ONI Country Profi le
325
The fi rst incident in 1964 carved out Singapore as a separate state from the newly
created Federation of Malaysia,
9 and the second, on May 13, 1969, led to at least 100
fatalities overnight.
10
Given BN ’ s uninterrupted rule since 1957, the litmus test of political strength in
Malaysia ’ s fl awed constitutional democracy lies in a particular coalition ’ s ability to
maintain a two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament — the requisite majority for amending the Malaysian Federal Constitution.
11 Barisan Nasional has achieved
this majority in almost every election since independence, in effect removing any real
restriction on its legislative whims.
12 On the strength of this test, BN ’ s political record
is unblemished. It accounted for an unprecedented majority of 90.4 percent of all
votes in the 2004 general elections.
13 In this context, BN ’ s failure in the 2008 elections
to secure the necessary number of seats in Parliament is unsurprisingly considered “ a
debacle. ”
14
Running on a savvy online campaign, the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat
(PR),
15 became a meaningful political adversary to the incumbent BN for the fi rst time
in Malaysian history. In contrast to BN ’ s three Web sites, PR was reported to have more
than 7,500 Web sites and blogs, with little to no coverage in the mainstream media.
16
Underlying PR ’ s heavy reliance on the Internet for campaigning in 2008 is Malaysia ’ s
long history of state censorship of the mainstream media.
Three main mechanisms of censorship and media control coexist and are wielded
by the government in tandem. First, the Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984
(PPPA) and CMA subject all offl ine media (i.e., newspapers, television, and radio stations) to licensing regimes granted at the unfettered and unreviewable discretion of
various ministers.
17 Thus the mainstream media are forced to develop a norm of selfcensorship to toe an opaque and undefi ned executive line. Also, the Malaysian government has not hesitated to employ coercive national security laws against critical
publications and journalists.
18 Second, BN spearheaded a privatization campaign in
1998, enabling its component parties to acquire signifi cant corporate stakes in the
four main Malaysian daily newspapers. Third, the Malaysian government has taken
the view that the role of the press is to act as agents and proponents, not critics, of
national development.
19 Together, these factors restrict effective political campaigning
against BN and create a defi cit of objective, neutral reporting.
Internet in Malaysia
Since 1996, the Malaysian government has pursued an aggressive Internet implementation and development policy. The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) project was one
of its most visible initiatives. The MSC is a strip of approximately 290 square miles
of developed land meant to attract foreign IT research and development investors
through tax breaks and infrastructural support — for example, connecting the area
325
The fi rst incident in 1964 carved out Singapore as a separate state from the newly
created Federation of Malaysia,
9 and the second, on May 13, 1969, led to at least 100
fatalities overnight.
10
Given BN ’ s uninterrupted rule since 1957, the litmus test of political strength in
Malaysia ’ s fl awed constitutional democracy lies in a particular coalition ’ s ability to
maintain a two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament — the requisite majority for amending the Malaysian Federal Constitution.
11 Barisan Nasional has achieved
this majority in almost every election since independence, in effect removing any real
restriction on its legislative whims.
12 On the strength of this test, BN ’ s political record
is unblemished. It accounted for an unprecedented majority of 90.4 percent of all
votes in the 2004 general elections.
13 In this context, BN ’ s failure in the 2008 elections
to secure the necessary number of seats in Parliament is unsurprisingly considered “ a
debacle. ”
14
Running on a savvy online campaign, the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat
(PR),
15 became a meaningful political adversary to the incumbent BN for the fi rst time
in Malaysian history. In contrast to BN ’ s three Web sites, PR was reported to have more
than 7,500 Web sites and blogs, with little to no coverage in the mainstream media.
16
Underlying PR ’ s heavy reliance on the Internet for campaigning in 2008 is Malaysia ’ s
long history of state censorship of the mainstream media.
Three main mechanisms of censorship and media control coexist and are wielded
by the government in tandem. First, the Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984
(PPPA) and CMA subject all offl ine media (i.e., newspapers, television, and radio stations) to licensing regimes granted at the unfettered and unreviewable discretion of
various ministers.
17 Thus the mainstream media are forced to develop a norm of selfcensorship to toe an opaque and undefi ned executive line. Also, the Malaysian government has not hesitated to employ coercive national security laws against critical
publications and journalists.
18 Second, BN spearheaded a privatization campaign in
1998, enabling its component parties to acquire signifi cant corporate stakes in the
four main Malaysian daily newspapers. Third, the Malaysian government has taken
the view that the role of the press is to act as agents and proponents, not critics, of
national development.
19 Together, these factors restrict effective political campaigning
against BN and create a defi cit of objective, neutral reporting.
Internet in Malaysia
Since 1996, the Malaysian government has pursued an aggressive Internet implementation and development policy. The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) project was one
of its most visible initiatives. The MSC is a strip of approximately 290 square miles
of developed land meant to attract foreign IT research and development investors
through tax breaks and infrastructural support — for example, connecting the area