahim to parliament after
his incarceration in 1998.
Subsequently, the two main distributed denial of service (DDoS)
18 attacks on Malaysia Today occurred in September 2009 and September 2010, after Raja Petra released
stories on governmental corruption running to billions of ringgit that were corroborated by leaked classifi ed documents.
19 As with the 2008 DNS block, these attacks were
strategically timed, occurring when Internet traffi c to the site was exceptionally high.
Raja Petra has suggested that the intermittent and focused nature of the attacks indicates that its instigators were professional for-hire hackers.
20 Two other sites, Anwar
Ibrahim ’ s blog and Free Malaysia Today, an independent news portal, also reported
DDoS attacks on September 10, 2010.
21
In 2007, the Malaysian government announced plans to introduce two additional
regulatory measures specifi c to the political blogosphere. First, a Singapore-styled
registration scheme was proposed, which would have rendered registration compulsory for bloggers designated as “ political ” by MCMC.
22 In Singapore this scheme has
arguably chilled online political speech. In 2001 the founder of a popular and active
Singaporean political discussion board, Sintercom, chose to shut the site down upon
receiving notifi cation that Sintercom had been designated “ political ” because registration would hold him personally liable for all content appearing on Sintercom. This
includes anonymous libelous comments, thus exposing him to the risk of ruinous