Internet Politics in Thailand after the 2006 Coup
109
related to l è se-majest é speech online and offl ine, there has also been growing evidence
of participatory forms of censorship — by service providers, content operators, and
users — against l è se-majest é . While this participatory censorship is partly a consequence of the climate of fear arising from the new computer law and strict enforcement of l è se-majest é law, the law is not an isolated cause. After all, as Lessig rightly
notes, norms constrain through the stigma that a community imposes, while law
constrains through the punishment it threatens. In the Thai scenario, both elements
apply.
Post-2006 Thailand is an interesting time and place to study Internet censorship
and control. In this unique context, an ideological struggle is being played out
between the old norm of preserving the sanctity of a revered institution that unites
the nation and the new norm of free speech that could disrupt national order. If
this ideological contest continues, we are likely to see more fi ltering, more cyber
surveillance, more cyber policing, and more “ rule of law ” being used to suppress and
undermine human rights and free speech online. In the meantime, civil society will
employ more tools and options to circumvent politically motivated censorship
through wider and higher circles of advocacy, to ultimately prove that freedom is
not a crime.
Notes
1. Reporters Without Borders, “ Is Thailand a New Enemy of the Internet? ” January 12, 2009,
http://en.rsf.org/thailand-is-thailand-a-new-enemy-of-the-12-01-2009,29945.
2. This was a result of the 1997 reform-oriented constitution that promoted transparency,
accountability of government, and people ’ s rights, liberties, and participation.
3. The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) was set up as part of
the bureaucratic reform introduced by Thaksin Shinawatra, then the new prime minister. From
its inception, the MICT ’ s main policy has been Internet regulation. This began with introducing
fi ltering through the unit called “ Cyber-inspector, ” aimed largely at pornographic content. Later
in 2003, the MICT passed regulatory measures to regulate online gaming in response to moral
panic in Thai society.
4. The “ red shirts ” is the informal name for the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship
(UDD), a major political organization in the post-coup period. Members of the UDD are known
for wearing red clothes during antigovernment protests. Established in 2006 as Democratic Alliance against Dictatorship (DAAD), the main objective of the red shirts then was to fi ght against
its arch rival — the People ’ s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) — and to support the ousted former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Supporters of the UDD are largely rural grassroots people
who benefi ted from Thaksin ’ s populist welfare policy, but also include the urban middle class
who admire Thaksin ’ s business-oriented administrative policy and action.
5. Duncan McCargo, “ Political Outlook: Thailand, ” Regional Outlook (2010 – 2011), 54 – 58.
109
related to l è se-majest é speech online and offl ine, there has also been growing evidence
of participatory forms of censorship — by service providers, content operators, and
users — against l è se-majest é . While this participatory censorship is partly a consequence of the climate of fear arising from the new computer law and strict enforcement of l è se-majest é law, the law is not an isolated cause. After all, as Lessig rightly
notes, norms constrain through the stigma that a community imposes, while law
constrains through the punishment it threatens. In the Thai scenario, both elements
apply.
Post-2006 Thailand is an interesting time and place to study Internet censorship
and control. In this unique context, an ideological struggle is being played out
between the old norm of preserving the sanctity of a revered institution that unites
the nation and the new norm of free speech that could disrupt national order. If
this ideological contest continues, we are likely to see more fi ltering, more cyber
surveillance, more cyber policing, and more “ rule of law ” being used to suppress and
undermine human rights and free speech online. In the meantime, civil society will
employ more tools and options to circumvent politically motivated censorship
through wider and higher circles of advocacy, to ultimately prove that freedom is
not a crime.
Notes
1. Reporters Without Borders, “ Is Thailand a New Enemy of the Internet? ” January 12, 2009,
http://en.rsf.org/thailand-is-thailand-a-new-enemy-of-the-12-01-2009,29945.
2. This was a result of the 1997 reform-oriented constitution that promoted transparency,
accountability of government, and people ’ s rights, liberties, and participation.
3. The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) was set up as part of
the bureaucratic reform introduced by Thaksin Shinawatra, then the new prime minister. From
its inception, the MICT ’ s main policy has been Internet regulation. This began with introducing
fi ltering through the unit called “ Cyber-inspector, ” aimed largely at pornographic content. Later
in 2003, the MICT passed regulatory measures to regulate online gaming in response to moral
panic in Thai society.
4. The “ red shirts ” is the informal name for the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship
(UDD), a major political organization in the post-coup period. Members of the UDD are known
for wearing red clothes during antigovernment protests. Established in 2006 as Democratic Alliance against Dictatorship (DAAD), the main objective of the red shirts then was to fi ght against
its arch rival — the People ’ s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) — and to support the ousted former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Supporters of the UDD are largely rural grassroots people
who benefi ted from Thaksin ’ s populist welfare policy, but also include the urban middle class
who admire Thaksin ’ s business-oriented administrative policy and action.
5. Duncan McCargo, “ Political Outlook: Thailand, ” Regional Outlook (2010 – 2011), 54 – 58.