178
Milton L. Mueller
Internet governance institutions such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) and the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). The next section
describes various interactions and spillover effects, both intended and unintended,
between China ’ s attempt to maintain its Great Firewall and the globalized operations
that characterize the Internet, focusing in particular on the domain name system
(DNS) and routing, and cyber espionage. A concluding section places these issues in
a more general discussion of the tensions inherent in the Chinese “ socialist market
economy. ”
The Four Quadrants of Internet Politics and China ’ s Place in Them
In another work I have described the politics of Internet governance using a space
defi ned by two axes.
3 This conceptual scheme is predicated on recognizing that the
Internet does indeed create a novel form of politics around communication and information policy. The novelty comes from the Internet ’ s transnational scope, its massively increased scale of interaction, its distribution of control, its capacity to facilitate
new forms of collective action, and the emergence of new, nonstate-based governance
institutions native to the Internet.
The horizontal axis pertains to the status of the territorial nation-state in the governance of the Internet and communications technology generally. The vertical axis
identifi es the level of hierarchical control one is willing to countenance in the solution
of Internet governance problems. Together, these axes form a four-quadrant space,
which provides a useful schema for analyzing and classifying the various ideologies
and policy systems related to the Internet.
In fi gure 9.1 , the horizontal or nation-state axis locates one ’ s view of the appropriate polity. Those on the right side of this axis prefer the traditional territorial nationstate as the institutional basis for governing the Internet. At the rightmost extreme
stand those who would subordinate the Internet to national sovereignty completely —
in effect, negating global networking altogether in favor of a bounded, analog telephone-network-like regime. At the left extreme, Internet governance decisions would
be made by a globalized polity where national borders, national sovereignty, and
national identity play almost no role.
The vertical or networking-hierarchy axis juxtaposes free association (at the top)
with command and control (at the bottom). This refl ects the degree to which one
believes the problems associated with Internet governance should be solved using
coercive and hierarchical mechanisms or left to the looser forms of association and
disassociation among Internet users and suppliers. At the top of this axis, the shape
of Internet governance would be defi ned by looser forms of networked governance ; at
the bottom, governance emerges from adherence to rules enforced by an authority.
Of course, what makes Internet governance especially interesting is that there is no
Milton L. Mueller
Internet governance institutions such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) and the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). The next section
describes various interactions and spillover effects, both intended and unintended,
between China ’ s attempt to maintain its Great Firewall and the globalized operations
that characterize the Internet, focusing in particular on the domain name system
(DNS) and routing, and cyber espionage. A concluding section places these issues in
a more general discussion of the tensions inherent in the Chinese “ socialist market
economy. ”
The Four Quadrants of Internet Politics and China ’ s Place in Them
In another work I have described the politics of Internet governance using a space
defi ned by two axes.
3 This conceptual scheme is predicated on recognizing that the
Internet does indeed create a novel form of politics around communication and information policy. The novelty comes from the Internet ’ s transnational scope, its massively increased scale of interaction, its distribution of control, its capacity to facilitate
new forms of collective action, and the emergence of new, nonstate-based governance
institutions native to the Internet.
The horizontal axis pertains to the status of the territorial nation-state in the governance of the Internet and communications technology generally. The vertical axis
identifi es the level of hierarchical control one is willing to countenance in the solution
of Internet governance problems. Together, these axes form a four-quadrant space,
which provides a useful schema for analyzing and classifying the various ideologies
and policy systems related to the Internet.
In fi gure 9.1 , the horizontal or nation-state axis locates one ’ s view of the appropriate polity. Those on the right side of this axis prefer the traditional territorial nationstate as the institutional basis for governing the Internet. At the rightmost extreme
stand those who would subordinate the Internet to national sovereignty completely —
in effect, negating global networking altogether in favor of a bounded, analog telephone-network-like regime. At the left extreme, Internet governance decisions would
be made by a globalized polity where national borders, national sovereignty, and
national identity play almost no role.
The vertical or networking-hierarchy axis juxtaposes free association (at the top)
with command and control (at the bottom). This refl ects the degree to which one
believes the problems associated with Internet governance should be solved using
coercive and hierarchical mechanisms or left to the looser forms of association and
disassociation among Internet users and suppliers. At the top of this axis, the shape
of Internet governance would be defi ned by looser forms of networked governance ; at
the bottom, governance emerges from adherence to rules enforced by an authority.
Of course, what makes Internet governance especially interesting is that there is no