30
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
are driven by the need to control dissent and opposition, protect and promote national
identity and territorial control, or simply respond to the growing pressures to regulate
cyberspace for copyright control, child protection, or antiterrorism measures. Among
the most impressive drivers is the perceived need to develop armed-forces capabilities
in cyberspace, which in turn has triggered an arms race in cyberspace. Naturally, such
assertions of state power are generating countermovements and resistance from individuals, civil society groups, and other states, which in turn create conditions for
multiple contestations.
Although there are many cases that have become emblematic of this complex
dynamic, perhaps the most potent is that of Iran in 2009. Thirty years before, the
country had experienced fi rsthand how small media could cause a revolution, in that
case through distributed cassette tapes spreading the message of resistance on behalf
of the Ayatollah Khomeini regime. During the summer of 2009, mass mobilization
occurred rapidly following disputed elections and charges of widespread fraud. Protests
spilled into the streets of Tehran and other urban centers, fueled by new technologies
and connected to networks of support over global social networking sites and among
civil society groups worldwide. An important catalyzing moment was the shooting
death of Neda Agha-Soltan, whose murder was captured by amateur video loaded
onto YouTube and other video-sharing sites, and then went viral on a global scale.
The video and the colors of the Green Revolution became a symbol of democratic
solidarity. For many in the Western press, academia, and the cognoscenti, the groundswell of support was evidence of the unstoppable might of social networks. It was not
uncommon to see headlines referencing a “ Twitter Revolution. ” At one point, members
of the Obama administration reportedly lobbied Twitter to keep the service reliable
and running in order to support the protests in the streets of Tehran.
30
But in and around the street demonstrations and social networking, the authorities
worked systematically to disable, disrupt, and neutralize opposition through a variety
of means. At the most basic level, the regime employed fi rst-generation controls of
Internet fi ltering to block access to social networking services and the sites and tools
used by dissidents and others to circumvent the controls. In and of themselves, these
fi rst-generation methods would easily have been bypassed and nullifi ed had that
been the limit of the Iranian regime ’ s tool kit. However, the Iranian authorities had
several other means at their disposal, employing the full range of second- and thirdgeneration control techniques. They instituted new laws and regulations that prevented the use of circumvention technologies and the distribution of information
threatening to the regime or insulting of Islam, which created an additional level of
self-censorship and a climate of fear. Notably, the Iranian authorities defi ned content
that was defi ling Islam or insulting to the regime as “ cybercrime. ”
More importantly, though, authorities began to employ more offensive, active
techniques of information shaping and denial. The European telecommunications
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
are driven by the need to control dissent and opposition, protect and promote national
identity and territorial control, or simply respond to the growing pressures to regulate
cyberspace for copyright control, child protection, or antiterrorism measures. Among
the most impressive drivers is the perceived need to develop armed-forces capabilities
in cyberspace, which in turn has triggered an arms race in cyberspace. Naturally, such
assertions of state power are generating countermovements and resistance from individuals, civil society groups, and other states, which in turn create conditions for
multiple contestations.
Although there are many cases that have become emblematic of this complex
dynamic, perhaps the most potent is that of Iran in 2009. Thirty years before, the
country had experienced fi rsthand how small media could cause a revolution, in that
case through distributed cassette tapes spreading the message of resistance on behalf
of the Ayatollah Khomeini regime. During the summer of 2009, mass mobilization
occurred rapidly following disputed elections and charges of widespread fraud. Protests
spilled into the streets of Tehran and other urban centers, fueled by new technologies
and connected to networks of support over global social networking sites and among
civil society groups worldwide. An important catalyzing moment was the shooting
death of Neda Agha-Soltan, whose murder was captured by amateur video loaded
onto YouTube and other video-sharing sites, and then went viral on a global scale.
The video and the colors of the Green Revolution became a symbol of democratic
solidarity. For many in the Western press, academia, and the cognoscenti, the groundswell of support was evidence of the unstoppable might of social networks. It was not
uncommon to see headlines referencing a “ Twitter Revolution. ” At one point, members
of the Obama administration reportedly lobbied Twitter to keep the service reliable
and running in order to support the protests in the streets of Tehran.
30
But in and around the street demonstrations and social networking, the authorities
worked systematically to disable, disrupt, and neutralize opposition through a variety
of means. At the most basic level, the regime employed fi rst-generation controls of
Internet fi ltering to block access to social networking services and the sites and tools
used by dissidents and others to circumvent the controls. In and of themselves, these
fi rst-generation methods would easily have been bypassed and nullifi ed had that
been the limit of the Iranian regime ’ s tool kit. However, the Iranian authorities had
several other means at their disposal, employing the full range of second- and thirdgeneration control techniques. They instituted new laws and regulations that prevented the use of circumvention technologies and the distribution of information
threatening to the regime or insulting of Islam, which created an additional level of
self-censorship and a climate of fear. Notably, the Iranian authorities defi ned content
that was defi ling Islam or insulting to the regime as “ cybercrime. ”
More importantly, though, authorities began to employ more offensive, active
techniques of information shaping and denial. The European telecommunications