278
China
The online community has broadened the capacity for collective action on a variety
of fronts. Notable among these are so-called “ human fl esh search engines, ” which are
massive online collective research projects. They have focused on conducting crowdsourced investigations into a variety of incidents, from fi nding missing relatives to
exposing corruption of government offi cials, although they have also strayed into
questionable acts of vigilantism.
54 Discussion forums and blogs also offer new opportunities for organization and dissemination of information. Charter 08, a prodemocracy manifesto whose signatories included 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo,
was circulated by e-mail and other means and had gathered 10,000 signatures by
2010.
55 However, these discussion forums are not the exclusive domain of those critical
of government. The “ Fifty Cent Party, ” named for the price individuals are rumored
to be paid per post, is organized by the government to steer online discussion of sensitive topics.
56
A variety of different Internet fi ltering mechanisms have been implemented. One
such effort, the Green Dam Youth Escort project, was a far-reaching and ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to implement fi ltering at the level of the user ’ s computer. The
project originally called for all new computers sold in China to come preinstalled with
the Green Dam software to fi lter harmful online text and images to prevent them from
being viewed by children.
57 However, ONI and Stop Badware researchers conducted
an initial technical assessment of the software that found that Green Dam ’ s fi ltering
not only is ineffective at blocking pornographic content as a whole, but also includes
unpredictable and disruptive blocking of political and religious content normally
associated with the Great Firewall of China.
58 Following the fi ndings, the MIIT delayed
implementation and made installation of the software optional.
59 Despite the apparent
failure of this initiative, a similar fi ltering package called Blue Dam was mandated for
installation by all ISPs by September 2009.
60 This system included a graphic-fi ltering
system, administration-management system, and Internet-behavior manager aimed at
blocking content deemed inappropriate.
61
Blog service providers also face requirements to ensure that there is no inappropriate content on their sites. These providers must install fi lters that prevent postings
of thousands of keyword combinations, delete or conceal posts with sensitive comments, and cancel the accounts of bloggers deemed to have posted too many troublesome posts.
62 This discretion on the part of service providers has led to uneven
patterns of fi ltering. A study of Chinese blog service providers demonstrated that
there is substantial variation in censorship methods, the amount of content censored, and providers ’ transparency about deleting content.
63 Similar fi ndings were
reached in a Citizen Lab study of four popular search engines in China, which found
signifi cant variations in the level of transparency about fi ltering, actual content censored, and methods used, suggesting that there is no comprehensive system for
determining censored content.
64
China
The online community has broadened the capacity for collective action on a variety
of fronts. Notable among these are so-called “ human fl esh search engines, ” which are
massive online collective research projects. They have focused on conducting crowdsourced investigations into a variety of incidents, from fi nding missing relatives to
exposing corruption of government offi cials, although they have also strayed into
questionable acts of vigilantism.
54 Discussion forums and blogs also offer new opportunities for organization and dissemination of information. Charter 08, a prodemocracy manifesto whose signatories included 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo,
was circulated by e-mail and other means and had gathered 10,000 signatures by
2010.
55 However, these discussion forums are not the exclusive domain of those critical
of government. The “ Fifty Cent Party, ” named for the price individuals are rumored
to be paid per post, is organized by the government to steer online discussion of sensitive topics.
56
A variety of different Internet fi ltering mechanisms have been implemented. One
such effort, the Green Dam Youth Escort project, was a far-reaching and ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to implement fi ltering at the level of the user ’ s computer. The
project originally called for all new computers sold in China to come preinstalled with
the Green Dam software to fi lter harmful online text and images to prevent them from
being viewed by children.
57 However, ONI and Stop Badware researchers conducted
an initial technical assessment of the software that found that Green Dam ’ s fi ltering
not only is ineffective at blocking pornographic content as a whole, but also includes
unpredictable and disruptive blocking of political and religious content normally
associated with the Great Firewall of China.
58 Following the fi ndings, the MIIT delayed
implementation and made installation of the software optional.
59 Despite the apparent
failure of this initiative, a similar fi ltering package called Blue Dam was mandated for
installation by all ISPs by September 2009.
60 This system included a graphic-fi ltering
system, administration-management system, and Internet-behavior manager aimed at
blocking content deemed inappropriate.
61
Blog service providers also face requirements to ensure that there is no inappropriate content on their sites. These providers must install fi lters that prevent postings
of thousands of keyword combinations, delete or conceal posts with sensitive comments, and cancel the accounts of bloggers deemed to have posted too many troublesome posts.
62 This discretion on the part of service providers has led to uneven
patterns of fi ltering. A study of Chinese blog service providers demonstrated that
there is substantial variation in censorship methods, the amount of content censored, and providers ’ transparency about deleting content.
63 Similar fi ndings were
reached in a Citizen Lab study of four popular search engines in China, which found
signifi cant variations in the level of transparency about fi ltering, actual content censored, and methods used, suggesting that there is no comprehensive system for
determining censored content.
64