When choosing the title for this chapter, I considered adding some qualifiers to
it, such as resurrecting Dretskean information “in part” or “(somewhat)”. I ultimately chose to stick with something more clear and crisp though. One of the
purposes of this chapter is to demonstrate that there are some insights to Fred
Dretske’s theory of meaning in his Knowledge and the Flow of Information that
are worth defending, and that they have to do with his concept of information.
Another purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the distinction between the concept
of information defended here and the one established in the mathematical theory
of communication (Shannon and Weaver 1949), and to highlight the importance of
this distinction to what follows.
This chapter will begin with a brief outline of the notion of information and
its role in an organism’s behaviour on a general, introductory level. I will then
dig more deeply into the issue of natural information, trying to recover the main
insights of Dretske’s account of natural information and discussing some of its
difficulties. The chapter will conclude with a consideration of some implications
of this view with respect to the phenomenon of intentionality.
Information, behaviour and probability
The frog does not seem to see or, at any rate, is not concerned with the detail of
stationary parts of the world around him. He will starve to death surrounded by
food if it is not moving. His choice of food is determined only by size and movement. He will leap to capture any object the size of an insect or worm, providing it
moves like one. He can be fooled easily not only by a bit of dangled meat but by
any moving small object. His sex life is conducted by sound and touch. His choice
of paths in escaping enemies does not seem to be governed by anything more devious than leaping to where it is darker. Since he is equally at home in water and on
land, why should it matter where he lights after jumping or what particular direction he takes? He does remember a moving thing providing it stays within his field
of vision and he is not distracted.
(Lettvin et al. 1968, 234)
According to these observations, the frog lives in a fairly simple environment.
To the frog, objects that do not move are just like objects that do not exist. Those
2 Resurrecting Dretskean
information
it, such as resurrecting Dretskean information “in part” or “(somewhat)”. I ultimately chose to stick with something more clear and crisp though. One of the
purposes of this chapter is to demonstrate that there are some insights to Fred
Dretske’s theory of meaning in his Knowledge and the Flow of Information that
are worth defending, and that they have to do with his concept of information.
Another purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the distinction between the concept
of information defended here and the one established in the mathematical theory
of communication (Shannon and Weaver 1949), and to highlight the importance of
this distinction to what follows.
This chapter will begin with a brief outline of the notion of information and
its role in an organism’s behaviour on a general, introductory level. I will then
dig more deeply into the issue of natural information, trying to recover the main
insights of Dretske’s account of natural information and discussing some of its
difficulties. The chapter will conclude with a consideration of some implications
of this view with respect to the phenomenon of intentionality.
Information, behaviour and probability
The frog does not seem to see or, at any rate, is not concerned with the detail of
stationary parts of the world around him. He will starve to death surrounded by
food if it is not moving. His choice of food is determined only by size and movement. He will leap to capture any object the size of an insect or worm, providing it
moves like one. He can be fooled easily not only by a bit of dangled meat but by
any moving small object. His sex life is conducted by sound and touch. His choice
of paths in escaping enemies does not seem to be governed by anything more devious than leaping to where it is darker. Since he is equally at home in water and on
land, why should it matter where he lights after jumping or what particular direction he takes? He does remember a moving thing providing it stays within his field
of vision and he is not distracted.
(Lettvin et al. 1968, 234)
According to these observations, the frog lives in a fairly simple environment.
To the frog, objects that do not move are just like objects that do not exist. Those
2 Resurrecting Dretskean
information