Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority
39
26. Joseph Menn, Fatal System Error (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
27. Information Warfare Monitor, Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network ,
March 29, 2009, http://www.tracking-ghost.net /; Information Warfare Monitor and Shadowserver
Foundation, Shadows in the Cloud: An Investigation into Cyber Espionage 2.0 , April 6, 2010, http://
shadows-in-the-cloud.net/ ; “ Websites of Three Burmese News Agencies in Exile under Attack, ”
Mizzima News, September 17, 2008, http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1052-websites-of
-three-burmese-news-agencies-in-exile-under-attack.html ; Alexis Madrigal, “ The Inside Story of
How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks, ” The Atlantic, January 24, 2011, http://www
.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebook-responded-to
-tunisian-hacks/70044 ; and Alexis Madrigal, “ Most Sophisticated Malware Ever Targets Iran, ” The
Atlantic , September 22, 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/09/
most-sophisticated-malware-ever-targets-iran-possibly-state-backed/63420 .
28. James Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, “ Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War, ” Survival 53.1
(2011), 23 – 40.
29. Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, “ Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace, ” in
Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace , ed. Ronald Deibert, John
Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 15 – 34.
30. Sue Pleming, “ U.S. State Department Speaks to Twitter over Iran, ” Reuters, June 16, 2009, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/16/us-iran-election-twitter-usa-idUSWBT01137420090616 .
31. Eddan Katz, “ Holding Nokia Responsible for Surveilling Dissidents in Iran, ” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 13, 2010, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/saharkhiz-v-nokia .
32. Hamid Tehrani, “ Iran: Cyber Islamic Militarism on the March, ” Global Voices, February 19,
2010, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/02/19/iran-cyber-islamic-militarism-on-the-march .
33. Reports that were made in confi dence to one of the authors of this chapter indicate that the
Iranian cyber army had been able to penetrate deep into Green Revolution social movements
through the use of sophisticated malware. If these reports are credible, and there is a good possibility that they are, the unquestioned assumption often made about the one-way impact of
information and communications technologies (ICTs) on social and political liberation would
need some serious qualifi cation.
34. Bruce Etling and John Kelly, Mapping Iran ’ s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian
Blogosphere, Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2008 – 01, 2008, http://cyber.law.harvard
.edu/publications/2008/Mapping_Irans_Online_Public .
35. Noam Cohen, “ Twitter Puts Spotlight on Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas, ” New York Times, January 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/business/media/10link.html?_r=1 & partner=rss & emc=rss .
36. Lee Tae-hoon, “ Censorship on Pro-NK Web Sites Tight, ” Korea Times , September 9, 2010,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/09/113_72788.html .
37. The member states of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan are observers.
39
26. Joseph Menn, Fatal System Error (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
27. Information Warfare Monitor, Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network ,
March 29, 2009, http://www.tracking-ghost.net /; Information Warfare Monitor and Shadowserver
Foundation, Shadows in the Cloud: An Investigation into Cyber Espionage 2.0 , April 6, 2010, http://
shadows-in-the-cloud.net/ ; “ Websites of Three Burmese News Agencies in Exile under Attack, ”
Mizzima News, September 17, 2008, http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1052-websites-of
-three-burmese-news-agencies-in-exile-under-attack.html ; Alexis Madrigal, “ The Inside Story of
How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks, ” The Atlantic, January 24, 2011, http://www
.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebook-responded-to
-tunisian-hacks/70044 ; and Alexis Madrigal, “ Most Sophisticated Malware Ever Targets Iran, ” The
Atlantic , September 22, 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/09/
most-sophisticated-malware-ever-targets-iran-possibly-state-backed/63420 .
28. James Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, “ Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War, ” Survival 53.1
(2011), 23 – 40.
29. Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, “ Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace, ” in
Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace , ed. Ronald Deibert, John
Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 15 – 34.
30. Sue Pleming, “ U.S. State Department Speaks to Twitter over Iran, ” Reuters, June 16, 2009, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/16/us-iran-election-twitter-usa-idUSWBT01137420090616 .
31. Eddan Katz, “ Holding Nokia Responsible for Surveilling Dissidents in Iran, ” Electronic Frontier Foundation, October 13, 2010, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/saharkhiz-v-nokia .
32. Hamid Tehrani, “ Iran: Cyber Islamic Militarism on the March, ” Global Voices, February 19,
2010, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/02/19/iran-cyber-islamic-militarism-on-the-march .
33. Reports that were made in confi dence to one of the authors of this chapter indicate that the
Iranian cyber army had been able to penetrate deep into Green Revolution social movements
through the use of sophisticated malware. If these reports are credible, and there is a good possibility that they are, the unquestioned assumption often made about the one-way impact of
information and communications technologies (ICTs) on social and political liberation would
need some serious qualifi cation.
34. Bruce Etling and John Kelly, Mapping Iran ’ s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian
Blogosphere, Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2008 – 01, 2008, http://cyber.law.harvard
.edu/publications/2008/Mapping_Irans_Online_Public .
35. Noam Cohen, “ Twitter Puts Spotlight on Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas, ” New York Times, January 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/business/media/10link.html?_r=1 & partner=rss & emc=rss .
36. Lee Tae-hoon, “ Censorship on Pro-NK Web Sites Tight, ” Korea Times , September 9, 2010,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/09/113_72788.html .
37. The member states of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan are observers.