The term “cognitive artefacts” was introduced by Andy Clark (1998) – although
it does not appear in Clark and Chalmers (1998). Kim Sterelny uses the roughly
synonymous term of “epistemic artefacts” (2003; 2004) which, in turn, is taken
up by Clark in (2010b). These terms are obviously supposed to be more accurate
in definition than the notion of information technologies, which is both less welldefined and typically more narrowly applied to computing artefacts. The term
“cognitive artefacts” is supposed to refer to that class of artefacts which, by whatever means, serve to support, augment or substitute the cognitive functions of
their users, in an analogous way to tools and machines that support, augment or
substitute human activities on a straightforwardly physical level. According to
this analogy, information would be to cognitive artefacts what directed motion is
to conventional machines (see the discussion in Chapter 1).
Although such an intuitive definition is not off the mark, it will raise questions
concerning, first, what the nature of the information involved is, second, what
cognitive functions are supposed to be thus served and, third, how, and hence
by what kinds of artefacts, they are supposed to be thus served. I have dedicated
much space to addressing the first two questions. In a nutshell, the answers are
that the information involved is paradigmatically natural information, and that
the cognitive functions involved are, at root, those of embodied perception and
orientation in an environment, which are reliant on the active uptake of natural
information. I will now direct my attention towards the nature of cognitive artefacts and the ways in which they provide information of the said kind and thereby
serve cognitive functions of the said kind.
I will argue that there are two fundamental ways in which cognitive artefacts
may convey information about a given subject matter: the information they
provide is either convergent with, or isomorphic to, natural information that a
perceiving subject could collect in his or her environment. This distinction, introduced towards the end of this chapter, will help to generate a more differentiated
picture of the nature of cognitive artefacts than the conventional reality/virtuality
distinction. It will be particularly relevant with respect to artefacts that integrate
simulated elements into the perception of an environment, as in “mixed” or “augmented” realities. These examples and their implications will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 9. I will prepare this line of argumentation by first considering
8 The nature of cognitive
artefacts
it does not appear in Clark and Chalmers (1998). Kim Sterelny uses the roughly
synonymous term of “epistemic artefacts” (2003; 2004) which, in turn, is taken
up by Clark in (2010b). These terms are obviously supposed to be more accurate
in definition than the notion of information technologies, which is both less welldefined and typically more narrowly applied to computing artefacts. The term
“cognitive artefacts” is supposed to refer to that class of artefacts which, by whatever means, serve to support, augment or substitute the cognitive functions of
their users, in an analogous way to tools and machines that support, augment or
substitute human activities on a straightforwardly physical level. According to
this analogy, information would be to cognitive artefacts what directed motion is
to conventional machines (see the discussion in Chapter 1).
Although such an intuitive definition is not off the mark, it will raise questions
concerning, first, what the nature of the information involved is, second, what
cognitive functions are supposed to be thus served and, third, how, and hence
by what kinds of artefacts, they are supposed to be thus served. I have dedicated
much space to addressing the first two questions. In a nutshell, the answers are
that the information involved is paradigmatically natural information, and that
the cognitive functions involved are, at root, those of embodied perception and
orientation in an environment, which are reliant on the active uptake of natural
information. I will now direct my attention towards the nature of cognitive artefacts and the ways in which they provide information of the said kind and thereby
serve cognitive functions of the said kind.
I will argue that there are two fundamental ways in which cognitive artefacts
may convey information about a given subject matter: the information they
provide is either convergent with, or isomorphic to, natural information that a
perceiving subject could collect in his or her environment. This distinction, introduced towards the end of this chapter, will help to generate a more differentiated
picture of the nature of cognitive artefacts than the conventional reality/virtuality
distinction. It will be particularly relevant with respect to artefacts that integrate
simulated elements into the perception of an environment, as in “mixed” or “augmented” realities. These examples and their implications will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 9. I will prepare this line of argumentation by first considering
8 The nature of cognitive
artefacts