Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority
31
company Nokia-Siemens had provided Iranians with high-grade surveillance and datamining technologies that were employed with precision to identify communication
networks and arrest individual protesters.
31 The Iranian authorities also harvested
information from social networking sites, like Facebook and Twitter. It became quickly
apparent that the very same technologies that were fueling dissidents and activists
were being exploited with precision to identify, preempt, and disable them. A cloud
of paranoia swept through Green Movement activists and their supporters as if a
poisoned pill had been dropped into the well of social networking.
An even more ominous development was the emergence of a shadowy group
known as the Iranian cyber army during the Green Revolution, which, in a very public
fashion, began attacking opposition Web sites and hosting services connected to the
revolution ’ s supporters.
32 The evidence was not entirely clear at fi rst, with the group
making claims of support for the Iranian regime but leaving considerable speculation
as to their actual attribution. Some more recent reports have surfaced providing circumstantial evidence linking the Iranian cyber army to the country ’ s Revolutionary
Guard. But whether evidence exists or not, the impact is clear enough: a menacing
band of mercenaries took very vigorous offensive actions against adversaries.
33
The Iranian case illustrates that cyberspace has become both a means and a battleground for intense, multivaried contestation. A revealing portrait of this complex
space was recently undertaken in a joint analysis by Morningside Analytics and the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society, which mapped the Iranian blogosphere.
34
The mapping shows the relative place and size of the conservatives and moderate/
reformist components of Iranian cyberspace as represented by blogs, Web sites, and
individuals. The main takeaway of this analysis is that cyberspace does not neatly
or symmetrically line up in a sharp division between states and subjects. It is a
complex domain of dynamic interaction, contestation, and confl ict that involves
links between segments of governments, the private sector, religious movements, and
both civil and uncivil society. Big Brother may not be so big anymore: she can live
next door. He can be your neighbor, the storekeeper down the street, your colleague
from work, or the relatives who are living in Los Angeles or Toronto, as well as in
Tehran.
It is important to emphasize that the newly invigorated cyberspace control strategies are not exclusive to authoritarian regimes like Iran. Some of the norms driving
cyberspace controls are emanating from policies taken by liberal-democratic and
advanced industrialized countries. Within these regimes, governments are developing
wide-ranging and ambitious interventionist strategies in cyberspace, from the setting
up of units within their armed forces dedicated to fi ghting and winning wars in cyberspace to introducing legislation on surveillance, data retention, and sharing. To give
just one example, the New York Times recently reported that about 50,000 “ national
security letters ” are sent out each year by U.S. law enforcement to companies in which
31
company Nokia-Siemens had provided Iranians with high-grade surveillance and datamining technologies that were employed with precision to identify communication
networks and arrest individual protesters.
31 The Iranian authorities also harvested
information from social networking sites, like Facebook and Twitter. It became quickly
apparent that the very same technologies that were fueling dissidents and activists
were being exploited with precision to identify, preempt, and disable them. A cloud
of paranoia swept through Green Movement activists and their supporters as if a
poisoned pill had been dropped into the well of social networking.
An even more ominous development was the emergence of a shadowy group
known as the Iranian cyber army during the Green Revolution, which, in a very public
fashion, began attacking opposition Web sites and hosting services connected to the
revolution ’ s supporters.
32 The evidence was not entirely clear at fi rst, with the group
making claims of support for the Iranian regime but leaving considerable speculation
as to their actual attribution. Some more recent reports have surfaced providing circumstantial evidence linking the Iranian cyber army to the country ’ s Revolutionary
Guard. But whether evidence exists or not, the impact is clear enough: a menacing
band of mercenaries took very vigorous offensive actions against adversaries.
33
The Iranian case illustrates that cyberspace has become both a means and a battleground for intense, multivaried contestation. A revealing portrait of this complex
space was recently undertaken in a joint analysis by Morningside Analytics and the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society, which mapped the Iranian blogosphere.
34
The mapping shows the relative place and size of the conservatives and moderate/
reformist components of Iranian cyberspace as represented by blogs, Web sites, and
individuals. The main takeaway of this analysis is that cyberspace does not neatly
or symmetrically line up in a sharp division between states and subjects. It is a
complex domain of dynamic interaction, contestation, and confl ict that involves
links between segments of governments, the private sector, religious movements, and
both civil and uncivil society. Big Brother may not be so big anymore: she can live
next door. He can be your neighbor, the storekeeper down the street, your colleague
from work, or the relatives who are living in Los Angeles or Toronto, as well as in
Tehran.
It is important to emphasize that the newly invigorated cyberspace control strategies are not exclusive to authoritarian regimes like Iran. Some of the norms driving
cyberspace controls are emanating from policies taken by liberal-democratic and
advanced industrialized countries. Within these regimes, governments are developing
wide-ranging and ambitious interventionist strategies in cyberspace, from the setting
up of units within their armed forces dedicated to fi ghting and winning wars in cyberspace to introducing legislation on surveillance, data retention, and sharing. To give
just one example, the New York Times recently reported that about 50,000 “ national
security letters ” are sent out each year by U.S. law enforcement to companies in which