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Pirongrong Ramasoota
In the post-2006-coup experience, the Computer-Related Offenses Act of 2007, a
product of the coup-installed legislature, appears to be a major driving force in shaping
the cyber experience in Thailand. A number of new regulatory practices have resulted,
including the following:
• Legalizing of blocking at network levels.
• Indirect regulation by intermediary providers, which gave rise to intermediary censorship by online service providers and self-censorship of online content providers.
• Creating an ID-enabled architecture that promotes traceability regulation.
• Incorporating censorship into the cyber community ’ s code of practice.
• Self-censorship by users in the online public sphere.
Other laws such as the Emergency Decree, the Internal Security Act of 2007, and
l è se-majest é laws also help intensify regulatory restraints with the elements of surveillance and punishment. Gradually, Internet operators — network, service, and content —
and Internet users in Thai society have learned to integrate these legal provisions into
their cyber behavior. While it is true that l è se-majest é law has been in existence since
1957, its actual enforcement or looming possibility of enforcement has never been as
evident as in the present period. I for one still remember the early days of the Internet
in the early 1990s in which Thai Net users exchanged opinions on the future of the
monarchy on Bulletin Board Service (BBS) using anonymous e-mails. The Internet was
free and unregulated because it was diffi cult to identify the user or poster of comments.
This is no longer true in Thai cyberspace, since everyone is now visible and traceable
through the new ID-enabled architecture.
Notably, the increased transparency of the Thai Internet is made possible by indirect
regulation from the new law. As users are forced to give self-authenticating facts to
service providers in order to gain access to the Net, they have contributed directly to
the regulation of their own behavior in cyberspace. The new law has changed the
regulation of architecture through design constraints that condition netizens ’ access
to cyberspace.
Meanwhile, automatic URL fi ltering, which involves more subtle fi ltering design
than IP blocking, has also led to a greater technical capability to deny access to information resources while reducing the possibility of blockers being discovered. Though
not directly related to the new law, this new technological design has indeed made
fi ltering more malleable and more effective.
The law and the architecture aside, social norms also have a powerful role to play
in the Thai politics of Internet fi ltering. The respect and reverence for the monarchy,
particularly for the current king who has reigned for more than 62 years, is a deeprooted norm in Thai society. Whether l è se-majest é is legitimate or not may be a moot
point. What is clear is that this enigmatic norm carries with it high sensitivity in
cyberspace as well as in the “ real ” world. Alongside the increase in prosecution cases
Pirongrong Ramasoota
In the post-2006-coup experience, the Computer-Related Offenses Act of 2007, a
product of the coup-installed legislature, appears to be a major driving force in shaping
the cyber experience in Thailand. A number of new regulatory practices have resulted,
including the following:
• Legalizing of blocking at network levels.
• Indirect regulation by intermediary providers, which gave rise to intermediary censorship by online service providers and self-censorship of online content providers.
• Creating an ID-enabled architecture that promotes traceability regulation.
• Incorporating censorship into the cyber community ’ s code of practice.
• Self-censorship by users in the online public sphere.
Other laws such as the Emergency Decree, the Internal Security Act of 2007, and
l è se-majest é laws also help intensify regulatory restraints with the elements of surveillance and punishment. Gradually, Internet operators — network, service, and content —
and Internet users in Thai society have learned to integrate these legal provisions into
their cyber behavior. While it is true that l è se-majest é law has been in existence since
1957, its actual enforcement or looming possibility of enforcement has never been as
evident as in the present period. I for one still remember the early days of the Internet
in the early 1990s in which Thai Net users exchanged opinions on the future of the
monarchy on Bulletin Board Service (BBS) using anonymous e-mails. The Internet was
free and unregulated because it was diffi cult to identify the user or poster of comments.
This is no longer true in Thai cyberspace, since everyone is now visible and traceable
through the new ID-enabled architecture.
Notably, the increased transparency of the Thai Internet is made possible by indirect
regulation from the new law. As users are forced to give self-authenticating facts to
service providers in order to gain access to the Net, they have contributed directly to
the regulation of their own behavior in cyberspace. The new law has changed the
regulation of architecture through design constraints that condition netizens ’ access
to cyberspace.
Meanwhile, automatic URL fi ltering, which involves more subtle fi ltering design
than IP blocking, has also led to a greater technical capability to deny access to information resources while reducing the possibility of blockers being discovered. Though
not directly related to the new law, this new technological design has indeed made
fi ltering more malleable and more effective.
The law and the architecture aside, social norms also have a powerful role to play
in the Thai politics of Internet fi ltering. The respect and reverence for the monarchy,
particularly for the current king who has reigned for more than 62 years, is a deeprooted norm in Thai society. Whether l è se-majest é is legitimate or not may be a moot
point. What is clear is that this enigmatic norm carries with it high sensitivity in
cyberspace as well as in the “ real ” world. Alongside the increase in prosecution cases