16 Informational environments
objects which move in a certain way, and which are also of a certain size, will
indiscriminately be treated as food. And the frog’s anti-predator strategies seem
to be exhausted by quickly moving away from illuminated areas. If a behaviourist
psychologist had to dream up an organism to fit his theory, where pure stimulusresponse mechanisms reign supreme and qualitative mental states either do not
count or are denied to exist to begin with, this would be it – at least on Lettvin
et al.’s account. However, the frog’s apparently rather modest accomplishments
have done nothing to diminish the lifespan, in evolutionary terms, of the frog as
a species, although they might have contributed to many an individual frog’s life
being cut short by a more clever animal that professes in preying on frogs.
The general idea to be promoted by this example is that, on the one hand,
human environments are certainly more complex than frog environments, despite
being governed by the same laws of physics, and despite human beings and frogs
inhabiting much of the same segments of space-time. On the other hand, one general condition applies to frogs and human beings alike. This condition is neatly
captured by Dretske:
There is no difference [. . .] between what happens to an electron in a magnetic field and what an electron does in a magnetic field. There definitely is
a difference between what happens to an animal placed in water and what it
does when placed in water.
(Dretske 1988, 11, emphasis in original)
Different things will happen to different animals when placed in water. Some may
drown, whereas others will depend on that very placement for survival, whereas
frogs will be indifferent, under many circumstances, to being placed on land vs.
in water. Quite obviously, water will be a different thing in many ways to different
animals. However, although different animals will do different things when placed
in water, the general kind of exchange is common to all animals (and perhaps in
some respects to plants, too). That exchange is behavioural and informational
in kind, with these two aspects being closely intertwined. In conjunction, these
aspects set an organism’s exchange with his environment apart from the exchange
between, say, a pebble or a spoonful of salt and the water in which they are placed.
As to the behavioural aspect of the exchange between organism and environment, it is obvious, on the one hand, that identical physical conditions, such as
heat or pressure, will have the same determinate effects on all organic matter as
such, just as magnetic fields will have the same determinate effect on electrons.
For example all organic matter of the kind that can be found in organisms will be
subject to processes of pyrolysis or combustion at elevated temperatures; blood
and other body liquids will invariably start to boil at body temperature when
exposed to an atmospheric pressure of 6.3kPa; no organic matter will ignite when
placed in water. On the other hand, however, changes in physical variables in
different organisms’ surroundings, unless they affect the composition and integrity of organic matter as such, may trigger or structure behaviours by means of
which various organisms react to these changes. Such changes in the environment
objects which move in a certain way, and which are also of a certain size, will
indiscriminately be treated as food. And the frog’s anti-predator strategies seem
to be exhausted by quickly moving away from illuminated areas. If a behaviourist
psychologist had to dream up an organism to fit his theory, where pure stimulusresponse mechanisms reign supreme and qualitative mental states either do not
count or are denied to exist to begin with, this would be it – at least on Lettvin
et al.’s account. However, the frog’s apparently rather modest accomplishments
have done nothing to diminish the lifespan, in evolutionary terms, of the frog as
a species, although they might have contributed to many an individual frog’s life
being cut short by a more clever animal that professes in preying on frogs.
The general idea to be promoted by this example is that, on the one hand,
human environments are certainly more complex than frog environments, despite
being governed by the same laws of physics, and despite human beings and frogs
inhabiting much of the same segments of space-time. On the other hand, one general condition applies to frogs and human beings alike. This condition is neatly
captured by Dretske:
There is no difference [. . .] between what happens to an electron in a magnetic field and what an electron does in a magnetic field. There definitely is
a difference between what happens to an animal placed in water and what it
does when placed in water.
(Dretske 1988, 11, emphasis in original)
Different things will happen to different animals when placed in water. Some may
drown, whereas others will depend on that very placement for survival, whereas
frogs will be indifferent, under many circumstances, to being placed on land vs.
in water. Quite obviously, water will be a different thing in many ways to different
animals. However, although different animals will do different things when placed
in water, the general kind of exchange is common to all animals (and perhaps in
some respects to plants, too). That exchange is behavioural and informational
in kind, with these two aspects being closely intertwined. In conjunction, these
aspects set an organism’s exchange with his environment apart from the exchange
between, say, a pebble or a spoonful of salt and the water in which they are placed.
As to the behavioural aspect of the exchange between organism and environment, it is obvious, on the one hand, that identical physical conditions, such as
heat or pressure, will have the same determinate effects on all organic matter as
such, just as magnetic fields will have the same determinate effect on electrons.
For example all organic matter of the kind that can be found in organisms will be
subject to processes of pyrolysis or combustion at elevated temperatures; blood
and other body liquids will invariably start to boil at body temperature when
exposed to an atmospheric pressure of 6.3kPa; no organic matter will ignite when
placed in water. On the other hand, however, changes in physical variables in
different organisms’ surroundings, unless they affect the composition and integrity of organic matter as such, may trigger or structure behaviours by means of
which various organisms react to these changes. Such changes in the environment